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ABSTRACT 
 
The Cur Deus Homo (CDH) of Anselm of Canterbury is one of the most well-
known and yet controversial works in the Anselmian corpus.  Anselm’s audacious effort 
to prove the necessity of the Incarnation has been met with varying levels of skepticism 
and critique in the intervening centuries.  Critics of Anselm have taken aim particularly at 
the language that Anselm used in the CDH, commonly asserting that the key terms of the 
argument were derived primarily from the feudal society that surrounded Anselm as he 
wrote.  The contention is then usually made that Anselm’s usage of such terminology 
betrays a mindset so entangled in feudalism as to render the whole work ineffective as a 
work of Christian theology.  Only in recent years have serious efforts been made to 
examine the theological roots of Anselm’s thought process in the CDH.  In this work, I 
examine the language that has been so maligned in recent years and I build on recent 
trends in Anselm scholarship to argue that his language is not so much feudal as it is 
scriptural and patristic.  By analyzing Anselm’s use of “honor,” “justice,” “debt” and 
“satisfaction,” I argue that Anselm was more concerned with maintaining consistency 
with his own work and with scriptural and patristic sources than with the feudal or 
juridical nature of his social context.  I conclude by highlighting the ways in which 
Anselm accomplished his stated purpose in the CDH and provided a unique perspective 
on the Incarnation and Atonement that stands on its own as a turning point in the history 
of Christian theology.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and History of Interpretation 
 
Anselm of Canterbury’s Cur Deus Homo (CDH) has been recognized for 
centuries as one of the hallmark works of the medieval theology of the Incarnation and 
Atonement.  However, in some cases, that recognition has taken the form of infamy 
instead of renown due to the interpretation of the medieval context in which Anselm 
wrote.  Scholars of various stripes have taken turns at running the CDH through a gamut 
of critiques: from merely pointing out weaknesses to dismissal as un-scriptural and fatally 
flawed, the CDH has weathered a wide-ranging storm of criticism, particularly over the 
course of the last 200 years.1  Much of this recent criticism has focused on Anselm’s 
approach to the topics of Incarnation and Atonement.  Scholars have found fault with 
Anselm’s characterization of the roles of God, humanity and the God-man in his scheme.  
Although there is a wide variety of specific criticisms aimed at Anselm, many of his 
critics have come to a similar conclusion: the fault lies with an improper injection of 
principles and terminology taken from the feudal society in which Anselm lived.  In this 
dissertation, I attempt to re-cast Anselm’s work in the CDH as a genuine effort at making 
the Incarnation and Atonement accessible to non-Christians while remaining faithful to 
(and predominantly influenced by) scripture and the works of the fathers of the church.  
 
1 I focus here on recent criticism because it represents a unique perspective on Anselm’s work in the history 
of interpretation.  The explicit critique of Anselm as a “feudal” writer did not appear until the 19th century.  
I have not found evidence of or references to such lines of criticism before this time period.   
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The thrust of this study will focus on the language that Anselm used – terminology of 
honor, justice, debt and satisfaction – that critics have interpreted as vestiges of the feudal 
context, but that I prefer to interpret as making connections between Anselm and his 
theological (as opposed to social or cultural) influences.  The criticism to which I respond 
is only one portion of the history of reception of the CDH, though.  In this first chapter, I 
will lay out the most relevant portions of Anselm’s argument and examine the ways that 
scholars – from his immediate followers to 21st century readers – have evaluated the 
work.   
Purpose and Argument of the CDH 
Anselm’s methodological starting point in the CDH sets the tone for the most 
brilliant and controversial portions of the work that follow.2  He begins by taking a 
defensive tact, responding to purported challenges to the logicality of the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation and Atonement.  Boso, as Anselm’s dialogue partner, 
presented the challenge: “obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles quia 
deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam…”3  In the eyes of unbelievers, Christians make the 
elementary mistake of believing that God could be lowered to the point of experiencing 
human life and all of the ill effects that come with it “in uterum mulieris descendisse, 
natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis humanis nutritum crevisse, et – ut multa alia 
taceam quae deo non videntur convenire – lassitudinem, famem, sitim, verbera et inter 
 
2 As will be noted at points later and more fully in the conclusion, it is my opinion that Anselm’s method 
should not be controversial and, in fact, the points at which Anselm deviates from his stated method are 
those that are among the weakest in his argument.   
3 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1938)., CDH lib. I, cap. 3 (II, 50).   
 3 Ch. 1 
                                                
latrones crucem mortemque sustinuisse.”4  While these criticisms of unbelievers focused 
on the mundane effects of human existence, Anselm responded by focusing on the higher 
level issues that perhaps outweighed (for him, at least) the concerns of unbelievers and 
would tip the balance of the issue in the other direction.  Anselm chose higher level 
concerns that would have been comprehensible and agreeable to unbelievers, so long as 
they shared the basic understanding of the nature and qualities of the Judeo-Christian 
God.5  He immediately appeals to the mercy, love and goodness of God in his initial 
reply:  
Nos non facimus deo iniuriam ullam aut contumeliam, sed toto corde 
gratias laudamus et praedicamus ineffabilem altitudinem misericordiae 
illius, quia quanto nos mirabilius et praeter opinionem de tantis et tam 
debitis malis in quibus eramus, ad tanta et tam indebita bona quae 
perdideramus, restituit, tanto maiorem dilectionem erga nos et pietatem 
monstravit.  Si enim diligenter considerarent quam convenienter hoc modo 
procurata sit humana restauratio, non deriderent nostram simplicitatem, 
sed dei nobiscum laudarent sapientem benignitatem.6 
 
For Anselm, the Christian story of the Incarnation and Atonement avoided injury and 
insult to the mercy, love and goodness of God (that would have been the case without any 
response to sin) by the coming of the God-man (and still preserved the perfection of the 
divine nature in the process).   
The concern for what was appropriate for God guided Anselm in his argument.  
This is clear from the structure of the CDH:7  
Book I 
 God and Creation (chapters 1-10) 
 
4 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 3 (II, 50).   
5 This seems to be a safe assumption since the unbelievers objected to aspects of humanity that would have 
violated divine simplicity, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc.   
6 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 3 (II, 50-51).   
7 There are many ways of portraying the structure of the CDH.  I have chosen a simple structure in an 
attempt to highlight Anselm’s clarity of thought.   
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 Sin (chapters 11-19) 
 Appropriate Response to Sin (chapters 20-25) 
Book II 
 Nature of the God-man (chapters 1-9) 
 Death of the God-man (chapters 10-15) 
 Reconciliation between God and Humanity (chapters 16-22) 
 
Facing critics who found impropriety in a physical manifestation of God in the world, 
Anselm began with the first interaction between God and the physical world: creation.  
He argued that the Incarnation was inextricably connected to the creation (and subsequent 
effects of sin) of the world, specifically human beings: “Nonne satis necessaria ratio 
videtur, cur deus ea quae dicimus facere debuerit: quia genus humanum, tam scilicet 
pretiosum opus eius, omnino perierat, nec decebat ut, quod deus de homine proposuerat, 
penitus annihilaretur, nec idem eius propositum ad effectum duci poterat, nisi genus 
hominum ab ipso creatore suo liberaretur?”8  Sin is a clear roadblock to the divine 
propositum and Anselm first explored the traditional explanations of the rescue of 
humanity (including, notably, his rejection of the idea that God paid a ransom to retrieve 
humanity from the control of the devil) before providing his own explanation of the 
problem and the solution.   
Anselm undertakes the discussion of sin and the response to sin in terms of the 
relationship between God and humanity (as part of God’s creation).  The first major point 
of Anselm’s argument is found in his definition of sin in book I, chapter 11: “Omnis 
voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati dei… Non est itaque aliud 
peccare quam non reddere deo debitum. …[I]ustitia sive rectitudo voluntatis... est solus 
et totus honor, quem debemus deo et a nobis exigit deus. … Hunc honorem debitum qui 
 
8 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 4 (II, 52).   
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deo non reddit, aufert deo quod suum est, et deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare.”9    Sin 
is cast as a rupture in the relationship between God and humanity because of the failure to 
render honor that was owed by humanity to God.  The order of the Creator-creation 
relationship must be maintained/restored and this is done via what Anselm refers to as 
“satisfaction:” “Sic ergo debet omnis qui peccat, honorem deo quem rapuit solvere; et 
haec est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator deo debet facere.”10  This is the solution to the 
problem of sin and Anselm takes the following chapters to reject alternative solutions and 
to explain in detail the ways in which sin disrupts the order and purpose of creation.   
The portion of the argument that sets Anselm apart from so many other 
theologians is the way that he unpacks what is involved in the satisfaction that solves the 
problem of sin.  He argues first that the disruptive effect of sin is so great that it 
simultaneously constitutes an infinitely great act of dishonor to God and renders 
humanity incapable of correcting the situation: “Nullatenus ergo debet aut potest 
accipere homo a deo quod deus illi dare proposuit, si non reddit deo totum quod illi 
abstulit; ut sicut per illum deus perdidit, ita per illum recuperet. … Sed hoc facere 
nullatenus potest peccator homo, quia peccator peccatorem iustificare nequit.”11  The 
solution to the inability of human beings to solve the problem of sin must involve some 
being outside the ranks of humanity and Anselm explains in book II how the God-man is 
the most appropriate, indeed only, solution.  Anselm begins his explanation by returning 
to the creation narrative and the point that God created human beings with a purpose: 
“Rationalem naturam a deo factam esse iustam, ut illo fruendo beata esset, dubitari non 
 
9 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).  This is a compilation of passages that have been condensed in the 
interest of clarity.   
10 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68-69).   
11 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 23 (II, 91).   
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debet.”12  Since the restoration of humanity is part of the same trajectory of divine 
activity as the creation of humanity, Anselm argues that it is fitting that it is God who 
joins with humanity to solve the problem of sin and not any other being.  Not only does 
the principle of fittingness point toward a God-man, but he argues that necessity dictates 
that no one other than God can save humanity.  This is due to the fact that no other being 
can offer anything great enough to make up for the great divine honor that was lost: “Hoc 
autem fieri nequit, nisi sit qui solvat deo pro peccato hominis aliquid maius quam omne 
praeter deum est. … Illum quoque qui de suo poterit deo dare aliquid, quod superet omne 
quod sub deo est, maiorem esse necesse est quam omne quod non est deus. … Nihil autem 
est supra omne quod deus non est, nisi deus.”13  Since the culpability of humanity was 
established in book I and the necessity of divinity followed soon after, Anselm finds 
himself in a place wherein the only logical solution to sin is a combination of humanity 
and divinity in the God-man: “Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est ut de hominibus 
perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam 
nec potest facere nisi deus nec debet nisi homo: necesse est ut eam faciat deus-homo.”14  
The remainder of the work deals with the details of how the God-man provides for the 
salvation of humanity, but the logic of his argument is complete at this point.  The mercy, 
love and goodness of God that were integral in the creation of humanity naturally 
provided for the redemption of humanity via the God-man: “Misericordiam vero dei quae 
tibi perire videbatur, cum iustitiam dei et peccatum homonis considerabamus, tam 
magnam tamque concordem iustitiae invenimus, ut nec maior nec iustior cogitari 
 
12 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 1 (II, 97).   
13 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 6 (II, 101).   
14 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 6 (II, 101).   
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possit.”15  Thus, Anselm declares that the integrity of the perfection of God, which critics 
worried were compromised by the Incarnation and Atonement, actually dictated the God-
man as a solution to the problem of sin, down to some of the smallest details.  Anselm 
clearly considered his work to be an elegant solution that fit perfectly with scripture: “per 
unius quaestionis quam proposuimus solutionem, quidquid in novo veterique testamento 
continetur, probatum intelligo.”16   
Early Responses to the CDH 
The first historically extant reactions to Anselm’s CDH did not arise immediately 
following its composition and there was certainly not the kind of back-and-forth 
engagement of the issue in the way that Anselm and Gaunilo debated the ontological 
argument made in the Proslogion.  This is most likely due to the fact that Anselm wrote it 
beginning in 1094 while he was Archbishop of Canterbury and toward the end of his 
life.17  Michael Robson has tracked the way in which it was circulated through various 
monastic and cathedral schools up to the point that it was clearly influential on the 
theological development of prominent early Franciscans, such as Alexander of Hales, and 
also the Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste.18  Robson argues that the CDH entered 
the realm of Franciscan scholarship around the same time as the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard, since Anselm is absent from the Sentences but is included in commentaries on 
the Sentences from the time of Alexander and his Franciscan students, in conversation 
 
15 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 20 (II, 131).   
16 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 22 (II, 133).   
17 R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990)., 202.  See the entire chapter nine for a full discussion of the CDH and this topic.   
18 Michael Robson, "The Impact of the Cur Deus Homo on the Early Franciscan School," in Anselm, Aosta, 
Bec and Canterbury : Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-Hundredth Anniversary of Anselm's 
Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093, ed. D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1996)., see particularly 336-338.   
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with and in place of the citations from Augustine’s De trinitate that make up the bulk of 
Lombard’s work on the redemption.19  J. Patout Burns has traced how the Franciscans 
and other scholastic theologians (Abelard, the Victorines, Thomas Aquinas, etc.) both 
expanded upon and departed from Anselm’s work in the CDH (specifically on the topic 
of satisfaction).20  In this time period, Anselm was considered to be an authority whose 
work marked a development from the work of Augustine, although he did not carry the 
same level of authority as Augustine.21  In the following section, I examine the ways in 
which two of the most prominent theologians following Anselm (Thomas Aquinas and 
Bonaventure of Bagnoregio) were influenced by the CDH.   
Thomas Aquinas 
 There are two points in the Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (ST) that seem 
to show evidence that Aquinas had the CDH in mind when he articulated his 
Christological theses.  One of the hallmarks of Anselm’s work in the CDH is his 
discussion of the necessity of the Incarnation.  At the beginning of the third part of the 
ST, Aquinas considers whether “fuerit necessarium ad reparationem humani generis 
verbum Dei incarnari.”22  Here he seems to have Anselm’s emphatic assertion of the 
necessity of the Incarnation in mind.  In his answer to whether the incarnation was 
necessary for human salvation, Aquinas makes a distinction between types of necessity:  
Respondeo dicendum quod ad finem aliquem dicitur aliquid esse 
necessarium dupliciter, uno modo, sine quo aliquid esse non potest, sicut 
cibus est necessarius ad conservationem humanae vitae; alio modo, per 
 
19 Ibid., 343.   
20 J. Patout Burns, "Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory," Theological Studies 36, no. 2 
(1975). 
21 See, for example the ways in which Bonaventure and Aquinas engaged the views of Anselm without 
explicitly citing him in the Breviloquium and Summa Theologiae, respectively.    
22 Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae," Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org., ST IIIª q. 1 a. 2.   
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quod melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem, sicut equus necessarius 
est ad iter. Primo modo Deum incarnari non fuit necessarium ad 
reparationem humanae naturae, Deus enim per suam omnipotentem 
virtutem poterat humanam naturam multis aliis modis reparare. Secundo 
autem modo necessarium fuit Deum incarnari ad humanae naturae 
reparationem.23 
 
Whereas Anselm takes pains to carve out the exact way in which he views the 
Incarnation as necessary, Aquinas seems to recognize the importance of the issue, but 
does not go as far as Anselm does in saying that the way the Incarnation happened was 
the only possible (and thus necessary) way.  Rather, he pointedly goes in the opposite 
direction.   
For Aquinas, Anselm’s position seems to be one that he has read, absorbed and 
then molded to fit his own views.  Another of Anselm’s key points from the CDH that 
Aquinas has apparently internalized is the argument that human sin has an infinite 
magnitude that needs to be counteracted.  Anselm and Boso discuss in book I, chapter 21 
“how heavy the weight of sin is” and conclude that any sin, even a mere glance contrary 
to the will of God, carries with it stakes as high as “an infinite multiplicity of universes.”  
Anselm uses this point to re-affirm that only God is capable of paying the debt of sin 
owed by humanity since the debt is so great that no human being is able to pay it.  
Anselm also makes the point that humans already owe an entire life of obedience to God 
and have no ability to “give” anything over and above just that.  In the same discussion of 
the necessity of the Incarnation, Aquinas considers the objection that God should simply 
be willing to accept whatever goodness is within human capacity.  Aquinas, focusing on 
God’s honor, replies with an Anselmian answer: “Tum etiam quia peccatum contra Deum 
commissum quandam infinitatem habet ex infinitate divinae maiestatis, tanto enim 
 
23 Ibid., IIIª q. 1 a. 2 co. 
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offensa est gravior, quanto maior est ille in quem delinquitur.”24  This key point from 
Anselm’s CDH becomes a given in Aquinas’ context.  So, Aquinas seems to have 
“received” Anselm’s CDH in a critical and thoughtful way.  Using these passages as 
examples, one can see that he shows his agreement and disagreement with Anselm 
through inclusion, revision and critique.   
Bonaventure of Bagnoregio 
As a key figure in Scholasticism, Aquinas’ Paris colleague Bonaventure clearly 
paid great attention to the writings of Anselm, following in the steps of Alexander of 
Hales and his early Franciscan followers.  Jacques-Guy Bougerol has pointed out that 
Bonaventure quotes from the works of Anselm on 249 occasions in his own writings.25  
Even though Bougerol contends that “the point on which Anselm’s influence upon 
Bonaventure seems to have been capital was the concept of God,”26 the most citations 
from the Anselmian corpus are taken from Anselm’s De conceptu virginali (46 citations) 
and Cur Deus Homo (45 citations).  While Bonaventure certainly made ample use of 
Anselm’s definition of God as “that than which a greater cannot be thought,” his interest 
in Anselm’s explication of the Incarnation is clear.   
 In Part Four of the Breviloquium, Bonaventure discusses the Incarnation as the 
center point of his systematic theology and in this discussion reveals instances of reliance 
on the work of Anselm in the CDH.  His arguments for why it must be God united with 
man (rather than any other type of being) are strikingly Anselmian: “Excellentiam 
namque recuperare non poterat, nisi reparator esset Deus; quia, si mera creatura, tunc 
 
24 Ibid., IIIª q. 1 a. 2 ad 2.   
25 Jacques Guy Bougerol, Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, 1st American ed. (Paterson, N.J.: St. 
Anthony Guild Press, 1964). 35.   
26 Ibid. 35.   
 11 Ch. 1 
                                                
homo esset illi merae creaturae subiectus, et sic non recuperaret statum excellentiae.”27  
Bonaventure takes this a step further when he contends that man could not have 
recovered the purity of original creation without the involvement of mankind in the 
Atonement process:  
Innocentiam vero mentis recuperare non poterat, nisi dimissa culpa; quam 
dimittere non decebat divinam iustitiam nisi per satisfactionem 
condignam; et quia satisfacere non poterat nisi Deus pro toto humano 
genere, nec debebat nisi homo, qui peccaverat: ideo congruentissimum 
fuit, humanum genus reparari per Deum-hominem natum de genere 
Adae.28 
 
This hearkens back not only to Anselm’s contention that the debt of sin is of such great 
magnitude that only God is capable of paying it , but also to the conclusion drawn from 
it: “no one can pay except God, and no one ought to pay except man: it is necessary that a 
God-man should pay it” (CDH II, 6).   
In addition to following Anselm’s line of reasoning, Bonaventure shows his 
familiarity with even the smaller points of Anselm’s argument by drawing from the CDH 
almost word for word in places.  In his discussion of the details of the Incarnation, 
Bonaventure argues that the Virgin conception came about because it completed the set 
of logical possibilities for the generation of human beings:  
…cum ex quatuor modis tres modi producendi hominem praecessissent: 
primus nec de viro nec muliere, sicut in Adam; secundus de viro sine 
muliere, sicut in Eva; tertius de muliere et viro, sicut in omnibus 
concupiscibiliter natis: decuit, ad complementum universi quartum 
modum introduce, qui scilicet esset de muliere sine semine virili per 
virtutem summi operatoris.29   
 
 
27 Bonaventure, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, 10 vols., vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Colegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1891)., B pars IV, cap. 1 (V, 241).   
28 Ibid. , B pars IV, cap. 1 (V, 242).   
29 Ibid. , B pars IV, cap. 3 (V, 244).   
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This section is taken directly from the Cur Deus Homo in which Anselm writes the 
following: 
Quatuor modis potest deus hominem facere.  Videlicet aut de viro et 
femina, sicut assiduus monstrat usus; aut nec de viro nec de femina, sicut 
creavit ADAM; aut de viro sine femina, sicut fecit EVAM; aut de femina 
sine viro, quod nondum fecit.  Ut igitur hunc quoque modum probet suae 
subiacere potestati et ad hoc ipsum opus dilatum esse, nil convenientius, 
quam ut de femina sine viro assumat illum hominem quem quaerimus.  
Utrum autem de virgine aut de non-virgine dignius hoc fiat, non est opus 
disputare, sed sine omni dubitatione asserendum est quia de virgine deum-
hominem nasci oportet.30 
This makes it quite obvious that Bonaventure was closely integrating Anselmian thought 
into his systematic theological work.     
To more and less extents, both Aquinas and Bonaventure incorporate and respond 
to Anselm’s work in the CDH (Bonaventure seemingly “more” and Aquinas “less”).  By 
including him in summary and systematic works, though, both place the CDH within the 
realm of past, or inherited, theology.  For them, the CDH is a “given,” a work that had 
earned the respect of theologians and was worthy of having its ideas culled and gathered 
together in “big-picture” works.  Aquinas does this matter-of-factly without directly 
mentioning Anselm while Bonaventure at times draws from the CDH almost word-for-
word.  Both draw from Anselm with regard to some of the most central themes in the 
theology of the Incarnation: the necessity of the Incarnation and the magnitude of sin.  I 
would like to argue that both Aquinas and Bonaventure recognize the CDH as an 
important work in the theology of the Incarnation and both bring their own works into 
conversation with the CDH much as they would Augustine, Abelard or Lombard’s 
Sentences.  Less than 200 years after his death, Anselm’s work has been established as a 
 
30 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 8 (II, 104).   
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reliable, considerable tome on the Incarnation.  Even though they do not agree with every 
point that Anselm makes, Aquinas and Bonaventure seem to find Anselm’s work 
sufficiently cogent and accessible for them to both engage it and adopt it.   
Burns points out that by the time of John Duns Scotus in the early 14th century, 
the focus of theological work on the Incarnation and Atonement had turned from the idea 
of satisfaction to that of the merit of Christ.31  With that turn, Anselm’s work in the CDH 
faded to the background of theological work, especially during the period of the 
Reformation and counter-reformation.  It was not until the 19th century that Anselm’s 
work was taken up again in the effort to produce textbook histories of dogma.  This effort 
most notably included the influential work of Adolf Harnack and his Lehrbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte.32   
Harnack 
Harnack’s work set the tone for the interpretation for the CDH in the first half of 
the 20th century, since his work was so widely read.  Harnack praised Anselm for the 
areas in which he found agreement with his own theological perspective, but spent the 
majority of his analysis detailing the faults of the CDH.  He begins his critique by 
asserting that “there are so many defects that this theory is entirely untenable,” though he 
admits that “to a great extent these defects lie so much on the surface.”33  Harnack  
divides his critique of Anselm’s work in the CDH into three broad points, under which he 
makes several specific claims.  His first critique is that the CDH is riddled with 
 
31 Burns, "Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory.", 301-303.  Additionally, Scotus had 
little use for the kind of unconditional necessity that Anselm appealed to in the CDH and this also marked a 
significant departure in the history of theology.   
32 Adolf Harnack, Lehrbuch Der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vols. (Freiburg: Mohr, 1886). 
33 ———, History of Dogma, ed. T.K. Cheyne and A.B. Bruce, trans. William McGilchrist, vol. 6, 
Theological Translation Library (London: Williams & Norgate, 1899)., 70.   
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inconsistencies: the line of argumentation depends on both necessity and fittingness 
(which are improperly used interchangeably, according to Harnack); appeals are made to 
both the ideas of “satisfaction” and “merit,” which Harnack views as incompatible with 
each other; the concepts of divine “honor” and “righteousness” are used in contradictory 
ways; the possibility of pardon for humanity is dismissed but never properly explained; 
God is considered to be unaffected by humanity, but the whole argument seems to hinge 
on the idea of a give-and-take relationship between God and humanity; and, finally, 
Harnack contends that Anselm’s argument makes the death of the God-man involuntary, 
even though theological propriety and his own disclaimers indicate otherwise.34  This 
multi-faceted critique is essentially an attack on Anselm’s methodology in the CDH.  
Many of these points will be addressed in later chapters, but let it suffice to say that 
perhaps only one of these points gets to the heart of Anselm’s line of reasoning.  The 
point that reaches to the heart of the CDH is the third point above, that Anselm uses 
“honor” and “righteousness” in contradictory ways.  I will address this in chapters two 
and three, but a short reply is as follows: Harnack argues that the reasoning of the CDH 
depends on the idea of divine honor being violated by sin, but Anselm’s conception of 
divine righteousness demands that divine honor not be violated at all.  Anselm 
acknowledges this tension in book I, chapters 13, 14 and 15 by explaining that the eternal 
perfection and continuity of divine action is not compromised by temporal human 
actions.  The violation of divine honor by sin was real, but it was also resolved.  This 
seems to settle the matter for Anselm, however, this critique of Harnack is striking 
 
34 Ibid., 71-73.   
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enough to have been repeated and expanded by later interpreters, most notably J. Denny 
Weaver.35   
Harnack’s second point is that Anselm poorly navigates “the old ecclesiastical 
material”36 relating to the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ (the God-man, in 
Anselm’s terminology).  Harnack argues that Anselm has departed from “Athanasius and 
the Fathers of dogma”37 (basically, the work of Greek Patristic theologians) by assigning 
unsuitable or undesirable predicates to the human nature of the God-man instead of the 
divine nature.  This represents “a quite Nestorian diremption of the person”38 for 
Harnack, though he admits that Anselm is not alone among the theologians of the 
Western church in doing this.  As such, this is more a critique of Augustine and Anselm’s 
Western theological inheritance than of Anselm himself.   
Harnack characterizes his third point as a collection of “the gravest objections to 
be urged against the whole character of the Anselmic doctrine.”39  These include some 
broad allegations of employing false logic and using an improper definition of sin (even 
though Anselm explains his understanding of sin).  Harnack also objects to the lack of 
appeal to scripture and the lack of a place for the Church in the CDH.  However, Anselm 
explicitly works around these items in taking his apologetic approach (or at least an 
approach that attempted to avoid the alienation of non-Christian readers); appeals to 
scripture and mention of the Church would be inconsistent with his stated methodology.  
Finally, Harnack leveled his harshest and most resounding critique, which he considers to 
 
35 See J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
2001). See also the full discussion of this point in chapter 3 and the way in which I argue that Anselm 
would respond to Weaver.   
36 Harnack, History of Dogma., 73.   
37 Ibid., 75.   
38 Ibid., 74.   
39 Ibid., 75.   
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be “the worst thing in Anselm’s theory: “the mythological conception of God as the 
mighty private man, who is incensed at the injury done to His honour and does not forgo 
His wrath till He has received an at least adequately great equivalent…”40  Harnack 
expands upon his description of this aspect of Anselm’s approach, using adjectives such 
as “Gnostic,” “frightful,” “blasphemous,”  and “dreadful.”41  Harnack’s conclusion is that 
Anselm (in the course of his “good intentions”) proves, at best, “only the possibility of 
our being saved.”42 Ultimately, though, he takes such a low view of Anselm and his work 
that he asserts that “no theory so bad had ever before his day been given out as 
ecclesiastical.”43  Clearly Harnack finds no good place for Anselm’s work in the CDH 
and he seems to consider the work to be corrupted, both in terms of methodology and 
content, by historical, social and theological influences.  This wide-ranging indictment of 
the CDH still resonates in the world of theology today and it certainly set the tone for the 
interpretation of Anselm’s atonement theory in the decades following Harnack.  It has 
been nearly impossible to find a thorough examination of Anselm’s work that does not 
either repeat or respond to Harnack’s assessment.  As John McIntyre would later write, 
all critical commentators following him are “variations of, or deductions from, what 
Harnack had said.”44   
Foley 
In the English-speaking world, George C. Foley expanded on Harnack’s critique 
in one of the most important monographs devoted to the CDH in the first half of the 20th 
 
40 Ibid., 76.   
41 Ibid., 76-77.   
42 Ibid., 77.   
43 Ibid., 77-78.   
44 John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh,: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1954)., 186.   
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century, his book Anselm’s Theory of the Atonement.45  Foley views the CDH as a 
turning-point in the history of theology of the Atonement, but he sees it is as a negative 
point of demarcation:  
It is contrasted with the patristic teaching from which it is not derived, and 
with the Reformation theory to which it contributed the leading ideas.  It 
marks the turning-point at which the legal and external and purely logical 
and objective conception of God’s relation to us displaced the personal 
and organic and biological, after which the theology of the Atonement 
takes an entirely novel direction.46 
 
Foley makes it his goal to extract a “simpler and more Scriptural expression of the 
redemptive work of Christ” from the legacy of Anselm’s work, which he considers to be 
“misleading and dishonouring and inhibitive to faith.”47  He attempts to do so by 
examining the patristic precursors to Anselm, Anselm’s own theory (along with what he 
perceives to be Anselm’s direct influences, both from among and outside of the church 
fathers), and the legacy of Anselm’s work (both his immediate successors and the 
reaction to his work in the era of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation).  He follows 
this historical approach with his own assessment of the value of Anselm’s work on the 
Atonement.   
Leaving the details of Foley’s critique to the later points of this present work to 
which they are most germane, I would like to highlight his conclusions and their place in 
the history of interpretation of Anselm.  In the course of his analysis, he lays out three 
broad critiques in a manner similar to Harnack’s approach: 1) the CDH not only works 
around the evidence of scripture, it also takes an approach that is neither found in nor 
 
45 George Cadwalader Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1909). 
46 Ibid., 6-7.   
47 Ibid., 10.   
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compatible with scripture;48 2) the work is not logical and is fraught with 
contradictions;49 and 3) Anselm was too much influenced by feudalism and the 
penitential system of the institutional church.50 Foley then went on to expand on these 
points in detail and I will address those details through the course of this study, but, 
generally speaking, Foley seems unconvinced that Anselm was able to overcome his 
circumstances – both his societal influences and the motivation for writing the work – to 
produce an acceptable work on the Atonement.  In the end, he took issue with Anselm’s 
methodology of approaching the salvation of humanity from a putatively objective 
position without appealing to scripture and attempting to make clear the mysteries of the 
Christian faith to a non-Christian audience:  
Anselm’s adoption of a purely objective interpretation of Christ’s work, 
his assumption of an ability to penetrate into the esoteric relations of the 
Trinity, made him primarily responsible for the intrusive prying into 
Divine mysteries, and for the confident familiarity with the unrevealed 
portions of truth that issued in the dogmatic tyranny so conspicuous in the 
Protestant churches.51 
 
Foley, like Harnack before him, contrasts Anselm’s approach with that of scripture, 
specifically the Gospels and the letters of Paul.  He acknowledges that this critique may 
be best applied to Scholasticism in general, but Foley clearly prefers to prioritize 
scripture over the work of theologians in both methodology and content.  He then goes 
out of his way to commend Anselm on two points: removing the devil from the story of 
the salvation of humanity and the emphasis on the importance of personal salvation 
without any necessary mediation of the Church.  This latter point he attributes to 
 
48 Ibid., 143-145.   
49 Ibid., 145-146.   
50 Ibid., 147.   
51 Ibid., 256-257.   
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Anselm’s monastic influences and lauds Anselm for “a fresh and powerful statement of 
the Incarnation of Christ, one with man and one with God, which assured mankind that 
the Divine attitude towards each one of the redeemed was goodness, not severity.”52  
Foley sees such a strong emphasis on un-mediated, individual salvation in Anselm that he 
goes so far as to call him “the spiritual forerunner of Luther.”53  While this may be a 
dramatic bit of hyperbole and Foley acknowledges that Anselm himself would not agree 
with or have anticipated this interpretation of his work, it is clear that Foley does find 
some use for Anselm’s work, if only in terms of content and not necessarily 
methodology.  It should be noted, though, that even these elements of the CDH that Foley 
finds beneficial pale in comparison to the overall tone of disdain that Foley takes 
throughout the work.   
Aulén 
Gustaf Aulén set the tone for the interpretation of the CDH in the middle of the 
20th century with the publication of a series of lectures he gave in 1930 in the book 
Christus Victor.54  Here, Aulén sketches a history of the Christian doctrine of the 
atonement in which he pits the so-called “Latin” theory inaugurated by Anselm against 
the “Classic” view espoused by early Christian theologians such as Athanasius and 
Augustine.   In so doing, he drives a wedge between Anselm and those theologians whom 
I consider to have been influential for him in the development of the CDH.  Thus, 
Aulén’s work is especially important here, since he disagrees with the present analysis so 
sharply.  Like Foley, Aulén considers Tertullian to be Anselm’s most important influence 
 
52 Ibid., 259.   
53 Ibid., 259.   
54 Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, 
trans. A. G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1967). 
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with regard to the Atonement, albeit indirectly.  He ties Tertullian’s use of the term 
“satisfaction” with the development of the idea of penance in the Western (“Latin,” in 
Aulén’s terminology) church: “In Tertullian, we find the fundamental conceptions of 
satisfaction and merit: both words apply to penance. … Thus Penance is satisfaction, the 
acceptance of a temporal penalty to escape eternal loss.”55  Aulén blames the high profile 
of the penitential system in the church for the errors he finds in the views of Anselm and 
others: “It must be strongly emphasised that it was on the basis of the penitential system 
that the Latin theory grew up. … The Latin idea of penance provides the sufficient 
explanation of the Latin doctrine of the Atonement.”56  Although the penitential system 
rose to prominence in the same time frame as his lauded “Classic” view, Aulén dismisses 
this as more of an accident of chronology: “The Latin doctrine thus begins to appear quite 
early in the patristic period, in the Western Church; but, as we have seen, during that 
period it never became the dominant view in the West, but was only gradually working 
its way forward, not without opposition.”57  Thus, Aulén’s “Latin” theory primarily 
stands for the atonement theories of the medieval church and primarily the work of 
Anselm.  He makes this clear from the start in his assessment of the CDH: “The Latin 
theory of the Atonement first appears fully developed in the Cur Deus homo? of Anselm; 
a book which has been so universally regarded as the typical expression of the Latin 
 
55 Ibid., 81.   
56 Ibid., 82.  The ellipses in this quote take the place of the following sentence that seems a bit out of place: 
“The suggestion sometimes made, that the origin of Anselm’s doctrine is to be found in Germanic Law, is 
either beside the mark or flatly incorrect.”  This seems to be an odd place for Aulén to throw in this tidbit 
since he hadn’t been directly discussing Anselm.  However, it is clear that he indirectly connects Tertullian 
and Anselm (via penance) and others (Foley being one) have argued for a connection between Tertullian 
and the ideas of “Germanic Law.”   Since Aulén goes on to decry the juristic nature of the Latin theory, it is 
somewhat surprising that he makes the effort here to separate Anselm from Germanic Law.  Perhaps he felt 
that a connection between Anselm and the system of penance (that was the object of Luther’s scorn) was a 
more damning critique.   
57 Ibid., 83.   
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theory, that this theory has commonly been known as the Anselmian doctrine, and that 
the controversy on the Atonement has continually centred round Anselm’s name.”58   
Aulén wisely acknowledged that criticisms of the CDH are frequently the result of 
misinterpretations of Anselm and he contends that this applies to both opponents and 
supporters of Anselm.  For his part, he claims to focus on one issue in his interpretation 
of the CDH: “This is the decisive issue; and, therefore, the crucial question is really this: 
Does Anselm treat the atoning work of Christ as the work of God Himself from start to 
finish?”59  Aulén proceeds by arguing first that “the whole structure [of Anselm’s 
argument] is built on the basis of the penitential system.”60  While there is no question 
that Anselm’s thought would have been strongly influenced by the penitential system in 
which he lived (in his monastic context), it is not clear from the text that it is foundational 
or even necessary for Anselm’s argument.  Aulén offers no proof-text for this and his 
only explanation appeals to the Anselmian idea that human beings are indelibly 
connected to making recompense for sin since human beings were responsible for sin.  
However, as will be discussed in the later chapter devoted to Anselm’s use of the idea of 
“satisfaction,” Anselm does not base his idea of recompense directly on the penitential 
system or the regulations found therein.  Although Aulén does not go into extended detail 
on this point, it is part of the evidence from his own text that shows that he focused 
strongly on Anselm’s social context in explaining the theological concepts in the CDH.  
This focus leads Aulén to characterize the CDH as a narrative in which God and 
humanity are divided, rather than united.  He points to the different abilities and 
 
58 Ibid., 84.   
59 Ibid., 86.   
60 Ibid., 86.   
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obligations of God and humanity in Anselm’s system of atonement.  In this case, though, 
Aulén seems to be stretching the point of differences between God and humanity far 
beyond necessity.  Perhaps he overstates Anselm’s point that “the required satisfaction 
must be made by man”61 since he takes this as an indication that “the Incarnation and the 
Atonement are not organically connected together, as they were in the classic view.”62  
He argues that Anselm has neglected “the doctrine of the Incarnation, [which] is no 
longer with him a fully living idea, as it was to the Fathers.”63   
It is on the basis of a dichotomy between the activity of God and humanity in the 
CDH that Aulén drives his argument against the Latin theory.  He even goes so far as to 
distinguish between the activity of Christ and that of God when he lays out what he sees 
as the difference between Anselm and those who preceded him: “Here, then, the contrast 
between Anselm and the Fathers is as plain as daylight.  They show how God became 
incarnate that He might redeem; he teaches a human work of satisfaction, accomplished 
by Christ.”64  Although he acknowledges the accomplishment of Christ, Aulén seems 
convinced that Anselm’s atonement theory is ultimately a story of human efforts to make 
satisfaction, over and above any divine activity.  He views Anselm as relegating divine 
activity to the “big picture” issues of motivation and inception: “God is the author of the 
plan, and He has sent His Son and ordered it so that the required satisfaction shall be 
 
61 Ibid., 87.   
62 Ibid., 87.   
63 Ibid., 87.  This leads him to point out what he considers to be the “significant emphasis on the dignity of 
man (p. 87) by Anselm.  The particular example is the idea that satisfaction cannot be made by anyone 
other than God or a human (an angel or non-Adamic human).  However, he incorrectly characterizes 
Anselm’s refusal to allow this as a protection measure for the dignity of human beings.  Yet, as will be seen 
in the later chapters on Anselm’s use of “honor” and “satisfaction,” it is clear from the text that the 
“dignity” of both God and humanity are at stake with respect to this particular issue.  Aulén seems to have 
overplayed, if not simply manufactured, an “over-emphasis” on humanity in the CDH.   
64 Ibid., 88.   
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made.  Nevertheless, it is not in the full sense God’s work of redemption.”65  Aulén 
points out two specific examples of this in Anselm’s work.  First, he objects to Anselm’s 
repudiation of the ransom theory and what he considers to be a minimizing of the defeat 
of the devil in the process of atonement.  Second, he objects to the disjunction between 
forgiveness and satisfaction.  While the first objection is straightforward, he takes the 
second as an indication that Anselm is too limited in his perspective.  He views both 
alternatives as lacking a clear, active role for God.  Instead, Aulén contends that Anselm 
has substituted a legal system for God: “This rigid dilemma fastens the doctrine of the 
Atonement into a juridical scheme.  It is an indispensable necessity that God shall receive 
the satisfaction which alone can save forgiveness from becoming laxity; and this need is 
met by Christ’s death.”66  In Anselm’s system of satisfaction, Aulén finds only a passive 
God whose relationship with mankind is subject to some cosmic justice system: “The 
relation of man to God is treated by Anselm as essentially a legal relation, for his whole 
effort is to prove that the atoning work is in accordance with justice.”67  While I will 
reserve a full reply to this objection for the later chapter of this work devoted to Anselm’s 
understanding of “justice,” let it suffice to say that Aulén fails to take into account that 
Anselm considers God to be “justice” itself and any cosmic order to which the 
relationship between God and humanity conforms is only the divine order (which is 
ultimately God) itself.  However, Aulén sees a “juridical idea” in Anselm that he does not 
find in his reading of the “classic teaching” and he considers this to be a damning feature 
of Anselm’s position.   
 
65 Ibid., 88.   
66 Ibid., 90.   
67 Ibid., 90.   
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In addition to Anselm’s supposed juridical approach, Aulén finds fault with the 
rational approach of the CDH.  He broadly takes issue with Anselm’s methodology of 
necessity and rational explanations and contrasts it (as he did with the previous issue) 
with earlier atonement theories: “…the classic idea of the Atonement defies rational 
systematization; its essential double-sidedness, according to which God is at once the 
Reconciler and the Reconciled, constitutes an antinomy which cannot be resolved by a 
rational statement.”68  This frustration with the rational approach that avoids scripture is 
an echo of both Harnack and Foley.  Aulén joins them in pointing out the contrast 
between Anselm’s work and the work of both scripture and the church fathers.  Overall, 
Aulén objects to what he considers to be both the content and the methodology of 
Anselm’s approach.  He accuses Anselm of taking an overly-rational approach that 
minimizes (and in some cases excludes) the role of God in the atonement.  For the most 
part, he views Anselm as substituting a juridical order for the divine order and he 
attributes this to the medieval social context in which the CDH was constructed: “All this 
goes to show that the Latin doctrine of the Atonement is closely related to the legalism 
characteristic of the mediæval outlook.”69  Thus, Aulén carries forward the critiques of 
Harnack and Foley in finding Anselm to be overcome by legalism and rationalism in his 
approach to the Incarnation and Atonement.   
After his scathing assessment of Anselm, Aulén goes on to argue that Luther 
revived the lauded classic position in his own atonement theory.  While this is not of 
primary importance here, it is useful to note that Aulén explains away Luther’s use of 
similar language to Anselm’s language in the CDH.  With regard to “satisfaction,” Aulén 
 
68 Ibid., 91.   
69 Ibid., 92.   
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contends that Luther “speaks of satisfaction in relation to the wrath of God, and this 
association gives us at once his meaning.  His conception of the wrath of God and the 
way in which it is overcome shows that there is no thought here of a satisfaction of the 
legal claims of the Divine justice; for it is God Himself, the Divine blessing, which in 
Christ prevails over the wrath and the curse.”70  For Aulén, Luther’s use of “Latin” terms 
like “satisfaction” is “in direct relation to Christ’s conflict and His victory over the 
tyrants…”71  In his explication of the “Christus Victor” theory, he wants to avoid any 
attempt “to measure Luther by the standards of the Latin theory,”72 since that is, for 
Aulén, nearly the opposite of the atonement that he seeks to draw out as most prominent 
in the history of Christianity.  So, Aulén not only found fault with Anselm’s theory of 
atonement, but he did so by drawing it into contrast with what he felt to be an 
understanding of Luther’s atonement theory.  This seems to give some indication of the 
source of Aulén’s contention with Anselm: he sought to distinguish the latter from 
Luther, especially in light of the usage of “satisfaction,” in order to answer any objection 
that Luther may not have lined up with his “Christus Victor” approach.  Anselm, then, 
serves as a foil for the larger point that Aulén was attempting to make.   
McIntyre 
In the world of English-speaking scholarship, the first person to make a thorough 
defense against Anselm’s treatment at the hands of the textbook theologians (Harnack, et 
al.) and Protestant critics (Foley, Aulén, et al.) was John McIntyre in his book “St. 
 
70 Ibid., 118.   
71 Ibid., 118.   
72 Ibid., 119.   
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Anselm and His Critics”73 in 1954.  McIntyre specifically addressed the critiques of 
Harnack and Aulén (among others), though his primary focus was to offer a re-
interpretation of the CDH that would both offer insight into Anselm’s method and stand 
up to modern critiques.  McIntyre argued that a correct interpretation of the CDH requires 
first the recognition “of the supreme importance in the theology of St. Anselm of the 
concept of the aseitas of God.”74  McIntyre understands Anselm to be using it to describe 
the following divine characteristics: “self-sufficiency …, independence, self-origination 
in volition, freedom and, above all, grace and graciousness.”75  McIntyre argues 
throughout his evaluations of Anselm’s methodology, hamartiology, Christology and 
Soteriology that Anselm’s positions always return to the idea of aseity – that God always 
acts in consistency with the divine nature and there is no other motivation, cause or 
purpose for divine activity, including all activity related to the Incarnation and 
Atonement.  In the words of McIntyre, “The concept is, as we should expect, to be found 
influencing most of St. Anselm’s accounts of God and of His actions: it enters into his 
description of God’s grace, of God’s initiative in purposing man’s salvation, of His 
volitional acts, of Christ’s sinlessness and that of the angels, and of Christ’s decision to 
die, while it affects, too, his analysis of human behaviour.”76  So, McIntyre argues that a 
proper understanding of Anselm’s use of aseity is key both for understanding the CDH 
and for addressing the critics who have found fault with Anselm in the modern era.  His 
work is particularly useful for finding consistency in Anselm (and between the CDH and 
 
73 McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo. 
74 Ibid., 165.   
75 Ibid., 165.   
76 Ibid., 165.   
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other Anselmian works) and in gaining perspective on the faulty interpretations of 
Anselm that had gone relatively unchallenged to this point in time.   
Southern 
R.W. Southern composed some of the most insightful and comprehensive works 
on Anselm in the 20th century.  Writing from a historian’s perspective, Southern exposed 
Anselm’s life and works to the audience of theological scholarship in a compelling 
framework through his books on Anselm.  Southern’s focus was primarily on the history 
of Anselm’s life and work and he laid the foundation for generations of scholars to 
understand the connection between Anselm’s life and the works he penned at various 
stages of his life.  He accomplished this primarily through his book “Saint Anselm and 
His Biographer,”77 but he also covered similar topics in his later (and probably better-
known) book “Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape.”78  What is of most relevance for 
the present work is the way in which Southern connected Anselm’s religious, political 
and social context to the CDH.  In his earlier work, he referred to the CDH as “Anselm’s 
greatest intellectual achievement” and “the climax of his theological development.”79  
Southern went on to examine the theological culture of Anselm’s day, particularly 
regarding the time leading up to the writing of the CDH.  He details the challenge of 
Roscelin to which Anselm had already begun to respond and the tendency of others, 
including the important school at Laon, to affirm the doctrine of the Incarnation without 
 
77 R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought, 1059-1130, 
The Birkbeck Lectures, 1959 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 
78 Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape.  This is mostly a republication of what Southern 
wrote in his earlier work, with some condensation and changes.   
79 ———, Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought, 1059-1130., 77.   
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regard for contemporary challenges.80  Southern makes it clear that Anselm was doing 
something new in the CDH even though he composed the work in the midst of a time in 
which he was attempting to maintain as much consistency between his current life as 
Archbishop of Canterbury and his previous life as an abbot and monk at Bec.   
After summarizing the argument and its key features, Southern turns his attention 
primarily to the issue of “feudal imagery” in the CDH.  He notes that the way that 
Anselm used the “honour” of God in his argument leaves a “disagreeable impression”81 
on many readers.   Southern points out that this type of language that can be interpreted 
as reflecting Anselm’s feudal context and “nothing in this much criticized work has 
offered an easier target for indignation and ridicule than his use of feudal concepts.”82  
However, he acknowledges that, from a theological perspective, McIntyre’s work “has 
effectively answered the criticism that the Cur Deus Homo is irretrievably feudal in 
temper.  Everything of importance in Anselm’s argument can survive the removal of 
every trace of feudal imagery and the supposed contamination by elements of Germanic 
law.”83  Still, though, the historian in Southern cannot ignore the language that seemingly 
resonates feudal culture.  He contends that, even if McIntyre’s point stands, the CDH is 
not the same if it is understood completely apart from feudal society:  
Even if the argument can be stated without any feudal imagery, it is 
nevertheless also true that Anselm’s thoughts about God and the universe 
were very much coloured by the social arrangements with which he was 
familiar.  The formal argument can survive, but its temper is quite 
different if the contemporary imagery is removed; equally it is quite 
different if the monastic fervour is brushed aside.84   
 
80 Ibid., 82-87.   
81 Ibid., 107.   
82 Ibid., 107.   
83 Ibid., 108.   
84 Ibid., 108.   
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He goes on to use the idea of “honor” as an example, drawing on not only the CDH but 
also letters and notes from his lectures.  While I will leave a full discussion of this area 
aside here until the next chapter, it is important to note that Southern does distinguish 
between the feudal imagery in the CDH and what is found in his less formal works.  
Southern prefers to read the evidence from the sermons and conversations into the more 
formal work of the CDH.  He makes this clear in his summary remarks: “The feudal and 
monastic illustrations, which are closely related in his spoken words and hinted at in the 
Cur Deus Homo illustrate the principle from the facts of everyday life.  They are 
complementary expressions of Anselm’s argument.”85  For Southern, then, the CDH 
contains hints of feudal influence for which he finds confirmation in other works.  
Although he does not directly criticize Anselm for the influence of his social context, he 
admits that this may make the CDH unattractive and inaccessible to modern readers.   
Hopkins 
After Southern, the next prominent scholar to devote significant attention to 
Anselm and the CDH was the philosopher Jasper Hopkins.  Aside from authoring 
translations of Anselm’s works, Hopkins wrote a wide-ranging analysis of Anselm and 
his works in his book A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm.86  He devoted most of his 
chapter on “Christology and Soteriology” to the CDH (along with the ancillary works 
that Anselm wrote afterward).  Here, Hopkins attempts to systematize and clarify 
Anselm’s work.  He does this by dividing the work topically into four questions (and 
Anselm’s responses).  In his final section (“How can Christ’s sacrifice outweigh the sins 
 
85 Ibid., 114.   
86 Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis,: University of Minnesota Press, 
1972). 
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of all men?”), Hopkins seems to find Anselm’s position lacking completeness and 
logicality.  He takes issue with Anselm’s use of “ought” (and its variants) and contends 
that Anselm has not proved the case that a human from the race of Adam (in contrast to 
another sort of human, created outside of the lineage of Adam) must be joined with God 
in the God-man in order to provide for the salvation of humanity.  While the details of 
Hopkins’ argument will be examined later in chapter four, it is important to note here that 
Hopkins, a sympathetic reader of Anselm much like Southern, has found fault in the 
method and logic of the CDH.   
Recent Anselm Interpretation 
The last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century have 
been marked by two extremes in scholarly treatment of the Cur Deus Homo: a number of 
defenders of Anselm have arisen and defended Anselm in published articles and books 
while at the same time theological ethicists have raised warning flags about the way that 
the CDH may be used by those who over-emphasize the role of punishment in the 
Atonement.  The latter group seems to have picked up on some of the classic critiques by 
the likes of Harnack and Aulén and, for some unknown reason, singled out Anselm in the 
history of Atonement theology as a particularly negative figure.  At the same time, a 
number of article-length works appeared in which comparisons were drawn between 
Anselm’s work in the CDH and similar efforts by Patristic authors, particularly Eastern 
church fathers. 
Hart  
David Bentley Hart composed an important and oft-cited article in Pro Ecclesia in 
1998 in which he offered what he called an “Eastern Orthodox appreciation of Anselm’s 
 31 Ch. 1 
, 
 a 
                                                
Cur Deus Homo.”87  In addition to the range of Western critics, Hart also responded to 
criticism of Anselm by Eastern theologians, most notably Vladimir Lossky.  According to 
Hart, “Lossky takes special offense at the scandal of a book putatively explaining the 
Incarnation, but attempting to do so without reference to divinization, victory over hell, 
or the role of the Holy Spirit.”88  While Hart helpfully sketches the ways that Lossky 
adds an Eastern perspective (and critique) to the litany of Western criticisms of Anselm
he astutely worries that decades of criticism may only serve to conceal benefits found in
thorough examination of the CDH: “A question that might be asked here, however, is 
whether the actual text of Cur Deus Homo has not been lost to view, behind the welter of 
adverse judgments brought to bear upon it.  To begin with, it is not at all clear that 
Anselm’s language simply reflects the logic of sacramental penance, the logic of 
attempting to make reparation to God for particular sins.”89  Hart recognizes the line of 
criticism based on Anselm’s language and seeks to turn it on its head.  He helpfully crafts 
an argument based on Anselm’s own work, but the most valuable section of his article is 
the comparative effort he makes between Anselm and Athanasius.  Hart does this not 
only to answer critics of Anselm but also with an intentional eye toward exposing to an 
Eastern audience the commonalities between one of the more celebrated Eastern Fathers 
and Anselm, who has not been traditionally lauded in Eastern theological circles.  Hart 
approaches this by focusing on the use of the language of  “honor” and “debt” that is 
common to both Anselm and Athanasius.  Although the details will be examined in later 
 
87 David Bentley Hart, "A Gift Exceeding Every Debt: An Eastern Orthodox Appreciation of Anselm's Cur 
Deus Homo," Pro Ecclesia VII, no. 3 (1998). 
88 Ibid., 340.   
89 Ibid., 340.   
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chapters, Hart’s conclusion after listing multiple points of similarity (if not sameness) 
between Athanasius and Anselm is particularly helpful:  
Already present in Athanasius’s account is the very story whose inner 
shape Anselm will, in a moment of intense critical reflection, attempt to 
grasp as necessity.  Already, in Athanasius’s theology, one finds the 
language of punishment used, but subordinate to the narrative of complete 
and unmerited forgiveness, and the language of law employed to describe 
the depths of infinite mercy.  As it is with Athanasius, so it is with 
Anselm.90   
 
In addition to the points of comparison between Athanasius and Anselm (offered as a 
counterpoint to those who suggest that there is a drastic difference between the church 
fathers and Anselm), Hart also responds directly to critics of Anselm’s language: “The 
rigidity, the dryness, that even Anselm’s Western critics feel moved to deplore in the Cur 
Deus Homo is no aspect of the text itself, I would contend; rather it is an impression only, 
one bred by a largely illusory familiarity with Anselm’s argument.”91  Hart, then, has 
turned the tables on critics of the CDH who both dismiss the language and set it apart 
from the theologies of Incarnation and Atonement from the Patristic period.  This marks a 
clear shift in scholarly interpretation of the CDH.   
McMahon 
Just two years after the publication of Hart’s article, two papers by Anselm 
scholars on the CDH were independently presented at conferences and published the 
following year in the proceedings.  The first was by Kevin A. McMahon, with his article, 
“The Cross and the Pearl: Anselm’s Patristic Doctrine of the Atonement.”92  McMahon 
wrote in response to Aulén in particular, but also to critics of Anselm in general.  In 
 
90 Ibid., 347.   
91 Ibid., 347.   
92 Kevin A. McMahon, "The Cross and the Pearl: Anselm's Patristic Doctrine of the Atonement," in Saint 
Anselm - His Origins and Influence, ed. John R. Fortin (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001). 
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contrast to Aulén, McMahon argues that “rather than constitute a break with the tradition 
of the Fathers, Anselm in fact represents a continuation of their very point of view.”93  
He then goes on to survey similarities between the CDH and Irenaeus, Athanasius and 
even Nestorius.  McMahon pulls all of this together in what he terms a “preliminary 
demonstration” of consistency between Anselm and the tradition from which so many 
critics have sought to drive a wedge.  He concludes that his “preliminary demonstration” 
has shown that “Anselm’s talk in the Cur Deus Homo of justice, of debt, and of our 
paying off our debt, has deep patristic roots; which is all the more significant when one 
considers that Augustine is the only Father upon whom he seems to depend in the work, 
and one of only a handful of Church Fathers he seems to have known first-hand.”94  This 
is a clear counterpoint to those critics who have sought to dismiss Anselm’s work, and 
particularly his language, in the CDH as different and disconnected from Biblical and 
Patristic understandings of the Incarnation and Atonement.   
Rogers 
The other paper that appeared at roughly the same time as McMahon’s was by 
one scholar of Anselm who has offered some of the most thorough defenses of his work: 
Katherin A. Rogers.  In addition to her books in which she explores Anselm’s neo-
Platonic approach in his philosophical system, Rogers has also provided a brief riposte to 
critics of the Cur Deus Homo in her article entitled simply, “A Defense of Anselm’s Cur 
Deus Homo Argument.”95  Rogers wrote in response to those critics who contend that the 
 
93 Ibid., 61.   
94 Ibid., 65.   
95 Katherin A. Rogers, "A Defense of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo Argument," in Philosophical Theology: 
Reason and Theological Doctrine, ed. Michael Baur, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association (Bronx, NY: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2001). 
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CDH is “at best implausible, and at worst, implausible and offensive” and that it 
“portrays God as a feudal lord and embraces the most negative aspects associated with 
that image, painting a picture of God as absolutely powerful and perhaps possessed of a 
glacial justice, but jealous and pitiless.”96  As a philosopher (distinct from McMahon as a 
theologian), Rogers was concerned more for the plausibility of Anselm’s argument than 
for making historical connections with theological precedent.  Still, Rogers focuses on 
Anselm’s use of terms such as “honor” in showing that, negative connotations aside, 
Anselm used the term intentionally: “From the perspective of the philosopher I hope to 
show that Anselm’s argument has force, and that the term ‘honor’ is exactly the right 
word in context.”97  Leaving the details of Rogers’ point to the appropriate chapter later 
in this work, it is important to note that Rogers finds Anselm’s language to be 
philosophically appropriate, in addition to the theological pertinence highlighted by 
McMahon.  Ultimately, Rogers concludes that Anselm’s language is indicative of an 
emphasis on the biological connectedness of humanity and that is the key to 
understanding the plausibility of a God-man: “Apparently, for Anselm, biological 
connections really matter.  If so, then it is not implausible to think that, just as a country 
or a corporation may owe a debt, so may the race of Adam. … Christ does not personally 
owe the debt, but He is a bona fide member of the race, and so if the race owes, He can 
pay.”98   
 
 
 
96 Ibid., 187.   
97 Ibid., 191.   
98 Ibid., 197.   
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Gasper 
The survey of articles by Hart, McMahon and Rogers are indicative of a trend in 
recent scholarly interpretations of Anselm’s work in the CDH.  In each case, the authors 
have defended Anselm’s use of language that critics have attempted to use to confine him 
to a narrow historical window as a peculiarity of the late 11th century.  They have also 
shown that there are plausible parallels between Anselm’s ideas and language and the 
work of various Biblical and Patristic writers.  However, no scholar had published a 
systematic study of Anselm’s work and his possible influences until Giles Gasper’s 
recent efforts.  In work that was published as a paper in 1999 and later incorporated into a 
book examining Anselm’s theological influences, Gasper has drawn parallels between the 
motivation, concepts and language of Athanasius of Alexandria and Anselm.  In his 
paper, “Anselm's Cur Deus Homo and Athanasius's De Incarnatione: Some Questions of 
Comparison,”99 Gasper ignores critics who have explicitly rejected any connection 
between Athanasius and Anselm and, instead, focuses on broadening the scope of 
Anselm’s influences in the CDH beyond mere reliance on Augustine.  He argues that 
“Anselm and Athanasius have a number of comparable interests and attitudes.  By 
focusing on Cur Deus Homo and De Incarnatione, these areas may be exposed and 
addressed.  Both works may be found worthy of comparison and will hopefully reveal 
something of the interplay between individual thinker, work and context, and the wider 
community of theological investigation.”100  Gasper contends that Anselm and 
Athanasius share a common point of origin: “For both it comprises the divine truth of 
 
99 Giles E. M. Gasper, "Anselm's Cur Deus Homo and Athanasius's De Incarnatione: Some Questions of 
Comparison," in Cur Deus Homo: Atti Del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale, ed. Paul Gilbert, Helmut 
Karl Kohlenberger, and Elmar Salmann, Studia Anselmiana (Rome: Centro Studi S. Anselmo, 1999). 
100 Ibid., 153.   
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God, and the possibility of apprehending and knowing God, arising out of the Incarnation 
of the Word of God.  The theology of both Anselm and Athanasius is christologically 
centred.”101  Though the finer points of Gasper’s comparison will be covered in the 
following chapters, it is helpful to understand here that Gasper highlights the common 
approach, method and even language of Athanasius and Anselm in developing a 
favorable comparison between the two.   
The discussion of influences on Anselm must go beyond the examination of his 
social context and his written works to include some investigation of the sources that may 
have been at his disposal.  Gasper has recently done a thorough study on this matter in his 
book, Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance.102  He has studied the 
catalogue of the (no longer extant) library at Bec, where Anselm spent his theologically 
formative years.  Working from a 12th-century catalogue found in a collection of 
historical works at the Mont-St-Michel abbey, he notes that a number of works of 
Pseudo-Athanasius, John Chrysostom and Origen constituted the heart of the collection 
of works by the Fathers of the Church in Bec.103  Gasper also looks into the details of the 
catalogue (and sometimes the obvious errors therein) and highlights the possibility that 
Anselm might have had access to works by Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Pseudo-Dionysius and perhaps even Athanasius.104  This work is enormously useful in 
counteracting the long-held stereotype that Anselm was little more than a disciple (or 
worse, a parrot) of Augustine.  Gasper points out that Anselm clearly had a broad array of 
 
101 Ibid., 156.  Here, Gasper highlights the importance of considering the theologians’ work on the 
Incarnation and Atonement in the proper, broader context of their overall theological system.  Anselm’s 
language can not be an exception to this and must be contextualized.   
102 ———, Anselm of Canterbury and His Theological Inheritance (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004). 
103 Ibid., 92-99 (see particularly Gasper’s table of works on pages 97-99).   
104 Ibid., 100-105.   
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sources within his foundational understanding of theology and philosophy: “The context 
in which Anselm lived and worked was one in which access to Greek Patristic writings 
was not problematic.  His contemporaries used these works and their libraries stocked 
them.”105  It would be naïve and unrealistic to suggest that Anselm would have only 
integrated Augustine into his theological system when he clearly had exposure to so 
many other Fathers of the Church.  Gasper correctly acknowledges, though, that 
opportunity does not guarantee influence: “There are limits to this exercise; it is not 
possible to prove the early existence of such texts, and it is important that the titles the 
catalogue suggests should not prescribe the interpretation of Anselm’s sources.  There 
may have been other sources not recorded on this catalogue.”106  Without direct 
attribution from Anselm (as is frequently the case for citations of Augustine), there is no 
clear case for influence.  Still, influence can take many forms – even beyond exposure to 
written text.  As Gasper points out, the picture we have of Anselm is of one who enjoyed 
verbal communication and conversation: “Contact with ideas and approaches need not 
have come through the written word, verbal exchange was equally possible and fruitful, 
especially for one so famed for conversation as Anselm.  It would not do to insist on too 
close a dependence of Anselm on his sources, his was an independent and capable 
mind.”107  Just as one ought not to view Anselm as merely a product of his sources, he 
ought not to be viewed as one who was influenced by only one or a small quantity of 
sources.  Further, the timing of the writing of the Cur Deus Homo toward the end of his 
life would have allowed Anselm to marshal all of his (by that point extensive) influences.  
 
105 Ibid., 105.   
106 Ibid., 105.   
107 Ibid., 105.   
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Anselm acknowledges the fact there was a demand for him to produce the work, so it is 
only fair to assume that he made a good-faith effort to bring all of his philosophical and 
theological resources to bear on the CDH.   
Weaver 
Lastly, while the work of current scholars sympathetic to Anselm has just been 
outlined, it is important to note that Anselm is not without critics to this day.  The most 
prominent voice challenging the effectiveness and value of Anselm’s approach in the 
CDH is that of J. Denny Weaver.  In his book The Nonviolent Atonement, Weaver cast 
Anselm’s work as representative of all that has been wrong with Atonement theology and 
purported connections to and glorification of violence therein.  Weaver argues that “even 
at its best, Anselm’s satisfaction theory of atonement cannot escape its foundation in the 
idea of retributive violence.”108  He admittedly follows Southern for much of his 
interpretation (and understanding) of the CDH109 and follows the specific point that 
Anselm was thoroughly feudal, including the terminology he employed: “The language 
Anselm used in Cur Deus Homo to examine God’s honor reflects [his] feudal setting.”110  
While he allows that Anselm’s language does not contain the most explicit references to 
violence among the varieties of satisfaction theory that have appeared over the centuries, 
he is adamant that the principles to which he (Weaver) objects most strongly found their 
root in Anselm’s work: “Make no mistake about it.  Satisfaction atonement in any form 
depends on divinely sanctioned violence that follows from the assumption that doing 
 
108 Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement., 11.   
109 He explicitly follows on the work of Aulén and even characterizes his preferred approach as “Narrative 
Christus Victor.”  See chapters 2 and 3 of Weaver’s book.   
110 Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement., 193.   
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justice means to punish.”111  While I argue later in the present work that Weaver’s 
interpretation stems from a misreading of Anselm, Weaver’s work has played a 
prominent role in discussions of the history of atonement theory and it is important to 
recognize the charges levied against Anselm in the midst of it.  Unfortunately, few 
scholars have risen to Anselm’s defense against Weaver, so I hope to provide some small 
response (and contextualization of Weaver’s critique) in my response later in this study.    
This Study 
The trajectory of scholarship concerning Anselm and the CDH in the past 15 
years has been moving toward the idea that Anselm wrote the CDH with a broader 
perspective than merely his liturgical and feudal social contexts.  There has been 
intentional movement away from the standard textbook criticisms of Anselm and toward 
comparisons with Patristic and Biblical sources that were previously rejected. The goal of 
this study is to carry forward the work done by the likes of Hart, Gasper and Rogers in 
taking seriously the idea that Anselm was writing more in accordance with scripture and 
tradition than with his contemporary world.  In doing so, I would also like to explore the 
Biblical and Patristic antecedents (if not roots) for the language that Anselm used and 
argue that his use of terms like “honor,” “justice,” “debt” and “satisfaction” was 
influenced more by Biblical and Patristic sources than by the social context of feudalism 
that was “in the air” as the work was composed.  In order to do this, I will examine 
Anselm’s use of the concepts of “honor,” “justice,” “debt” and “satisfaction” in the CDH 
and offer preferred ways to understand their meanings, dedicating a chapter to each 
concept.  Throughout these chapters, I will engage many of the critics named in this 
 
111 Ibid., 203.   
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opening chapter and I will attempt to show the ways in which they properly or 
improperly interpreted Anselm with regard to the issues at hand.  By the end I hope to 
provide a balanced perspective on Anselm that fully considers objections to the CDH and 
proper responses from an Anselmian perspective.  Further, I will incorporate references 
to Patristic and Biblical sources that would have likely (or, in some cases, certainly) 
informed Anselm as he wrote the CDH in order to show that he was not as far removed 
from these earlier works as some have contended.  I will conclude by offering an 
interpretation of the CDH that takes into account the way I believe Anselm should be 
understood – an interpretation that engages Anselm as seriously as possible with respect 
to his own context and intentions for the work.   
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Chapter 2 
Honor 
 
One of the most nuanced terms that Anselm uses in the Cur Deus Homo is the 
word honor.  The term and its variants (such as exhonorare, inhonorare, etc.) appear 47 
times in the text, primarily in locations where Anselm lays the foundation for his 
argument that the Incarnation was necessary.  Anselm’s use of honor in this way has been 
raised as the prime example of the “feudal” imagery found in the CDH.  R.W. Southern 
uses honor as a case study to stand for all feudal imagery in the CDH.1  George C. Foley, 
in his thorough critique of Anselm’s work in the CDH, begins by attacking Anselm’s 
usage of honor as the foundation for a misguided, feudal perspective on the atonement.2    
It is the purpose of this chapter to re-characterize Anselm’s use of honor from a negative, 
feudal characterization to a positive, deeply-considered one that reflects the tradition of 
theology inherited by Anselm.      
Anselm and Honor 
In Anselm’s view, all beings have an honor that reflects their essence.  This honor 
is fundamental to the nature of a being and is conveyed through words and actions.  
God’s honor is perfectly maintained in harmony with His omnipotence, omniscience, 
eternity, etc.  He affirms this in agreement with his non-Christian, monotheistic audience: 
 
1 R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990)., 225-227.   
2 George Cadwalader Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1909)., 147-153.   
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“Divinam enim naturam absque dubio asserimus impassibilem, nec ullatenus posse a sua 
celsitudine humiliari, nec in eo quod facere vult laborare.”3  Although he immediately 
follows up this statement with the Christian assertion that the alleged “humilia” of the 
Incarnation applied only to the humanity of Christ, Anselm is careful to be consistent 
with his assertions concerning the supreme nature of God that he made in other works 
(most notably in the Monologion).4  He is keenly aware of the central problem that the 
divinity of God seems inconsistent with the human experiences of Jesus Christ.  Even 
after assigning weakness to the humanity of Christ (rather than the divinity of Christ), 
Anselm feels compelled to make it explicit with Boso that “nullum vel minimum 
inconveniens in deo a nobis accipiatur.”5  Just as no inappropriateness or deficiency (my 
understanding of inconveniens) in God was to be considered, consequently, God must be 
considered to be perfect in whatever He is.6  Honor is a significant factor in this 
consideration: if God’s honor is violated in any way, His omnipotence, omniscience, etc. 
is also besmirched.  Thus, Anselm takes the honor of God as seriously as the nature and 
essence of God.   
Honor also reflects the relationships between beings.  In any given relationship, 
one party honors (or dishonors) the other based on the degree to which their actions are 
appropriate with respect to the other party’s being.  In the relationship between God and 
human beings, the honor relationship is defined by the Creator/creation dynamic.  God 
has a certain honor as the Creator and humans’ relationship to God is defined by the fact 
 
3 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1938)., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 59).   
4 See Monologion chapters 15-17.   
5 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 10 (II, 67).   
6 Again, consistent with his description of God in the Monologion.   
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that they are not only created beings but also were created by the God with whom they 
are in relationship.  The activities of all humans are indelibly tied to the fact that humans 
are the creation of God.  God did not create human beings randomly, but with a purpose.  
For Anselm, the most basic purpose for the creation of human beings was to bring honor 
to God who created them.  Further, Anselm viewed the creation of humanity as God’s 
plan to replace the fallen angels in heaven.  While it is never explained at what later point 
humans would actually replace the fallen angels in heaven, the assumption is clear that 
humans were to demonstrate lives of obedience to God in stark contrast to the rebellion 
of the fallen angels.   
The plan that God intended for humanity to fulfill was jeopardized by the sin of 
humanity.  Adam’s original sin marked the beginning of a failure to render honor to God 
that has plagued humanity ever since.  Adam’s sin affected not only himself, but also all 
other humans because, collectively, humanity failed to maintain the status quo of the 
relationship with God.  This leads to a situation in which there is both a corporate 
obligation to render honor and individual obligation to render honor to God.  In order for 
the situation to be rectified, there needs to be both corporate and individual satisfaction of 
the honor of God.   
Anselm undertakes a detailed explanation of the honor relationship in the context 
of sin.  He argues that sin is merely the failure on the part of a creature to give to God 
what is owed to God.  For Anselm, omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet 
esse voluntati dei.7  It is clear that Anselm views honor in the light of both activity and 
attitude of human beings.  This voluntas is rectitudo voluntatis and is therefore a choice 
 
7Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
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made by human beings as creatures.  It is “willing done rightly” just as much as it is 
“uprightness of the will.”  Anselm, as a believer in libertarian freedom, places the activity 
of willing squarely in the realm of human beings as independent, free agents.  It is 
something that humans freely choose and so, when they do right or not, humans can be 
held accountable and judged based on their actions.  Anselm continues by arguing that 
hic est solus et totus honor, quem debemus deo et a nobis exigit deus.8   This uprightness 
of will is the sole obligation of humanity to God.  Similarly, it is a necessary feature of 
any activity that is pleasing to God: nullum opus sine illa placet.9  This voluntas is both 
necessary and sufficient for fulfilling a human’s obligation to God and for pleasing God.  
Conversely, when this voluntas is lacking, it constitutes a failure to honor God and thus, 
is sin.   
Although Anselm does not seem to operate from a clear scriptural basis in his 
discussion of honor and sin, the idea that humanity owes something to God that is 
disrupted by sin is clearly present in the Bible.  David Brown has suggested that the 
frequent biblical connection between glory and honor can shed some light on a scriptural 
background for Anselm’s use of honor:  
Although many, if asked, might well declare ‘honor’ not to be a biblical 
word, this misleading impression is created only because so often its use is 
yoked with others, especially ‘glory.’  So, significantly, God is repeatedly 
offered ‘glory and honor’ in the worship of heaven, and that is also seen as 
an appropriate ascription to God here on earth.  More puzzlingly, it is not 
inconceivable that Paul may have thought ‘honor’ a legitimate human 
aspiration also.10 
 
 
8 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
9 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
10 David Brown, "Anselm on Atonement," in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, ed. Brian Davies and 
Brian Leftow, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)., 
294.   
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Paul’s assessment of the state of sinful humanity in Romans 3:23 (“omnes enim 
peccaverunt et egent gloriam Dei”) seems to have clearly influenced Anselm.  Sin (and 
its presence in all humans) has caused a separation between humanity and God.  Paul 
characterizes this as a failure to attain to or a privation of the glory of God and it seems 
that, in light of Brown’s suggestion, “honorem” could just as easily be inserted into this 
passage in place of “gloriam.”  Anselm seems to be on firm (although perhaps narrow) 
scriptural ground for his assertion that sin is a failure to render honor to God.   
The way that human beings honor God is more than simply a matter of the will, 
though.  Later on, Anselm states more broadly that quando unaquaeque creatura suum et 
quasi sibi praeceptum ordinem sive naturaliter sive rationabiliter servat, deo oboedire et 
eum honorare dicitur, et hoc maxime rationalis natura, cui datum est intelligere quid 
debeat.11  The honor of God is a function of the proper maintenance of the order of 
creation.  For Anselm, humans have both a special ability and responsibility within this 
order.  As rational creatures, humans have the ability either to knowingly maintain their 
place in the order of things or to disrupt it.  This distinguishes human beings (and human 
actions) from those of the rest of creation.  Put clearly, quae cum vult quod debet, deum 
honorat; non quia illi aliquid confert, sed quia sponte se eius voluntati et dispositioni 
subdit, et in rerum universitate ordinem suum et eiusdem universitatis pulchritudinem, 
quantum in ipsa est, servat.12  Whereas the actions of other creatures do not affect their 
standing before God, human actions determine whether or not they have properly 
submitted themselves to God.  Uprightness of will is as much about God as it is about 
humans.   
 
11 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 72-73).   
12 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 72-73).   
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Having connected honor to ordo, Anselm makes a crucial argument that the order 
of creation remains undisturbed, regardless of human sin.  Even though it may seem like 
human sin has violated the order of creation, Anselm argues that at no time is the order of 
creation ever actually breached.  For him, potestatem aut dignitatem dei nullatenus laedat 
aut decoloret.13  Rather, God has ordered the universe in a way that for every such 
apparent breach of order, one of two counter-balancing events occur: either voluntary 
recompense is made, or punishment is exacted (spontanea satisfactio vel a non 
satisfaciente poenae exactio).14  Anselm argues that otherwise, sibi deus ipsi iustus non 
erit aut ad utrumque impotens erit; quod nefas est vel cogitare.15  Since God can not 
violate His own will or order, justice demands that there always be an even balance, a 
zero-sum game of the order of the universe.  Anselm uniquely argues that this balance is 
not accomplished through a ledger book of wrong and right, or disorder that is later 
corrected, but rather that the balance is eternally maintained via God’s will.  Recompense 
or punishment necessarily accompanies any “disruption” of order.  In that sense, there is 
really never any “disruption” at all.  Rather, God eternally balances out the instances in 
which humans create disorder.   
At this point, Anselm moves on from the issue of honor to questions of justice, 
owing a debt, and, finally, satisfaction.  These issues will all be taken up in later chapters 
of this work, so the task remains in this part to further explicate Anselm’s understanding 
and use of “honor.” Anselm has three primary concerns relating to honor:   
1) The honor of God is inherently tied to the essence of God.  
 
13 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 73).   
14 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 73).   
15 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71).   
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2) The honor of God is inherently tied to His relationship with creation as 
Creator.   
3) The honor of God is eternally maintained so that any apparent breach or 
besmirching of God’s honor by creation is presently and immediately 
accompanied by punishment or recompense.   
 
These concerns will guide the foregoing discussion of honor both for Anselm, his 
interpreters and others who deal with this issue.  Anselm’s approach has been laid out 
already, so the remaining portion will deal with his interpreters and other sources to be 
brought into conversation with Anselm.   
Critics of Anselm on Honor 
Foley wrote a detailed critique of the CDH in his book Anselm’s Theory of the 
Atonement in 1909.  In this work, Foley builds on the 19th-century textbook criticisms of 
Anselm16 and points out three “defects” of Anselm’s theory:  1) it is not based in 
scripture, 2) it is not logically sound, and 3) it is “external and institutional” and fails to 
account for the personal nature of Christianity.17  Foley makes his case by analyzing 
Anselm’s theory step-by-step and has a great deal to say about honor throughout the 
work.  He focuses on Anselm’s usage of honor as it relates to sin and describes the 
offense of humanity as “defrauding the suzerain of a vassal’s service” and reparation as 
“the soothing of a feeling of impaired official prestige.”18  He characterizes Anselm’s 
understanding of honor as “derived from the institution of feudalism” and focuses on a 
personal and anthropomorphic understanding of honor.19  In this way, he deals with the 
second of Anselm’s concerns for honor (the relationship between God and humanity).  
Finally, he accuses Anselm of inconsistency with regard to the loss and restoration of 
 
16 Such as those of Harnack and Ritschl.   
17 Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement., 143-147.   
18 Ibid., 148.   
19 Ibid., 148.   
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honor.  He contends that the “loss of God’s honour is the basis of his whole reasoning; 
but he admits that God can suffer no objective loss of this kind.”20  Here, Foley either 
misunderstands or disagrees with Anselm’s third concern for the balance of God’s honor.  
He references the possibility that Anselm could be talking about two different types of 
honor (“essential honor” that is internal and cannot be violated and “exterior honor” that 
is affected by creation, humans, etc.), but this does not seem to have any basis in 
Anselm’s text.  He concludes that Anselm obviously contradicts himself and pronounces 
that “the argument, notwithstanding all its acuteness, is utterly vitiated by this 
contradiction.”21   
 R.W. Southern takes a more objective, if not friendlier, approach to Anselm’s use 
of honor in his book Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape.22  In a broad sense, 
Southern argued that the CDH “was the product of a feudal and monastic world on the 
eve of a great transformation” and that “it bears the marks of this rigorous and – if the 
word can be used without blame – repressive regime.”23  Southern chose honor as the 
prime example of the way that the CDH reflected the feudal world in which Anselm 
wrote.  He translates honor as “due honour” and takes a further step in explaining that “it 
is equated with the well-known secular servitium debitum: it is capable of being paid, 
withdrawn, restored.”24  After quoting a passage from the CDH, he argues that the 
language “could scarcely be more feudal, and the thought it expresses is only intelligible 
 
20 Ibid., 152.   
21 Ibid., 152.   
22 Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape., primarily the section “Feudal Imagery and Universal 
Order” found at pp. 221-227.   
23 Ibid.,  222.   
24 Ibid., 225.   
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if the language is understood in a strictly contemporary sense.”25  Not only does Southern 
believe that Anselm’s use of honor should only be understood in his feudal context, he 
argues that Anselm’s use is also distinct from those who came before him and from those 
who followed: 
The solidity of his concept of honour, its minute gradations and 
equivalents, and its reiteration at the most important moments of his 
argument, all suggest a social and ideological background quite different 
from our own or from that of St Augustine or St Thomas Aquinas.  This 
background, which sets Anselm as far apart from Patristic as from 
modern, or even later medieval thought, is the complex of feudal 
relationships.26 
 
This assessment of the CDH by Southern and the case of honor in particular has had an 
enormous impact on later scholarly work concerning the CDH.  The idea that Anselm 
took a perspective that was different from the better-known perspectives of Augustine 
(and, by extension, other Patristic writers), Aquinas (and other Medieval writers) and the 
contemporary world is common among many who interpret Anselm, whether they do so 
in philosophical, theological or historical contexts.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
Southern, as one of the premier scholars of Anselm, may have strongly contributed to 
making this negative attitude commonplace.   
Athanasius’ Use of Image as Analogue for Anselm and Honor 
The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to re-interpret the way that Anselm 
used honor in the Cur Deus Homo by bringing his work into conversation with the 
corresponding work of a theologian whom Foley and Southern (and others) would 
consider to be utterly distinct: the De Incarnatione (DI) of Athanasius of Alexandria.  
Even though some recent scholars have explicitly rejected any possible correlation 
 
25 Ibid., 225.   
26 Ibid., 225.   
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between the works of Athanasius and Anselm, others have begun to notice similarities of 
approach and language.27  I do not wish to argue for any influence of Athanasius on 
Anselm,28 but I think the point can be made quite clearly and strongly that they took 
remarkably similarly tacts in their arguments for the necessity of the Incarnation.  With 
regard to the topic under consideration in this chapter, Anselm’s use of honor, I would 
like to draw a comparison to Athanasius’ use of image (eivkw,n).   
Athanasius’ overarching concern in the DI was very similar to Anselm’s in the 
CDH:  an apologetic investigation into the logic of the Incarnation in the face of non-
Christian objections that a fleshly/human appearance is incompatible with divinity.  
Athanasius sets the scope of his own work to be to “tell of the incarnation of the Word 
and expound his divine manifestation to us, which the Jews slander and the Greeks mock, 
but which we ourselves adore, so that from the apparent degradation of the Word you 
may have ever greater and stronger piety towards him.”29  Athanasius felt the burden of 
explaining all aspects of the Incarnation in language and terminology that was accessible 
to educated, non-Christian critics.  As Khaled Anatolios has pointed out, the DI (along 
with its’ companion work the Contra Gentes (CG)) “is first and foremost an apologia 
crucis.”30  Athanasius also builds up his argument by starting with concepts shared 
among Christians and non-Christians alike (creation and sin) and attempts to show that 
the Incarnation was a necessary result.  For both Anselm and Athanasius, the key 
 
27 Some examples include David Bentley Hart, Kevin McMahon and Giles E.M. Gasper.  Please see 
Bibliography for exact citations.   
28 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gasper has examined this issue thoroughly in his book Anselm of 
Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance.  While it is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest that Anselm 
knew any genuine work of Athanasius, there are other possible connections that will be explored later in 
this work.   
29 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. Henry Chadwick, trans. Robert W. Thomson, 
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)., 135 (DI 1).   
30 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought (London: Routledge, 1998)., 28.   
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rationale for the necessity of the Incarnation is that the original state of creation 
(specifically humanity) is in need of restoration.  The focus, then, is on the relationship 
between God and humanity as Creator and creation.  For Anselm, this relationship is 
defined by the idea of honor.  Honor, as both defenders and critics of Anselm agree, 
stands for the order of creation.  For Athanasius, humans were created in the image of 
God and this defines the relationship between God and humanity.   It remains to be seen, 
then, how Anselm and Athanasius use honor and image in parallel ways and contexts.   
 The idea of image certainly has a stronger Biblical foundation for use in 
describing the relationship between God and humanity than does honor.  Genesis 
describes the creation by God of humans katV eivko,na qeou/ – in the image of God.  This 
theme is echoed in further passages to value humanity’s privileged status as the image of 
God,31 decry the worship of idols in place of God,32 and affirm Christ as the image of 
God (after whose image humans were created).33  The idea of image is also found in the 
Platonism and Neo-Platonism that had such a strong influence on many early Christian 
theologians.  Plato used the word eivkw,n frequently in the Republic in discussing 
reflections (visible and invisible) of forms.   
Athanasius, himself strongly influenced by the Platonism and Neo-Platonism of 
the Alexandrian schools, places this idea at the center of his argument in the DI.  He first 
asserts that God created everything “from nothing through his own Word, our Lord Jesus 
Christ.”34  The idea of creation through a mediating Lo,goj was a concept that Athanasius 
would have shared with the Jews and Greeks with whom he found himself in 
 
31 See, for example, Genesis 9:6. 
32 See, for example, Romans 1:23.    
33 See, for example, 2 Corinthians 4:4 and Colossians 1:15.   
34 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 141 (DI 3).   
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conversation.  The identification of this Lo,goj with Jesus Christ (whereas Jews might 
identify it with the feminine Wisdom of Proverbs) was Athanasius’ particularly Christian 
move.  He then explains that, in creation, God gave humanity “an added grace, not 
simply creating men like all irrational animals on the earth, but making them in his own 
image and giving them also a share in the power of his own Word, so that having as it 
were shadows of the Word and being made rational, they might be able to remain in 
felicity and live the true life in paradise, which is really that of the saints.”35  Humans, 
then, were originally created in the image of the Word, who Himself, for Athanasius, was 
the Image of God (as we have seen earlier – n. 33).  The next step is to explain sin and 
the consequences thereof:   
God, then, had so created man and willed that he should remain in 
incorruptibility.  But when man had disregarded and turned away from the 
understanding of God, and had thought of and invented for themselves 
wickedness, as was said in the first part, then they received the 
condemnation of death which had previously been threatened, and no 
longer remained as they had been created, but as they had devised, were 
ruined.36            
 
The state of sin was entirely avoidable – sinful humanity was “devised” and not 
“created.”  The will of God in creation was stymied by the sinful actions of humans who 
had the power to choose to follow God.  Athanasius makes it clear that even though 
humans were created “corruptible” like all creatures, participation in the image of the 
Word meant that corruption was not inevitable: “by the grace of the participation of the 
Word they could have escaped from the consequences of their nature if they had 
remained virtuous.”37  So, humans were responsible for the corruption that came upon 
 
35 Ibid., 141 (DI 3).   
36 Ibid., 143 (DI 4).   
37 Ibid., 145 (DI 5).   
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them, but the nature of the image relationship between God and humans was such that the 
corruption (and corresponding death, due to the law of God) of creation marked an 
unacceptable blot on the handiwork of the Creator.   
For God would not have been truthful, if after he had said we would die, 
man had not died.  And furthermore, it would have been improper that 
what had once been created rational and had partaken of his Word, should 
perish and return again to non-existence through corruption.  For it would 
not have been worthy of the goodness of God that what had been brought 
into existence by him should be corrupted on account of the deceit which 
the devil had played on men.  And it would have been especially improper 
that the handiwork of God in mankind should come to nought, either 
through their neglect, or through the deceit of demons.38   
 
The goodness of God is key for Athanasius, since he considers how “good” God would 
appear if the circumstances were viewed objectively.  If God were to stand by and simply 
allow corruption and death to rule creation by His neglect to intercede, “the weakness of 
God rather than his goodness would be made known, if after creating he had abandoned 
his work to corruption…”39   
Athanasius characterizes the situation as a conflict between the divine law that 
meant death for sin and the need for humanity to remain uncorrupted so that God’s 
goodness would not be compromised.  He finds himself at the same position as Anselm at 
the end of chapter 13 of the first book of the CDH.  The choice between the law and 
goodness of God is strikingly similar to Anselm’s struggle between maintaining the 
honor and omnipotence of God.  At this point, Athanasius takes up a key question that 
Anselm also considers at this stage of his argument: whether mere repentance might 
relieve humanity from corruption and death.  Athanasius’ answer is that the problem lies 
not so much with sin, but with the effect that sin had in bringing corruption on humanity: 
 
38 Ibid., 149 (DI 6).   
39 Ibid., 149 (DI 6).   
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“If…there had been only sin and not its consequence of corruption, repentance would 
have been very well.  But if, since transgression had overtaken them, men were now 
prisoners to natural corruption, and they had been deprived of the grace of being in the 
image, what else should have happened?”40  Repentance alone could not restore 
humanity from corruption to incorruption and only the creator could restore the image in 
.   
Having excluded the possibility of human repentance in providing for the 
salvation of humanity, Athanasius makes an extended argument and offers multiple 
variants in explaining how the 
tion is the following:   
For since the Word realized that the corruption of men would not be 
abolished in any other way except by everyone dying – but the W
not able to die, being immortal and the Son of the Father – therefore he 
took to himself a body which could die, in order that, since this 
participated in the Word who is above all, it might suffice for death on 
behalf of all, and because of 
grace of the resurrection.41   
The language of “participation” here is evocative of the earlier ways in which Athanasiu
discussed the way that humanity was created in the image of God.  However, he makes 
the connection explicit in one of the later passages in which
 the rationale for the necessity of the Incarnation.   
What then was God to do, or what should have happened, except that he 
should renew again that which was in his image, in order that through
men might be able once more to know him?  But how could this have been 
done, unless the very image of God were to come, our Saviour Jesus 
Christ?  For neither by men was it possible, since they had been created
the image, nor by the angels, for neither were they images.  So the Word 
 
40 Ibid., 151 (DI 7).   
41 Ibid., 153-155 (DI 9).   
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of God came in his own person, in order that, as he is the image of his 
Father, he might be able to restore man who is in the image.  In any other 
way it could not have been done, without the destruction of death and 
corruption.  So he was justified in taking a mortal body, in order that in i
d
For this, then, none other than the image of the Father was required.42   
Athanasius here argues emphatically that the image of the Word must have been renewed
in humanity by the coming of the Word Himself.  He comes to the same conclusion tha
only by the Incarnation of the Word was a necessary and sufficient cause available to 
provide for the salvation of humanity.  What is striking is that he makes his point to a 
ilar certainty and by a similar argument
Image and Honor in the Incarnation 
In comparing Anselm’s use of honor with Athanasius’ use of image, let us return
to Anselm’s three primary concerns relating to honor: honor is 1) inherently tied to the 
essence of God, 2) inherently tied to God’s relationship with creation as Creator, and 3) 
presently and immediately accompanied by punishment or recompense if it ever seems to
be compromised.  Some of these concerns have been hinted at already in the discussion 
of Athanasius’ use of image, but it is i
n Athanasius will be helpful.   
First, the inherent connection between the image and essence of God should be 
obvious.  As the image of God, humans reflect (in as many ways as physically possible) 
the essence of God.  Athanasius relies on the scriptural identification of the Word, Jesus 
Christ, as the Image of God.  As An
sius’ Trinitarian theology:  
 
42 Ibid., 165-167 (DI 13) – emphasis mine.   
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Image, as Athanasius uses it, refers both to the relationship between humans and God and 
to the relationship between the Son and the Father.  It is as fundamental to the essence of 
God for Athanasius as God’s goodness, grace, power, etc.  This is a cornerstone of 
Athanasius’ apologetic strategy, in the words of Anatolios: “Athanasius wants to show 
that the fact of the incarnation is consistent with who God is, and with God’s general way 
of relating to creation from the beginning.”   The essence of God includes the Word as 
Image and this is only made clearer in the discussion of the next point.    
 The concern for an inherent tie between the idea of image and God’s relationship 
with creation as Creator is a point that Athanasius makes on numerous occasions.  The 
essence of God includes the idea of image and this naturally extends to creation, in the 
way that God is just as essentially “creator” as He is good, powerful, etc.  As Anatolios 
puts it, “God is beyond all created being, as uncreated, but his nearness to creation has its 
basis also in his very nature, as supremely good and loving.  In the self-same movement 
of creation, God asserts his transcendence over that which he brings into existence from 
nothing, as well as demonstrating his love which leads him to generously grant existence 
to what was not.”   Creation, then, flows naturally from God’s essence.  For Athanasius, 
                                                
Humanity, therefore, is the ‘image of the image.’  Its similarity to God is 
thus fundamentally articulated as a participation in the Son’s archetypal 
relationship of similitude to the Father.  This point alerts us to the 
Trinitarian background of Athanasius’s anthropology.  It also provi
with a fundamental insight into the logic whereby Athanasius asserts that 
only the true Image can re
participation in) the natural (i.e., unparticipated, substantial) similitude of 
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43 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought., 56.   
44 Ibid., 39.   
45 Ibid., 41.   
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God could not ignore the corruption and death of His creation since “this was neither 
proper nor fitting for the goodness of God.”46  The problem was not simply a desire that 
humanity not be destroyed, but that what was created in His image (“what had once bee
created rational and had partaken of his Word”47) should not be destroyed.  Athanasius 
makes it clear that humanity was unique by virtue of having been created in the ima
God.48  This unique situation prompted the renewal of the image in humanity to be 
performed in a way similar to the original act of creation.  Just as humans were created b
the activity of the Word, so also the re-creation of humanity was effected by the Word
“…it is necessary for him whose portrait it is to come again so that the picture can be
renewed in the same material – for because of his portrait the material on which it is 
painted is not thrown away, but the portrait is redone on it…”49  The original image was 
renewed in the same “material” by the One who was both Image and Creator.  Thus,
idea of image is key to
renewal of creation.   
 The third and final concern is the necessary accompaniment of a response to the
disruption of the image in creation.  As noted earlier, Anselm has faced criticism from
Foley and his followers for his position that God faces the loss of honor without ever 
actually losing it, since that would be impossible for God.  Foley argued that this was a
contradiction to base an entire argument on sin causing humanity to fail to honor God 
and yet maintain that God could never actually suffer any loss of honor.  As Anatolios 
explains, Athanasius is in a similar position with regard to the image of God in the DI. 
 
46 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 149 (DI 6).   
47 Ibid., 149 (DI 6).   
48 See DI 13.   
49 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 167 (DI  14).   
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Anatolios contrasts that Athanasius, on the one hand, argues that “nothing short of the 
incarnation of God could renew” the relationship between humans and God and, o
other hand, “the whole dramatic movement of the De Incarnatione, in which the 
incarnation takes place at the penultimate moment before humanity’s utter demise.”50  
The dramatic tension that Athanasius builds up in detailing how corrupted the image of 
God became in humanity only to be renewed in the Incarnation is paralleled by Anselm
explanation of “how heavy the weight of sin is” and yet, at the same time, how sin ca
never actually affect God’s honor since it is eternally maintained, just like any other 
divine perfection.  Just as the natural consequences of human corruption (the demise of 
humanity) were never felt by Athanasius’ reckoning, so also the natural consequences o
dishonoring God (punishment [death] equal to the offense) were replaced in Anselm’s 
system by recompense.  For
to fy the Incarnation.   
 It seems, therefore, that Anselm and Athanasius share the same concerns in the 
way that they approached the rationale of the Incarnation.  Anselm’s use of honor and 
Athanasius’ use of image allow the respective authors to describe how the essence of God
and the need for a counter-balance to sin all work together to compel a rational audie
to agree that the Incarnation was a necessary solution to the problem of human sin.
However, it is more than shared concerns that join Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo and 
Athanasius’ De Incarnatione.  As noted above, critics have seized upon Anselm’s use of 
honor as indicative of the feudal context for his writings, which they view as a negative
characteristic of Anselm’s work.  I would like to argue that the particular use of honor
 
50 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought., 66.   
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that is so often criticized can also be seen in Athanasius’ use of image.  In doing so, I 
hope to show that Anselm’s use of honor is not so imbedded in a feudal context that it 
cannot be seen to have redeeming, universally applicable theological value.  There are
two characteristics of feudalism that are associated with Anselm’s use of honor that I 
wish to show to be fo
b ans to God.   
 Southern pointed out the important role that hierarchy played in Anselm’s 
understanding of honor.  For Southern, Anselm’s understanding of honor is very closely
linked to the idea of one’s “estate,” in which Southern includes one’s “due place in the 
hierarchy of authority, his family background, and his personal honour.”51  Southern goes
on to explain that obedience is linked to the preservation of hierarchy and order, wher
disobedience (sin, in the particular case of the CDH) damages and even destroys the 
order of things.  According to Southern, Anselm “valued hierarchy as an expression of 
the rule of reason.”52  In this ordered hierarchy that Anselm valued so much, God as th
Creator of all stands at the top of the hierarchy and all of creation is beneath Him.  In 
disobedience, “a man is guilty of attempting to put himself in the place of the Creator.  
He fails; but in making this attempt, he excludes himself from, and to the extent of his 
power destroys, the order and beauty of the univers
linked to the order and hierarchy of the universe.   
 Athanasius, too, gives high value to the ordered hierarchy of the universe, as 
ordained by God.  However, as Anatolios points out so well, Athanasius emphasized the 
 
51 Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape., 225.   
52 Ibid., 227.   
53 Ibid., 226.   
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transcendence, incorruption and supremacy of God as Creator in order to demonstrate the
magnitude of God’s goodness in the Incarnation.  Anatolios argues that the transcend
Creator and the Word Incarnate both consistently reflect the nature of God:  “God is 
beyond all created being, as uncreated, but his nearness to creation has its basis also in his
very nature, as supremely good and loving.  In the self-same movement of creation, God
asserts his transcendence over that which he brings into existence from nothing, as we
as demonstrating his love which leads him to generously grant existence to what was 
not.”54  Athanasius works through this himself, as described above, when he weighs the 
destruction of humanity due to the law of death against the goodness of God.  On the o
hand, God had ordained in His law the punishment of death for disobedience and sin, 
since corruption of His image in humanity was an affront to Him.  In the face of human 
sin, God the Creator and transcendent ruler of all, must respond to this, and death was the 
fore-ordained response.  Athanasius emphasizes that this was most fitting in regard to the
nature of God: “it would have been absurd that for our benefit and permanence God, the 
Father of truth, should appear a liar.”55  On the other hand, the elimination of human
creation and those whom God ruled would have improperly altered the hierarchy of 
things by removing humans: “it would have been improper that what had once been 
created rational and had partaken o
ce through corruption.”56   
Athanasius makes a clear distinction between God who is Creator and uncreated 
and everything else, which is created out of nothing.  As Anatolios points out, tho
 
54 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought., 41.   
55 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 149 (DI 7).   
56 Ibid., 149 (DI  6).   
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is the relation between God and specifically humanity that is most important for 
Athanasius, and which he believes is of primary significance in the objective order of 
things.”57  It is due to the fact that God imbued humanity with His
d this privileged status compared to the rest of creation:   
For God, the creator of the universe and king of all, who is beyond all
being and human thought, since he is good and bountiful, has made 
mankind in his own image through his own Word, our Saviour Jesus 
Christ; and he also made man perceptive and understanding of reality 
through his similarity to him, giving him also a conception and know
of his own eternity, so that as long as he kept this likeness he might neve
abandon his concept of God or leave the company of the saints, but 
retaining the grace of him who bestowed it on him, and also the special 
power given him by the Father’s Word, he might rejoice and converse 
with God, living an idyllic and truly blessed and immortal life.  For havin
no obstacle to the knowledge of the divine, he continuously contemplate
by his purity the image of
w
towards the universe.58   
Humans were ordained to remain in contemplation of God, by virtue of having been 
created in the image of God.  This was the place of humans within the order that God ha
created.  However, as Anatolios makes clear, Athanasius explains the disruption o
order in light of the fact that “humanity had failed to ‘remain’ within the original 
structure of the relationship with God and had turned to the non-being of evil.”59  Th
emphasis on “remaining” by Athanasius can be clearly linked to the role of human 
“obedience” in the ordered hierarchy that was a part of Anselm’s use of honor.  In both 
cases, human rebellion against the role ordained for them by God caused a disruption in 
the order of creation.  For Anselm, this necessitated a repair to t
 
57 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought., 32.   
58 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 7 (CG 2).   
59 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought., 35.   
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 A further point of comparison between Anselm and Athanasius is the nature of 
human activity with relation to God.  For both, God created humans in a special place 
within the hierarchy of the universe, enabling them to play an active role in maintaining 
the order of things through choices and actions of their free will.  These actions reflect 
not only the privileged state of humanity in comparison to the rest of creation, but also 
the subordinate position of humans to God.  It is the latter part that has drawn criticism 
for Anselm and it will be useful to see how the same subject is handled by Athanasius.   
 Southern explored this issue as part of his examination of what God’s honor 
meant to Anselm.  In Southern’s account, “God’s honour is the complex of service and 
worship which the whole Creation, animate and inanimate, in Heaven and earth, owes to 
the Creator, and which preserves everything in its due place.”60  As mentioned above, 
Anselm’s understanding of human obligations with regard to the honor of God is that 
“omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati dei.”61  Anselm views 
this as the particular obligation of “angel and human,” apart from the rest of creation.62  
Much of the criticism of this position stems from analyses like that of Southern, who 
compares this human obligation to the feudal servitium debitum.63  This was an integral 
part of feudal society in which service (commonly represented by military service) was 
owed by vassals to lords.  A lord’s honor was directly related to the degree to which he 
received this servitium debitum from his subjects.   
 As mentioned above, the creation of humans in the image of God is what set 
humanity apart from the rest of creation for Athanasius.  Just as uprightness of will is 
 
60 Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape., 226.   
61 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
62 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
63 Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape., 225.   
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required of humans in Anselm’s system, Athanasius describes the situation that God 
provided for humans to maintain their privileged status:  
Furthermore, knowing that men’s faculty of free will could turn either 
way, he first secured the grace they had been given by imposing a law and 
a set place.  For he brought them into his paradise and gave them a law, so 
that if they kept the grace and remained good they would enjoy the life of 
paradise, without sorrow, pain, or care, in addition to their having the 
promise of immortality in heaven.64   
 
The responsibility of humans was to not turn away from the grace that had been given 
them (having been created rational and in the image of God) and to follow the law that 
had been given by God.  Anatolios characterizes this distinction as one between humans 
who actively receive divine grace and other creatures that merely receive it passively.  
This active reception is tied to the fact that humans were created in the image and 
likeness of God:  
Athanasius describes humanity as not only protected and maintained by 
the Word, but also as charged with the task of consciously assenting and 
clinging to this protection and maintenance.  Thus, the ‘added grace’ 
bestowed upon humanity comes with the condition that humanity itself 
maintains its accessibility to this grace.  Its ‘likeness’ to God is 
simultaneous with the vocation to strive to retain that likeness…65 
 
Thus, there is a direct and active involvement by humans in maintaining the image that 
God placed in humanity.  This activity is the responsibility incumbent upon humans to 
maintain the relationship with God, much like humans are responsible to God for 
obedience in Anselm’s system.   
Shared Approach Among Anselm and Athanasius 
 Having compared Anselm’s honor with Athanasius’ image, I would like to draw 
out a shared approach to the rationale for the Incarnation that can be explicitly applied to 
 
64 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 141 (DI 3).   
65 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought., 59.   
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Anselm’s use of honor in order to argue that his work should not wholly be confined to 
the feudal social context in which he lived.  For both, the order of creation flows from the 
nature of God as Creator.  Humans occupy a privileged place within that order in that 
they are given the gift of rationality.  This rationality comes with the attendant 
responsibility to actively maintain a life of obedience to God.  When this order of 
creation was violated by sin, it was God’s nature as perfect Creator and lover of creation 
that was the driving force behind the Incarnation as a means of restoring the order of the 
universe as it was originally created.  Only God as creator could accomplish this act of 
restoration because it involved a re-creation on the magnitude of the original creation and 
only God is capable of this.  The remainder of this chapter will focus on showing how 
Anselm’s use of honor fits this abstracted approach.   
First, Anselm’s definition of the way that humans honor God (omnis voluntas 
rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati dei)66 should be understood as the way 
that rational creatures actively maintain a life of obedience to God.  Although the 
language is that of “being subject,” it can and should be understood as obedience within 
the context of a human’s station in the order of the universe.  Anselm makes this clearer 
later on: “Verum quando unaquaeque creatura suum et quasi sibi praeceptum ordinem 
sive naturaliter sive rationabiliter servat, deo oboedire et eum honorare dicitur.”67  Here, 
obedience and maintaining one’s place in the universal order is equated with honoring 
God.  Further, this occurs within the context of the Creator-creation relationship for 
Anselm, since he refers to humans here as “creatura.”   
 
66 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
67 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 72-73).   
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When a human sins, Anselm makes it clear that “deum, quantum ad illam 
pertinet, inhonorat, quoniam non se sponte subdit illius dispositioni, et universitatis 
ordinem et pulchritudinem, quantum in se est, perturbat…”68  Sin is a disruption of the 
order (and beauty) of the universe.  It may be an offense or an affront to God, but the 
ultimate impact of sin is upon the order of creation.  Within that order, though, are built-
in counter-balances to the disruption of sin: “perversitatis spontanea satisfactio vel a non 
satisfaciente poenae exactio.”69  These counter-balances (punishment or satisfaction for 
sin) are applied eternally, in Anselm’s view.  Thus, a sin may appear to disrupt the order 
of creation within the context of time, but all sins are counter-balanced from God’s 
eternal perspective.  The purpose of the Incarnation was to provide the satisfaction for sin 
so that punishment equal to the sin would not be meted out upon humanity.  As Anselm 
makes clear, such punishment would result in the destruction of humanity.  The 
Incarnation avoided the destruction of humanity while at the same time it upheld the 
order of creation, since satisfaction for sin was provided.  The fact that God allowed for 
satisfaction instead of punishment indicates the divine love for creation.   
Anselm viewed God’s original act of creation as being of the utmost weight and 
importance.  It was a reflection of God’s nature as Creator.  No created being has this 
nature in the perfect way that God does, so it is impossible for any other being to rectify 
the order of creation in the way that was needed.  Only God could bring to bear the 
positive creative force to counter the destructive force of sin.  Whereas Anselm spends a 
great deal of time in explaining the extent of human sin and the accompanying negative 
impact on the honor of God, Athanasius is more eager to explain how God’s goodness 
 
68 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 73).   
69 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 73).   
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met and overcame the destructive force of human sin.  This is the great accomplishment 
of Athanasius by comparison to Anselm.  However, reading Anselm with the Athanasian 
approach in mind allows one to see that Anselm, too, has a place for the goodness and 
love of God when considering the honor of God.   
The convergence of the love and honor of God in the CDH is most clear in 
chapter 11 of the second book when Anselm discusses the self-giving of the God-man.  
For Anselm, the God-man, having been born of a virgin and lived a sin-free life, is the 
only human being who did not individually dishonor God.70  Thus, even though the God-
man owes lifelong obedience to God as a human, the God-man would never need to die, 
since human death is only a result of human sin and corruption.  According to Anselm’s 
understanding of honor, the God-man has fully honored God in His life and has not 
participated in the dishonor of God that is attendant with all other humans as a result of 
corporate and individual sin.  So, the death of the God-man is a complete reversal of the 
system of honor as Anselm has described it.  The God-man who is perfectly obedient is 
not subject to punishment and needs no satisfaction.  Human death is regarded as the 
ultimate punishment for disruption of the order of creation and that is exactly what the 
God-man uses to provide satisfaction.  As Anselm puts it:  Nihil autem asperius aut 
difficilius potest homo ad honorem dei sponte et non ex debito pati quam mortem, et 
nullatenus se ipsum potest homo dare magis deo, quam cum se morti tradit ad honorem 
illius.71  The God-man turns the instrument of punishment into the means of satisfaction 
of the honor of God.  Whereas the dishonoring of God was to such a great extent that an 
 
70 See Anselm’s De conceptu virginali for a full explanation of the relationship between the God-man and 
original sin.  He also here distinguishes the unique nature of the conception of the God-man from those of 
other miraculously-conceived human beings (e.g. – John the Baptist).   
71 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 111).   
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extreme level of punishment was needed, the satisfaction accomplished by the death of 
the one for whom death was not required constituted the greatest act of self-giving for the 
honor of God.  The way that Anselm understood and used honor allowed him to 
underscore the ultimate, even perfect, love of God toward humanity by demonstrating 
that it complements the ultimate dishonor of God by human sin.72  Anselm articulates the 
need for this just as strongly as Athanasius explains that God was driven to restore the 
image in humanity by His goodness and love.  The correspondence between human sin 
and the death of the God-man cannot be understated.  Athanasius argued that the image 
of God must be restored after humanity failed to remain in obedience to God.  
Athanasius’ emphasis on the goodness and love of God in driving the restoration of the 
same image in humanity that had been corrupted provides the best analogue for Anselm’s 
use of honor to describe the way that the death of the God-man in an act of ultimate self-
giving provided the perfect complement and satisfaction for the act of sin that marred the 
honor of God.   
 
72 This, then, constitutes a higher-level issue of concern for the motivation of the Incarnation in contrast to 
the mundane objections to the Incarnation.   
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Chapter 3 
Justice 
 
For Anselm, honor provides the framework for his argument for the necessity of 
the Incarnation, but it is his conception of justice that moves the argument along through 
its steps.  As Foley points out, “compensation is due to the honour of God, but it is 
required by His justice; the justice is involved in the acceptance of Christ’s death as a 
reparation.”1  Foley and other critics for generations have seized upon Anselm’s use of 
the term justice (iustitia) and held it up as a prime indicator of the feudal nature of 
Anselm’s thought process in the CDH, much like Southern’s focus on honor described in 
the previous chapter.  Foley, himself reflecting the critiques set out by the textbook 
histories of theology from the 19th century, takes issue primarily with what he perceives 
to be Anselm’s strict opposition between justice and mercy.  He sees no place for this 
kind of justice in Christianity, let alone any theory of the atonement: “If infinite justice 
demands its due, what sphere of activity has infinite love?  There must be a necessity for 
our redemption in the eternal nature of His love; to centre theology in His justice is 
paganism, not Christianity.”2  In this chapter, I would like to argue that Anselm used the 
term justice (and its variants, including related usages of iustitia) in a different way than 
his critics have assumed.  I will trace the usage of justice beginning with Augustine and 
 
1 George Cadwalader Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1909)., 149.   
2 Ibid., 166.   
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the devil-ransom theory that Anselm refutes through to the conclusion of the CDH where 
it plays an important role.  I will then examine the critiques of Anselm’s use of justice 
and argue that his critics have mistakenly assumed a meaning of justice taken from 
Augustine’s soteriological theory, which Anselm specifically avoids.  I will then 
conclude with a re-interpretation of Anselm’s usage of justice based on a revised 
understanding of its meaning.  It is hoped that this will better position the CDH with 
regard to Augustine’s devil-ransom theory and also answer wholesale critiques of the 
CDH that are based in large part on a misunderstanding of Anselm’s use of the term 
justice.   
Anselm and Augustine on Justice 
Anselm first discusses justice in the context of his rejection of the devil-ransom 
theory of the atonement in book I, chapter 7.  He broadly characterizes the theory as one 
in which it is said that “deum…debuisse prius per iustitiam contra diabolum agere, ut 
liberaret hominem, quam per fortitudinem…”3  Justice was prioritized over the power of 
God because sinful humans were supposedly justly under the power of the devil by virtue 
of sin.  In sinning, humans handed themselves over from serving God to serving the 
devil, since humans had at the same time disobeyed God and followed the lead of the 
devil.  Because humans had willingly handed themselves over to the devil, God could not 
simply remove them from the power of the devil without paying a ransom in exchange.  
The assumption is that God could not do anything in violation of strict justice and must, 
therefore, compensate the devil in exchange for his loss of human servitude.  So, the 
devil-ransom theory posits that the life of Christ was offered to the devil in exchange for 
 
3 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1938)., CDH lib. I, cap. 7 (II, 55).   
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humanity, since Christ was the only human not under the control of the devil.  However, 
it is important to note that Anselm rejects both this theory and the understanding of 
justice that it assumes.  Anselm points out that “diabolus aut homo non sit nisi dei et 
neuter extra potestatem dei consistat.”4    Since both the devil and humans are in the 
service of God, Anselm re-casts the situation as one in which “servum suum…suo 
conservo communem dominum deserere et ad se transire persuasisset…”5  By this 
reckoning, God cannot act unjustly with respect to the devil since the devil is under the 
power of God in the same way that devil-ransom theory proponents argue that humans 
were under the power of the devil.  The alleged tension between justice and the power of 
God is a non sequitur, then, for Anselm since there is no difference in standing toward 
God between the devil and human beings.  With both the devil and human beings in 
equal service to God, even if human beings were under the power of the devil, this would 
be no motivation for the Incarnation and Atonement.  However, Anselm would disagree 
even with the idea that humans were in bondage to the devil.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the relationship between God and humanity is defined by the order set 
out by the idea of honor.  This is more fundamental than (and thus supersedes) any 
relationship between humanity and the devil.   
By rejecting the devil-ransom theory in this way, Anselm shows that he is 
operating with a different understanding of justice than that of the devil-ransom 
proponents (most notably Augustine of Hippo).  Anselm has denied both the narrative of 
the events surrounding the fall of humanity and the impact of it upon divine justice.  In 
order to better understand Anselm’s position, it is important to examine the background 
 
4 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 7 (II, 56).   
5 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 7 (II, 57).   
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of Augustine’s theory to show how Anselm is setting himself apart from the theologian 
who was most influential for him.  The devil-ransom view of justice starts with the role 
of justice in dealing with the first human sin.  According to Augustine, “Quadam justitia 
Dei in potestatem diaboli traditum est genus humanum, peccato primi hominis in omnes 
utriusque sexus commixtione nascentes originaliter transeunte, et parentum primorum 
debito universos posteros obligante.”6  He adduces the “handing over” from Paul’s Letter 
to the Ephesians in which he talks about sinners walking “secundum principem potestatis 
aeris.”  He takes this to indicate that the original humans who sinned (and all who were 
born in sin thereafter) were handed over to the control of the devil.   
Augustine describes the manner of this “handing over” as one in which God 
merely allows it to happen: “Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli 
potestatem, non ita debet intelligi, tanquam hoc Deus fecerit, aut fieri jusserit: sed quod 
tantum permiserit, juste tamen.”7  Augustine portrays God as standing on the sidelines 
when humans were brought under the power of the devil, but he asserts that God 
permitted the action to occur “justly” (juste).  He explains that God withdrew himself 
from humanity to the extent that they were no longer subject to him, but rather to the 
devil.  Similarly, the remission of sins delivers humanity from this subjection to the devil 
and provides reconciliation with God: “Si ergo commissio peccatorum per iram Dei 
justam hominem subdidit diabolo, profecto remissio peccatorum per reconciliationem 
Dei benignam eruit hominem a diabolo.”8  This sort of justice that would allow the devil 
to be inserted in the place of God in some part of the life of humanity is perplexing, to 
 
6 Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest 
Information and Learning Company, 1996)., XIII.4.   
7 Ibid., XIII.4.   
8 Ibid., XIII.4.   
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say the least.  Augustine does not detail exactly how humanity is subjected to the devil as 
a result of sin, though he does assert that there are certain areas in which humans were 
still subject to God: as creator, life-giver, benefactor, divine lawgiver, etc.  However, the 
“ira dei justa” that subjects humans to the devil in Augustine’s system is difficult, if not 
impossible, to defend or qualify.  Even Edmund Hill, in the notes to his English 
translation of De Trinitate, is compelled to make the following comment: 
Explanations of the redemption in terms of justice are not very fashionable 
nowadays.  Indeed they are regarded with a reserve verging on disapproval 
as being “legalistic” or “feudal” or “juridical” – all of which are very bad 
names indeed.  And even if we can stomach such qualities in a theological 
explanation, most of us nowadays find it rather peculiar to think of the 
devil as having legal rights which God has somehow to buy him out of, 
and we assume that some such idea as this is involved in talking about 
God overcoming the devil with justice.9   
 
If Augustine’s soteriological work faced charges of feudalism based on the use of the 
term justice, it is interesting that Anselm also faced this charge despite his rejection of 
Augustine’s approach, specifically with regard to the role of justice.  A justice that would 
prompt God to withdraw from humanity to any extent and even allow humans to become 
subjects of the devil does seem objectionable.  However, this is Augustine’s justice, not 
Anselm’s.  Anselm specifically repudiates the idea that humans were subjected to the 
devil as a result of sin.  As we have seen above, Anselm argues that divine justice would 
not allow humans to become subjected to the devil, but instead would maintain the 
subjection of all creatures to God.  Perhaps some of the charges that critics bring against 
Anselm’s use of justice stem from the incorrect assumption that Anselm was operating 
with the same definition of justice as Augustine.   
 
9 ———, The Trinity, ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A., trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., vol. 5, The Works of Saint 
Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1991)., 367 n. 36.   
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Anselm’s Justice Beyond Augustine 
Anselm goes beyond a mere rebuttal of Augustine’s position in his use of justice 
in the Cur Deus Homo.  He uses iustus, iustitia and other forms of the same root over 175 
times in the CDH to describe the role of justice in the Incarnation and Atonement.   The 
majority of the usages involves instances in which the terms translate into English as 
justice, righteous(ness) and unrighteous(ness)/wrongdoing.  Anselm uses the term in a 
complicated and sophisticated way that has challenged translators to develop consistent 
patterns of translation in spite of the various contexts in which Anselm employs the term.  
In this, he was likely influenced not only by Augustine’s usage but also by the way that 
the term was employed in the Vulgate.10  In the following section, I will examine the way 
that Anselm develops his understanding of justice beyond his disagreement with the way 
that Augustine and others used it in the devil-ransom theory.   
After his rejection of the devil-ransom theory, Anselm next addressed justice in 
his discussion of whether human sin could be merely forgiven by God without the 
necessity of the Incarnation.  He takes up the point in connection with freedom of the 
divine will and whether God’s will is somehow restricted by not being able to will the 
forgiveness of human sin without the Incarnation.  Anselm argues that God does not will 
this because it is unfitting that God would leave anything unregulated within creation and 
that mere forgiveness of sin would disrupt this order of regulation.  He concludes by 
arguing that “itaque de illis tantum verum est dicere: si deus hoc vult, iustum est, quae 
 
10 Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998)., xxiv.  Davies and Evans point this out here in the “Note on the Text and Translators” – 
“Another term which presents huge difficulties is iustitia.  It means both ‘righteousness’ and ‘justice’ and 
the play of that double meaning in the Vulgate translation of the Bible was of endless importance in 
Anselm’s own thinking.”      
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deum velle non est inconveniens.”11   Divine justice, then, does not compel God to act in 
ways that are not fitting.  Additionally, the divine will does not will anything that is not 
fitting.  The will and justice of God are consistent with the nature of God as a perfect 
being and so no inconsistency can be introduced by pitting one divine attribute or activity 
against another.  Thus, in this case, God’s will is not so “free” that it can will something 
inconsistent with the divine nature (e.g. – mere forgiveness of human sin without 
regulation/reparation).   
Having raised the issue of justice with regard to the will of God, in the next 
chapter Anselm discusses the extent to which human sin represents an offense to the 
justice of God.  As reviewed in the previous chapter of this study, Anselm characterizes 
sin as the failure to render honor to God as creator.  For Anselm, this creates an 
intolerable situation in regard to God.  He goes further to state that “nihil autem iniustius 
toleratur, quam quo nihil est minus tolerandum.”12  From this characterization of 
injustice Anselm argues for an inherent connection between the justice and honor of God: 
“nihil iustius quam honorem illius servat in rerum dispositione summa iustitia, quae non 
est aliud quam ipse deus.”13   An affront to God’s honor is an affront to the justice of 
God, which, as Anselm reminds his audience, is identical to God himself.  This latter 
point hearkens back to Anselm’s work in the Monologion in which he uses the example 
of justice to argue that God simply is whatever it is better to be than not.  He argues that 
God is these things due to His divine nature, rather than participating in some external 
quality (e.g. – goodness, justice, beauty, etc.): “bona vel magna vel subsistens quod est, 
 
11 ———, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 12 (II, 70).   
12 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71).   
13 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71).   
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omnino per se est, non per aliud.”14  With regard to the specific case of justice then, 
“eadem natura est ipsa iustitia; et cum dicitur esse iusta per iustitiam, idem est quod per 
se.”15  Here, Anselm establishes the principle that God is supreme justice and vice versa.  
In this, he is strongly influenced by Augustine, who makes a similar point in De Civitate 
Dei.16  So, Anselm here places the weight of the nature and essence of God behind the 
idea that God’s honor must be preserved.  This preservation takes place within the 
context of justice and so the nature and justice of God are at stake when human sin 
threatens the honor of God.  This principle drives Anselm to argue for the necessity of the 
resolution for human sin (“aut ablatus honor solvatur aut poena sequatur”) since the 
alternative would be to deny divine justice (“aut sibi deus ipsi iustus non erit”) or to deny 
divine omnipotence (“aut ad utrumque impotens erit”).17  Neither alternative is 
acceptable for him since both involve introducing internal inconsistencies into the nature 
of God, so his argument concerning the honor of God carries on with the two possibilities 
presented by divine justice. 18   This is one instance in which justice drives Anselm’s 
argument, in this case by narrowing the range of possibilities.   
Anselm emphasizes justice in the next stage of his argument when he discusses 
the effect of human sin on the relationship between God and humanity.  He argues that 
 
14 Ibid., Monologion, cap. 16 (I, 30).   
15 Ibid., cap. 16 (I, 30).   
16 “illa simplicia, quae principaliter vereque divina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud 
substantia, nec aliorum participatione vel divina, vel sapientia, vel beata sunt.” - Augustine of Hippo, De 
Civitate Dei Contra Paganos, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest 
Information and Learning Company, 1996)., XI.10.   
17 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71).   
18 It is interesting that Anselm finds himself facing a similar tension between the justice and power of God 
to the one that Augustine raised in his version of the devil-ransom theory.  For Augustine, the tension 
revolved around the interaction between God and the devil.  For Anselm, the tension is solely concerned 
with the internal consistency of the nature of God.   
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human sin deprived God of “quidquid de humana natura facere proposuerat.”19    He 
then appeals to justice to show that humanity in and of itself is incapable of making 
recompense for this theft: “Intende in districtam iustitiam, et iudica secundum illam, 
utrum ad aequalitatem peccati homo satisfaciat deo, nisi id ipsum quod permittendo se 
vinci a diabolo deo abstulit, diabolum vincendo restituat.”20  This “strict justice” 
demands that the repayment be equal and complementary to what was taken.  So, since 
the event of the initial sin was a victory for the devil and a loss for God, the repayment 
must come in the form of a loss for the devil and a victory for God.21  Anselm asks Boso 
rhetorically: “Putasne summam iustitiam hanc iustitiam posse violare?”,22 emphasizing 
that the just resolution to the problem of sin is perfectly fitting with God’s nature as 
supreme justice.  Justice, then, drives Anselm to make the next key move in his argument 
when he asserts to Boso that humanity has been so thoroughly corrupted by sin that no 
human being is born without it.  However, the way that the human race can fulfill the 
plan that God intended would be for a human being to be victorious over sin to such an 
extent that there are enough righteous, justified humans to fill the gap in heaven that was 
left by the fallen angels.  Anselm brings the problem to a head when he concludes that 
“hoc facere nullatenus potest peccator homo, quia peccator peccatorem iustificare 
nequit.”23   No human born in sin can provide for the salvation of humanity in the just 
way that Anselm described.  To this, Boso mournfully replies, “Et nihil iustius et nihil 
 
19 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 23 (II, 91).   
20 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 23 (II, 91).   
21 The contrast between the devil and God over the first sin and the satisfaction for sin shows that Anselm is 
still heavily influenced by the Augustinian account of the atonement.  The devil still plays a role, but it is a 
different, side role.  The devil’s victory and defeat are secondary to the interplay between God and 
humanity.   
22 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 23 (II, 91).   
23 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 23 (II, 91).   
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impossibilius.  Sed ex his omnibus videtur misericordia dei et spes hominis perire, 
quantum ad beatitudinem spectat, ad quam factus est homo.”24  The working of justice 
seems to have led to an impossible situation for the salvation of humanity.  The death of 
divine mercy and human hope are also tied to this move, since there does not seem to be 
any room for God to intervene on behalf of humanity, since it is God’s own supreme 
justice that has seemingly placed salvation beyond human reach.   
Anselm defers the discussion of the tension between justice and mercy and turns 
first to the issue that humanity can still be judged to be unjust even if humans lack the 
capability to conform to justice.  Even though the initial human sin removed the ability 
for humanity to make recompense for sin and fulfill the divine purpose for the creation of 
humanity, it is still no excuse for the failure of humans to make recompense for sins and 
live righteously to the extent that heaven can have its full complement of righteous beings 
restored.  He begins by making the point that the stakes for humanity are higher since 
they are being judged on actions related to God and not merely inter-human actions: “Si 
homo dicitur iniustus, qui homini non reddit quod debet: multo magis iniustus est, qui 
deo quod debet non reddit.”25  After Boso questions how someone can be blameworthy if 
they do not have the capacity to act justly, Anselm responds by allowing that there might 
be a valid excuse, but not if the incapacity is the fault of the individual in question: “Sed 
si in ipsa impotentia culpa est: sicut non levigat peccatum, ita non excusat non 
 
24 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 23 (II, 91).   
25 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 92).  The translation of the CDH by Janet Fairweather in the Oxford World 
Classics series (“The Major Works”) somewhat misleadingly translates “iniustus” as “wrongdoer” in this 
chapter when the term is used to refer to human beings.  I find it more helpful here to translate it as “unjust” 
or “an unjust person” in order to better connect it the usage with the discussion of divine justice in the 
remainder of the chapter.   
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reddentem debitum.”26  Rather than excusing an ongoing failure to fulfill the purpose of 
God in humanity, the initial sin is placed in a position of even greater injustice since it 
had the effect of both a one-time injustice and a continuing state of injustice in humanity.   
Anselm then addresses the question of divine mercy in relation to a divine justice 
that seems to offer no human possibility for salvation and excludes even simple divine 
intervention.  Anselm recognized the tension between justice and mercy and, although he 
addresses it directly, his later critics accuse him of providing an unsatisfactory 
explanation of the relationship between the two.  As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Foley took issue with what he viewed as an extreme prioritization of justice that 
rendered mercy non-existent: 
He made such a complete distinction between justice and mercy as to 
render antagonism possible, and then arrayed the one against the other by 
portraying the one as demanding what the other does not.  This is a 
practical revival of the Gnosticism of Marcion.  Mercy was represented as 
helpless until justice was satisfied; their reconciliation was the proof of 
their previous opposition.27 
 
Anselm both exacerbates and anticipates this critique in Book I, chapter 24.  He raises the 
possibility of divine mercy remitting either what humanity was supposed to provide to 
God or the punishment that humanity was to receive for failing to fulfill their created 
purpose.  He argues that these characterizations of divine mercy contradict divine justice 
and are thus impossible situations: “Verum huiusmodi misericordia dei nimis est 
contraria iustitiae illius, quae non nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum.  
Quapropter quemadmodum deum sibi esse contrarium, ita hoc modo illum esse 
 
26 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 92).   
27 Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement., 173. 
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misericordem impossibile est.”28  He sharply contrasts this view of divine mercy with 
justice, but he immediately follows it up with an alternate understanding of mercy.   
The kind of mercy that would circumvent the workings and effects of divine 
justice is a false understanding of mercy according to Anselm.  Since he does not deny 
that God is merciful along with being just (that is to say, God is supreme mercy in the 
same way that God is supreme justice), he offers an alternative interpretation for the 
place of mercy in his soteriology.  Boso represents the voice of one who looks for a 
divine mercy that circumvents the operation of divine justice to provide a way out of the 
effects of sin without incurring punishment or satisfaction.  Anselm acknowledges the 
role of mercy in human salvation but he locates it later in the process than his interlocutor 
has in mind: after satisfaction is made – “Misericordem deum esse non nego, qui 
‘homines et iumenta’ salvat, ‘quemadmodum’ multiplicavit ‘misericordiam’ suam.  Nos 
autem loquimur de illa ultima misericordia, qua post hanc vitam beatum facit 
hominem.”29  Anselm’s mercy works in conjunction with (though his critics might say 
that it is subservient to) divine justice by granting eternal blessings to human beings 
chronologically after human life has been completed and logically after satisfaction has 
been made for sin.  The mercy of God, then, is inherently connected to the salvation that 
is provided by the God-man.  Furthermore, as with all divine attributes, it is inseparable 
and indistinguishable from the justice, power, goodness, etc. of God.  By that reasoning, 
the mercy of God may be found in those activities that are attributed to the justice of God.  
Even though the two may seem to be opposed, Anselm unites them by locating them in 
 
28 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 93).   
29 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 94).   
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the same activity of God: the salvation of humans.  Salvation through satisfaction for sins 
is the merciful conclusion of a series of events driven by justice.  
Marilyn McCord Adams argues that justice and mercy are so intertwined in 
Anselm’s work that, not only is it not possible to distinguish separate salvific activities 
between the two, mercy “emerges as initiator and relentlessly driving force,”30 especially 
upon consideration of Book II of the CDH.  Bearing this in mind, Adams argues that 
justice serves as the rhetorical front-man for the activity of mercy:    
…in the order of explanation, Mercy is prior to both sin and satisfaction 
insofar as Mercy orders the beatific end and chooses as means “loop-hold” 
general policies with regard to Adam’s race; in the order of execution, 
Mercy is prior to and simultaneous with the payment of satisfaction, 
insofar as Mercy orders the Incarnation and insures the God-man’s sinless 
career.  Why, then, does Cur Deus Homo lead with an argument from 
“strict justice” that seems to put satisfaction first?  In my judgment, 
rhetorical strategy is key.31 
 
Although I do not agree that Anselm emphasized justice for merely rhetorical strategy 
(Adams herself acknowledges Anselm’s earlier emphasis on justice in the Proslogion that 
seems to carry through to the CDH), her counter-emphasis on mercy is helpful to 
illustrate Anselm’s belief that he was not shortchanging mercy, but rather choosing to 
locate it at different points in his argument than his critics might wish to find it 
themselves.  I would prefer to push the issue even further and argue that Anselm did not 
wish to differentiate between the mercy and justice of God in the Incarnation at all.  As 
discussed earlier, he ultimately locates divine mercy in the granting of the state of 
blessedness to humanity after satisfaction has been made for sin.  However, Anselm is 
clear that this is the result of the operation of divine justice.  His position seems to be that 
 
30 Marilyn McCord Adams, "Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered," The Modern 
Schoolman 72 (1995)., 97.   
31 Ibid., 101-102.   
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justice and mercy are two sides of the same coin in his soteriology.  This seems to be the 
goal of Book II, chapter 20 in which he claims (and practically exclaims) “quam magna 
et quam iusta sit misericordia dei.”32  Although his definition of divine mercy might not 
be shared with his critics, he seems to be content with viewing the broad story of human 
redemption as merciful: “cum peccatori tormentis aeternis damnato et unde se redimat 
non habenti deus pater dicit: accipe unigenitum meum et da pro te; et ipse filius: tolle me 
et redime te?”33  Adams does not attribute much more than this to the “merciful 
management” that she finds in the CDH: “destining humans to eternal beatific intimacy,” 
“powers of reason and will, equipping will with freedom, spontaneity, inclinations to 
justice and advantage,” “the dignity of human nature,” etc.34   
Having discussed the usage of justice in Book I of the CDH in which Anselm 
used the concept of divine justice to argue for the necessity of human salvation through a 
God-man, it remains to examine Anselm’s use of justice in Book II.  Here, he makes his 
detailed argument for the necessity of the Incarnation and follows his remoto Christo 
method by assuming no particularly-Christian theological principles.35  He begins with 
the creation of humanity and the role of justice with respect to the rational nature with 
which God created human beings.  He assumes the universality of the idea that God 
created humans to be rational creatures, but he is careful to make the connection between 
 
32 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 20 (II, 131).      
33 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 20 (II, 132).   
34 Adams, "Satisfying Mercy.", 97-101.   
35 While attempting to broaden his scope beyond the walls of Christianity in making this move, Anselm 
clearly does not wish to accept or assume any principle that is incompatible with Christianity, despite the 
later charges of some critics.  For him, natural reasoning and logic are divinely ordained and perfectly 
compatible with a Christian perspective.   
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rationality and justice.36  For him, the purpose of the rationality that was endowed upon 
human beings (by contrast to all other creatures that do not have rationality) was to be 
oriented toward and conformed to divine justice: “Ad hoc itaque factam esse rationalem 
naturam certum est, ut summum bonum super omnia amaret et eligeret, non propter 
aliud, sed propter ipsum.  Si enim propter aliud, non ipsum sed aliud amat.  At hoc nisi 
iusta facere nequit.  Ut igitur frustra non sit rationalis, simul ad hoc rationalis et iusta 
facta est.”37  He further argues that this interconnection between rationality and justice 
constitutes the foundation for the purpose of humanity: to love and choose the highest 
good.  The ultimate end of this combination of rationality and justice is “beatus”, the 
blessedness or blessed happiness of the eternal favor of God: “Homo ergo qui rationalis 
natura est, factus est iustus ad hoc, ut deo fruendo beatus esset.”38   Anselm follows this 
up with a point that seems (to him) to naturally follow: that humans would not die so long 
as they do not waver in justice and the purpose for which they were created.  For him, 
death is only a result of the failure to maintain the just nature of the original created state.  
He appeals to divine justice to make his point, as he argues that death is inconsonant with 
the justice of God, so long as humans do not fail in their own justice: “sapientiae et 
iustitiae dei repugnat, ut cogeret mortem pati sine culpa, quem iustum ad aeternam fecit 
beatitudinem.  Sequitur ergo quia, si numquam peccasset, numquam moreretur.”39  
Taken together, these first two chapters of Book II exhibit the way that Anselm used 
 
36 Some translations render iustus as “righteous” in this section, but I would argue that “just” is a better 
translation to more clearly make the point that Anselm viewed human nature as ideally oriented toward and 
conforming to divine justice.  In my view, “righteous” represents only the human equivalent of divine 
“justice” whereas Anselm was focused on bringing human and divine justice closer together, rather than 
distinguishing the two.   
37 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 1 (II, 97).   
38 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 1 (II, 97).   
39 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 2 (II, 98).   
 83 Ch. 3 
 an 
                                                
justice to lay the foundation for his argument, particularly the way in which he sought to 
appeal to his non-Christian audience.  The doctrines of the initial justice and 
righteousness of humanity and the effect that sin had in introducing death are clearly 
represented in Christian scripture, but here Anselm defers a scriptural proof and relies 
instead on arguing that these theological precepts follow logically from the nature of God 
as supreme justice.  In this way, again, justice moves Anselm’s argument along from one 
premise to the next.   
Justice and Necessity 
Anselm’s focus on justice and the creation of humanity leads him naturally into a 
discussion of necessity.  Justice led him in his deduction of the purpose of the creation of 
human beings.  Since there is a purpose (eternal, blessed happiness), two options present 
themselves: aut hoc de humana perficiet deus natura quod incepit, aut in vanum fecit tam 
sublimem naturam ad tantum bonum.40  Since (as previously discussed), God did not 
intend for humanity to die, God does not will that the created purposed of humanity be 
frustrated.  So, Anselm derives the necessity of the Incarnation to provide for the 
fulfillment of the purpose of humanity: “Necesse est ergo, ut de humana natura quod 
incepit perficiat.  Hoc autem fieri, sicut diximus, nequit, nisi per integram peccati 
satisfactionem, quam nullus peccator facere potest.”41  Anselm takes pains to explain 
that the type of necessity he has in mind is a “naturally follows” necessity rather than
external, compulsory necessity.  He spends chapter 5 of Book II clarifying his usage of 
necessity in anticipation of criticism that the salvation of humanity (as he described it) 
happened not for the benefit of humanity, but for the benefit of God.   
 
40 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 4 (II, 99).   
41 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 4 (II, 99).   
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To illustrate the type of necessity by which he argues that the Incarnation must 
have happened in the way that it occurred, Anselm makes the comparison to promises to 
others or vows concerning holy living that a person might freely make with regard to 
future action:  
Nam si quod hodie sponte promittis cras te daturum, eadem cras voluntate 
das, quamvis necesse sit te cras reddere promissum, si potes, aut mentiri: 
non tamen minus tibi debet ille pro impenso beneficio cui das, quam si non 
promisisses, quoniam te debitorem ante tempus dationis illi facere non es 
cunctatus.  Tale est, cum quis sanctae conversationis sponte vovet 
propositum.42   
 
The promise and the vow are made freely; however, once made, there is a sense in which 
there is an obligation to complete the future action.  Similarly, whenever God acts in any 
way, there is an absolute consistency between the beginning and the end.  In the specific 
example of creation (and, consequently, salvation from sin), “si deus facit bonum homini 
quod incepit, licet non deceat eum a bono incepto deficere, totum gratiae debemus 
imputare, quia hoc propter nos, non propter se nullius egens incepit.”43  Since creation 
was initially an action of grace for the benefit of humanity, there is no reason to alter that 
by arguing that any part of that overall process is done by compulsion, since the larger 
activity is one of grace.  There is a necessity that the action should be brought to 
completion once begun, but that is an internal necessity owing to the nature of God and 
not an external necessity by which God is compelled to bring the action to completion by 
some outside force.  Anselm makes this clear at the conclusion of chapter five: “Quae 
scilicet necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a se ipso et 
non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas.  Dicamus tamen quia necesse 
 
42 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 5 (II, 100).   
43 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 5 (II, 100).   
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est, ut bonitas dei propter immutabilitatem suam perficiat de homine quod incepit, 
quamvis totum sit gratia bonum quod facit.”44  The immutability of God is the only 
principle that dictates the actions of God.  So, although he admits that it is not the most 
proper term, Anselm is willing to apply the label of necessity to the process of human 
salvation by the God-man.   
Anselm clearly felt the force of arguments relating to both extremes of necessity 
(that there were either open options or that God’s actions were compelled by some 
external force of necessity) because he returned to the subject in chapter 17 of Book II in 
response to further prodding on the subject from Boso.  Here, he clarifies that divine 
necessity is directly connected to the divine will and forcefully disavows any outside 
influence on the will or activity of God: “Omnis quippe necessitas et impossibilitas eius 
subiacet voluntati; illius autem voluntas nulli subditur necessitati aut impossibilitati.  
Nihil enim est necessarium aut impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita vult; ipsum vero aut velle 
aut nolle aliquid propter necessitatem aut impossibilitatem alienum est a veritate.”45  He 
also places the converse of necessity – impossibility – in its proper context given all that 
he has said about necessity: “Quotiens namque dicitur deus non posse, nulla negatur in 
illo potestas, sed insuperabilis significatur potentia et fortitudo.  Non enim aliud 
intelligitur, nisi quia nulla res potest efficere, ut ille agat quod negatur posse.”46  In both 
of these cases, Anselm is careful to preserve the principle that God acts in accordance 
with His nature.  This gets to the heart of Anselm’s view of necessity as divine internal 
consistency.  The necessity of divine actions is merely a logical outflow from the 
 
44 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 5 (II, 100).   
45 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 17 (II, 122).  
46 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 17 (II, 123).   
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necessity of divine being.  He uses the example of telling the truth to make this point: 
“Nam cum dicimus quia necesse est deum semper verum dicere, et necesse est eum 
numquam mentiri, non dicitur aliud nisi quia tanta est in illo constantia servandi 
veritatem, ut necesse sit nullam rem facere posse, ut verum non dicat aut ut mentiatur.”47  
The necessity is directly connected to the internal constancy or consistency of God, 
which never wavers from what is best.  Any departure from the best would be a negative 
characteristic for God, so upholding what is best (and the necessity that is consequent) is 
a positive characteristic for God, by Anselm’s reasoning.   
Eugene Fairweather points out that this rationale for the necessity of the 
Incarnation that Anselm employs is rooted in his understanding of justice.  Fairweather 
characterizes Anselm’s understanding of justice as “the intrinsic order of reality, the 
rectitudo whose ultimate principle is God’s own being” and contends that “it is therefore 
by way of an argument based from start to finish on the acknowledgment of an 
indefectible order of iustitia that Anselm finally answers his question of the necessitas of 
the Incarnation.”48  He goes on to quote a passage from book II, chapter six and draws 
the following conclusion: “No single phase of his argument is ultimately intelligible 
without reference to his metaphysic of order and rectitude; once we take that doctrine 
seriously, however, the whole argument takes form before our eyes as a coherent 
whole.”49  In this way, then, justice not only moves Anselm’s argument along from one 
 
47 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 17 (II, 123-124).   
48 Eugene R. Fairweather, ""Iustitia Dei" As The "Ratio" Of the Incarnation," in Spicilegium Beccense: 
Congrès International Du Ixe Centenaire De L'arrivée D'anselme Au Bec (Le Bec-Hellouin; Paris: Abbaye 
Notre-Dame du Bec; J. Vrin, 1959)., 334-335.   
49 Ibid., 335.  
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point to the next, but it also provides a ratio that unites all points, even ones that do not 
explicitly
Brian Leftow offers a different interpretation of necessity for Anselm, but still 
indicates the close connection between justice and necessity for Anselm.  Leftow reads 
Anselm and the CDH through the lens of Thomas Aquinas and Aquinas’ own variation 
on Anselm’s work in his article “Anselm on the Necessity of the Incarnation.”50  Leftow 
lists a number of reasons that Anselm gives for the necessity of the Incarnation via the 
life and death of a God-man that are all rooted in the divine nature and divine justice: 
“that in 'strict justice', satisfaction ought to be proportional to the crime,” “that God is not 
fair to Himself if He settles for less,” “that God would be unfair to His supreme worth if 
He let that be insulted,” “that if God leaves sin unpunished and yet forgives it, He 
unfairly treats Adamic humans and unfallen angels as equals” and “that if sin were 
neither punished nor paid for, that would violate the prima facie order of justice, which 
demands the one or the other.”51  He argues that “nothing prevents our taking these 
considerations as all prima rather than ultima facie moral reasons for God to become 
incarnate and atone for humanity. Prima facie 'oughts' are precisely 'oughts' which one 
can at times permissibly ignore.”52  Leftow builds on this idea that Anselm’s 
explanations from justice are all contingent and contends that the necessity that Anselm 
utilizes in his argument involves multiple options from among which God chooses: “T
'necessity' Anselm sees in God's choice God [sic] to become incarnate and atone, I 
suggest, is the 'necessity' that a perfectly rational God choose to maximize the valu
 
50 Brian Leftow, "Anselm on the Necessity of the Incarnation," Religious Studies 31 (1995)., 167-185.   
51 Ibid., 182.  
52 Ibid., 182.  
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plan of salvation realizes. The plan God chooses satisfies these prima facie moral 
demands. That is a good reason to choose it, and God is maximally sensitive to goo
reasons.”53  Leftow’s agenda is to show that Anselm’s understanding of “necessity” in 
the CDH is the same as Aquinas’ view of the necessity of the Incarnation.  However, 
Aquinas’ view of necessity does not seem to match up with Anselm’s upon examinatio
of the primary texts.  Aquinas seems to argue that the salvation of humanity in the way
that Anselm described it was necessary only insofar as it was one option among ma
possible o
ad finem aliquem dicitur aliquid esse necessarium dupliciter, uno modo, 
sine quo aliquid esse non potest, sicut cibus est necessarius ad 
conservationem humanae vitae; alio modo, per quod melius et 
convenientius pervenitur ad finem, sicut equus necessarius est ad iter. 
Primo modo Deum incarnari non fuit necessarium ad reparationem 
humanae naturae, Deus enim per suam omnipotentem virtutem poterat 
humanam naturam multis aliis modis reparare. Secundo autem modo 
necessarium fuit Deum incarnari ad humanae naturae reparationem.54   
 
I would argue that Anselm’s understanding of necessity is much closer to Aquinas’ first 
way, which he explicitly renounces.  Anselm is clear (as seen earlier) that he believes that 
there was only one way to fulfill the demands of justice.  Even though he also argues that 
it was better and more convenient than the supposed alternatives, he does not believe that 
there was any real, possible alternative to the Incarnation and Atonement as it happened.   
Aquinas’ differentiation from Anselm on necessity and Leftow’s interpretation  of 
both indicate a difference in the respective understandings of Anselm’s use of justice.  
Anselm is guided by the concept of justice to argue that there was one and only one way 
that the salvation of humanity could have been accomplished, given God’s free choice to 
 
53 Ibid., 183.  
54 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 3a.1-6, vol. 48 (London: Blackfriars, 1976)., 10 (ST IIIa q1 a2).   
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create humanity.  Aquinas and Leftow seem to want to extend divine freedom of choice 
beyond the initial choice of creation and attribute real, possible alternatives at every step 
of the way from sin through salvation.  By contrast, Augustine portrayed God as almost 
constrained by justice and the rights of the devil, to such an extent that God’s free will 
was constrained by the contingent decision of humans to commit sin and the rights of the 
devil that resulted.  Anselm clearly disagrees with both of these positions in the CDH 
and, fittingly, offers a solution that mediates between the positions of Augustine and 
Aquinas.  Whereas Aquinas seemed concerned with avoiding any limitation on divine 
freedom, Augustine seemed to have been concerned with preserving scriptural narratives 
that alluded to some sort of power that the devil had over human beings.  Anselm’s 
concern, by contrast, is that God always does what is best.  Katherin A. Rogers makes the 
point that Anselm’s position on necessity in the CDH serves a broader purpose of 
resolving any possible tension between divine freedom and necessity: 
God “must” respond to human sin by saving His creation, and He must 
save it in the only way God can do anything, that is, the best way.  But this 
necessity is in no way a limitation on God.  It is not a limitation because it 
arises from His own nature as best.  The first cause in this chain of 
relationships is God Himself.  It is not that human sin causes God to 
become incarnate.  God “must” become incarnate because He does the 
best because He is perfect.  A similar point can be made with respect to all 
of God’s “reactions” to the free choices of creatures.  God gives us 
freedom because He Himself is good.  The originating cause of the whole 
system in which God would respond to free choices is God, and so His 
aseity is preserved.55   
 
 This brings to mind Anselm’s definition of justice from his De Veritate: “Iustitia igitur 
est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.”56  For God, what is “right” is always what is 
 
55 Katherin A. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology, Reason and Religion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1998)., 37.   
56 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., De Veritate cap. 12 (I, 194).   
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“best,” according to Anselm.  Anselm makes this point in many places, perhaps none 
better known than in his Proslogion, in which he lays out his argument for the existence 
of God: “Tu es itaque iustus, verax, beatus, et quidquid melius est esse quam non esse. 
Melius namque est esse iustum quam non iustum, beatum quam non beatum.”57  
Anselm’s understanding of justice is inseparable from his view on necessity, since God as 
supreme justice necessarily does what is best by virtue of the fact that God both is and 
does what is supremely right.  This naturally leads Anselm to argue and believe that his 
version of the soteriological process involving the God-man was necessarily the one and 
only possible series of events.  This is all built into Anselm’s understanding of justice.     
The connection between justice and necessity leads Anselm to argue that the key 
aspects of the Incarnation of the God-man were necessary because they represented the 
best possible means for effecting the salvation of humanity.  So, after addressing 
necessity in Book II, chapter five, Anselm addresses a number of topics that, for him, are 
natural (or even logical) consequences of the fact that God necessarily saved humanity 
via a God-man:   
VI.  Quod satisfactionem per quam salvatur homo, non possit facere nisi 
deus-homo. 
VII.  Quod necesse sit eundem ipsum esse perfectum deum et perfectum 
hominem. 
VIII.  Quod ex genere ADAE et de virgine-femina deum oporteat assumere 
hominem. 
IX.  Quod necesse sit verbum solum et hominem in unam convenire 
personam. 
X.  Quod idem homo non ex debito moriatur; et quomodo possit vel non 
possit peccare; et cur ille vel angelus de sua iustitia laudandus sit, cum 
peccare non possint. 
XI.  Quod moriatur ex sua potestate; et quod mortalitas non pertineat ad 
puram hominis naturam. 
 
57 Ibid., Proslogion cap. 5 (I, 104).   
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XII.  Quod quamvis incommodorum nostrorum particeps sit, miser tamen 
non sit. 
XIII.  Quod cum aliis infirmitatibus nostris ignorantiam non habeat.58 
 
Anselm links these chapters together with phrases such as “Hoc autem fieri nequit, 
nisi…,”59 “Investigandum nunc est quomodo…possit…,”60 “Restat nunc quaerere unde et 
quomodo…,”61 and “Nunc autem restat indagare utrum possit…”62  He uses this 
language of “investigating,” “seeking,” “finding” now to illustrate how each point 
follows on what has come before.  For Anselm, these tenets of the Incarnation reflect the 
methods and paths of supreme justice – in the words of Boso, “Non videtur aliquid 
iustius.”63  Anselm proceeds through the steps of his argument by asserting that each step 
is the natural result of the proceedings of supreme justice.   
In the discussion of the previous section of eight chapters in Book II, it should be 
noted that Anselm did not explicitly appeal to justice at every turn.  Rather, he explored 
what followed necessarily from the intervention of God through “investigations” and 
“demonstrations” in which he argued for what was “just,” “right,” “fitting,” etc.  
However, there seem to be some points on which Anselm is aware of possible (and real) 
critiques of his line of argumentation.  One obvious point is the death of the God-man, a 
point that is at the thrust of the objections of unbelievers listed at the beginning of the 
 
58 Ibid., Cur Deus Homo Capitula libri secundi (II, 46).    
59 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 6 (II, 101).   
60 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 7 (II, 101).  
61 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 8 (II, 102).   
62 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 109).   
63 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 6 (II, 101).  Anselm finds a seemingly unending number of ways for Boso to 
agree with him in the CDH.  In this chapter alone, Boso uses five different phrases to move the 
conversation along by agreeing with Anselm (“Ita constat,” “Nequeo negare,” “Verum est,” “Sic sequitur,” 
and “Non videtur aliquid iustius”).   
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work.64  Anselm is careful to make the argument that the death of the God-man was 
neither arbitrary nor injurious:  
Si homo per suavitatem peccavit: an non convenit ut per asperitatem 
satisfaciat? Et si tam facile victus est a diabolo ut deum peccando 
exhonoraret, ut facilius non posset: nonne iustum est ut homo satisfaciens 
pro peccato tanta difficultate vincat diabolum ad honorem dei, ut maiori 
non possit? An non est dignum quatenus, qui se sic abstulit deo peccando, 
ut se plus auferre non posset, sic se det deo satisfaciendo, ut magis se non 
possit dare?65 
 
Here, he contrasts the difficulty (“tanta difficultate”) of the death of the God-man that 
provided for human salvation from sin with the ease (“tam facile”) that humanity fell into 
sin and came to require salvation.  He appeals to justice (in addition to fittingness and 
appropriateness) to make the key point that the unseemly matters of the suffering and 
death of the God-man were not only rational but necessary.  He makes this connection by 
arguing that death is the action with the greatest degree of difficulty for humans: “Nihil 
autem asperius aut difficilius potest homo ad honorem dei sponte et non ex debito pati 
quam mortem, et nullatenus se ipsum potest homo dare magis deo, quam cum se morti 
tradit ad honorem illius.”66   
Up to this point, he has argued that God must act to save humanity through the 
God-man, but the means of this salvation have not been in explored in detail.  Anselm 
appeals to justice here for the same purpose as he has in earlier cases: to argue that the 
events of the Incarnation are consistent with the nature of God.  In this case, he does not 
go into much more detail as he argues for the broad point that the salvation of humanity 
must be accomplished through death and self-giving.  It is notable that from this point of 
 
64 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 3 (II, 50) 
65 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 111).   
66 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 111).   
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Book II until chapter 18, Anselm does not appeal to justice or use justice to move his 
argument through its various steps in the same way that he did throughout the earlier 
parts of the work.  This section covers the crucial issue of how the death of the God-man 
counteracts the sin of humanity.  Anselm and Boso engage in a dialogue in chapter 14 
that leaves a great deal unsaid.  The key issue is that “peccatum quod in persona eius fit, 
incomparabiliter superat omnia illa, quae extra personam illius cogitari possunt.”67  
However, Anselm does not explore the details of why this is so, even though this is a 
crucial step in his line of argumentation.  He went to great lengths to explain the 
magnitude of human sin (and the attendant injustice) in earlier chapters but he comes up 
short here in explaining the justice of the death of the God-man.  The thrust of the point 
that Anselm makes here comes in the voice of Boso: “Si omne bonum tam bonum est 
quam mala est eius destructio, plus est bonum imcomparabiliter, quam sint ea peccata 
mala, quae sine aestimatione superat eius interemptio.”68  Anselm has not explained why 
the death of the God-man is such a bad thing (especially if that was the will of God and 
the purpose of the Incarnation) and consequently how the self-offering in death of the 
God-man can outweigh the debt of sin owed by humanity.  The latter point will be taken 
up in the next chapter concerning Anselm’s use of the term “debt,” but the former point 
still stands as a weakness of Anselm’s argument.  He would have been better served to 
explain the role of justice in the self-offering of the God-man to death since he went to 
such great lengths to emphasize the role of justice in so many earlier points.   
The lacunae in Anselm’s use of justice are made all the more obvious by the fact 
that Anselm makes it such an important part of his argument in other key locations.  
 
67 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 14 (II, 114).   
68 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 14 (II, 114).   
 94 Ch. 3 
                                                
Anselm uses justice to drive his argument to its conclusion when he explains how the 
work of the God-man can be applied to the benefit of humanity.  Concerning the 
greatness of what the God-man did through His death, Anselm argues that He deserves 
some sort of recompense for this action: “Immo necesse esse video, ut pater filio 
retribuat.  Alioquin aut iniustus videretur esse si nollet, aut impotens si non posset; quae 
a deo aliena sunt.”69  Obviously God has the power to reward the God-man, so any 
suggestion that He would not provide recompense is a matter of divine justice.70  
However, Anselm acknowledges the absurdity of God rewarding God, even within the 
context of the persons of the Trinity.  So, the gift stands superfluous, but Anselm argues 
that this is an impossible situation because it would mean that the action of the God-man 
was carried out in vain (“in vanum filius tantam rem fecisse videbitur”71).  Since this 
cannot be, Anselm suggests that the compensatory gift could be redirected to whomever 
the God-man should choose: “Immo et iustum et necessarium intelligo, ut cui voluerit 
dare filius, a patre reddatur; quia et filio quod suum est dare licet, et pater quod debet 
non nisi alii reddere potest.”72  Justice dictates that the recompense for the death of the 
God-man be redirected to someone else and the natural suggestion is that it go to 
humanity.  Anselm pushes further and argues that it is not just natural or fitting that the 
gift go to humanity, but justice drives him to this conclusion: “quos iustius faciet 
haeredes debiti quo ipse non eget, et exundantiae suae plenitudinis, quam parentes et 
fratres suos, quos aspicit tot et tantis debitis obligatos egestate tabescere in profundo 
 
69 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 130).   
70 Again, note the contrast between the justice and power of God.   
71 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 130).   
72 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 130).   
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miseriarum.”73  The gift would allow for the salvation of humanity by providing 
repayment for the debt owed by humanity to the honor of God.  Anselm reiterates that the 
God-man was not compelled to do this by anything other than consistency with divine 
truth and the divine nature (“ita veritas immutabilis exigebat”, “propter unitatem 
personae”, “qui per peccatum deum offenderat, per iustitiam satisfaceret”).74  He brings 
his argument back to its starting point contra the devil-ransom theory when he concludes 
that human salvation was not a God-devil matter, but a God-human matter:  
deus tamen non egebat ut de caelo descenderet ad vincendum diabolum, 
neque ut per iustitiam ageret contra illum ad liberandum hominem; sed ab 
homine deus exigebat ut diabolum vinceret, et qui per peccatum deum 
offenderat, per iustitiam satisfaceret.  Siquidem diabolo nec deus aliquid 
debebat nisi poenam, nec homo nisi vicem, ut ab illo victus illum 
revinceret; sed quidquid ab illo exigebatur, hoc deo debebat non 
diabolo.75   
 
In the same way that divine justice orchestrated the actions of God with relation to 
humanity in reaction to the first human sin, Anselm argues that justice is critical to 
closing the loop on the issue as humanity is reconciled to God through the actions of the 
God-man.  In all of this, Anselm is clear that the devil takes no more than a side role as, 
at best, an agent provocateur who is defeated in the end.  Following the path of justice 
shows that the victory over the devil is secondary to the reconciliation between God and 
humanity.76   
Anselm concludes his discussion of justice in the CDH with a chapter that at once 
crystallizes his understanding of divine justice and mercy while also providing fodder for 
 
73 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 130-131).   
74 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 131).   
75 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 131).   
76 Much to the chagrin of critics such as Aulén who prioritize the defeat of the devil over all other aspects 
of human salvation.   
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critics who see him as too drastically opposing divine mercy and justice.  He trumpets 
how great and just is divine mercy (“Quam magna et quam iusta misericordia dei”77)in 
light of the self-offering of the God-man in order to save humanity from the 
condemnation of eternal death.  To his critics, Anselm’s association of divine justice with 
the condemnation of humans to eternal torments indicates that he focuses too much on 
justice in the CDH.  However, Anselm’s position is that extremes of justice only reveal 
extremes of mercy.  This is because God’s action is supremely unified.  Even though 
Anselm and anyone else can discuss the condemnation of humanity to death that is the 
result of sin in isolation from the reconciliation and salvation of humanity, God cannot 
and does not.  There is no condemnation and justice without corresponding redemption 
and mercy.  This is what Anselm means when he declares “Misericordiam vero dei…tam 
magnam tamque concordem iustitiae invenimus.”78  There is an indivisible and 
unbreakable concord between divine justice and mercy that is revealed in Anselm’s 
discussion of the topics in the CDH.   
Anselm and His Critics on Justice 
Critics of Anselm have seized on his usage of justice as an indication not only of 
an irretrievable feudal influence but also of a soteriology so fraught with violence and 
punishment that it is rendered intolerable.  The latter argument is made by theological 
ethicist J. Denny Weaver in his book The Nonviolent Atonement.  Weaver argues that a 
“narrative Christus Victor” motif represents the most fitting approach to the atonement in 
 
77 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 20 (II, 131).   
78 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 20 (II, 131).   
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a contemporary pluralistic world.79  He uses Anselm and the CDH as a foil and spends 
almost as much time criticizing Anselm (and later variations on Anselmian satisfaction 
theories of the atonement) as he does in building up his own positive argument for an 
appropriate atonement narrative.  In Weaver’s narrative Christus Victor approach, the 
purpose of the Incarnation was to make visible the reign of God in the world and the 
death of Jesus was committed at the hand of the evil powers of the world and ultimately 
demonstrated the victorious power of God over the evil powers of the world in the 
resurrection.80  Weaver takes the “classic Christus Victor” approach as his starting point 
and maintains a significant degree of consonance with it, particularly related to the role of 
the devil in the sin and redemption of humanity.  He considered Augustine’s view of sin 
and redemption (and the devil-ransom theory in general) to be one variant of this classic 
Christus Victor motif.81  This leads Weaver to very quickly find himself at odds with 
Anselm since Anselm denied the devil a primary role in the sin and redemption of 
humanity.  Weaver’s goal of removing violence (especially divinely-sanctioned violence) 
from the atonement leads him to focus on the cause or agency behind the death of the 
God-man.  Since Weaver would prefer to make the evil powers of the world responsible 
for the death of the God-man, he faults Anselm for removing them from the equation: 
However, when Anselm deleted the devil from the picture for satisfaction 
and moral theories, the picture changed markedly.  Since the divine order 
needs the death to satisfy the debt owed to God, and since humankind 
obviously cannot arrange any plan to rescue itself or to pay its debt, only 
God remains as the one for whom God arranged the plan by which the Son 
could pay the debt.  And since only God can arrange the plan, the logic of 
 
79 J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
2001)., 210-228.   
80 Ibid., 72-74.   
81 Ibid., 14-15.   
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the salvation motif itself makes God the author of the death of Jesus in 
Anselm’s model.82 
 
For Weaver, the idea that God could be responsible for the death of Jesus (even if it flows 
logically from the nature of God) is unconscionable.   
Weaver examines Anselm’s methodology in the CDH and points to justice as the 
culprit (since he correctly notices that justice is the moving force behind the steps of 
Anselm’s argument):  
Divine justice – God’s justice – is what Jesus’ death is aimed at.  It is 
divine justice – God’s justice – that needs the death of Jesus.  Without the 
death, divine justice would not be restored.  And most tellingly, God is the 
agent who arranged the scenario whereby Jesus could be killed so that his 
death would satisfy divine justice.83 
 
 Weaver recognizes that Anselm makes a distinction between violent punishment and 
satisfaction that involves the death of the God-man in his “aut satisfactio aut poena” 
distinction.84  However, he makes the case that Anselm is not absolved from the charge 
of incorporating divinely-sanctioned punishment just because he contrasts the death of 
the God-man with punishment of humanity: “The fact that the death is called satisfaction 
of ‘divine justice’ rather than punishment of an innocent man in place of punishing sinful 
humanity does not alter the fact that God is the agent behind the death.”85  For Weaver, 
this reveals a key assumption that results from the responsibility of humanity to make 
satisfaction for a debt of honor owed to God: “That assumption is that salvation, however 
defined, is linked to or depends on the equation of doing justice with inflicting 
punishment.  In this case the punishment is the ultimate penalty of death.  Doing justice 
 
82 Ibid., 197.   
83 Ibid., 198.   
84 Found in various forms in Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71) and CDH 
lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 74).   
85 Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement., 198.   
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or righting injustice depends on punishment.”86  For Weaver, this is a damning point for 
Anselm’s argument and satisfaction arguments in general.  He places the blame for 
centuries of erroneous, overly-violent atonement motifs on the role of justice in Anselm’s 
work and similar approaches to the atonement: 
Following through the logic of the questions concerning the object of 
Jesus’ death and the agent of Jesus’ death shows that the quid pro quo 
violence of ‘doing justice means inflicting punishment’ is just as true for 
Anselm’s version as for the penal substitutionary variant that developed in 
the Reformed tradition. … To then say that God the Father killed Jesus in 
order to pay the debt, and that the killing of Jesus is a model of divine 
child abuse may be a provocative image – but it flows from the logic of 
satisfaction atonement itself.87  
 
Weaver’s criticism here has been echoed by other scholars who continue to find fault 
with Anselm’s use of justice in the CDH and so deserves an answer on behalf of 
Anselm.88   
Although Anselm likely would not share all of the same concerns that Weaver has 
for developing a proper atonement motif, he would nonetheless be able to make the 
following reply.  The death of the God-man is still better than the alternative, which is 
punishment of all humanity.  The reason it is better is that it is more consonant with the 
nature of God as creator to create humanity and not allow creation to cease to exist due to 
sin.  Anselm views the destruction of humanity as the only other (theoretically) possible 
solution to human sin.  However, given the choice of “aut satisfactio aut poena,” Anselm 
has argued that justice requires satisfaction and not punishment.  Taking it a step further, 
Anselm argues that humanity cannot simply be destroyed, since some humans must 
 
86 Ibid., 201.   
87 Ibid., 202.   
88 For example: Lisa Sowle Cahill, "The Atonement Paradigm: Does It Still Have Explanatory Value?," 
Theological Studies 68, no. 2 (2007). 
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survive to fill the ranks of heaven.89  Justice, then, is opposed to human punishment, by 
Anselm’s logic.90   
Anselm’s discussion of necessity in conjunction with justice also indicates that 
Gods actions are necessary because they are the best possible actions, given the nature of 
God.  Weaver’s criticism that the death of the God-man constitutes divinely-sanctioned 
violence would most likely be met by an Anselmian reply that even though death (and 
perhaps through this death even punishment) is involved, God always acts in the best 
way.  If the death of the God-man is shown to be consistent with the nature of God, then 
the burden of the critic lies in showing that it is inconsistent with the nature of God and 
not merely that it offends the sensibilities of the critic.  If the death of the God-man is the 
action that best corresponds to the nature of God given the situation of sin, then it is the 
best possible action, even if it may seem that God is somehow involved in agency or 
sanctioning.   
While Weaver brings twentieth-century critiques to bear on Anselm’s work, Foley 
represents the critiques of the textbook histories of doctrine from the nineteenth century.  
These criticisms (by the likes of Harnack and Ritschl) shaped the reception of Anselm by 
generations of theology students well into the twentieth century (including Weaver, 
though perhaps indirectly).  Foley’s work builds on the textbook analyses and offers a 
more detailed and nuanced critique of Anselm’s atonement theory in the CDH.  As noted 
earlier, Foley argues that Anselm over-emphasizes justice at the expense of the mercy 
 
89 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia. CDH lib. I, cap. 25 (II, 95).  I believe this is Anselm’s rationale for 
including Book I, chapters 16-18.  Otherwise, he does not have a strong answer to why humanity should be 
saved at all.     
90 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71).   
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and love of God.91  Foley seems to understand that the nature of God influenced the 
actions of God, but he also seems to overlook Anselm’s understanding of divine 
simplicity, which prevents Anselm from making a sharp distinction between the attributes 
of God.  With regard to the obligation of maintaining the honor of God, he argues that 
“this obligation was not to His nature of love, but to His attribute of justice.  If infinite 
justice demands its due, what sphere of activity has infinite love?”92  Foley attributes 
Anselm’s reliance on justice at the expense of love to the latter’s feudal context and uses 
the example of the relationship between Father and Son: 
The juristic conception of satisfaction belonged also to a time when a 
child’s relation to his father was severely legal, and was made more 
natural to Anselm by the fact that the Norman was ‘a born lawyer.’  Thus 
his doctrine, as all succeeding forms of it, was ‘shot through with colours 
drawn from the corruption of Roman society, from the Roman sense of 
authority and the Roman forms of justice.93   
 
As discussed earlier, this has become a standard line in criticism of Anselm, even when 
critics acknowledge that Anselm’s work in the CDH can be consistently re-stated without 
reference to feudal imagery.  Foley here connects the argument that Anselm is too reliant 
on justice at the expense of mercy and love with the argument that Anselm’s feudal 
context leads him to interject an extra-Biblical framework.  I would argue that if Foley 
were to take seriously Anselm’s understanding of justice as standing for the consistency 
of the divine nature with itself, he would come to a different conclusion.   
Foley finds fault with Anselm’s use of justice for what he perceives to be an over-
emphasis on legalism.  He focuses on instances when Anselm discusses punishment in 
relation to justice and draws the following conclusion: “This hard mechanical legality is 
 
91 Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement., 166, 174.   
92 Ibid., 166.   
93 Ibid., 167.   
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completely unethical and unspiritual, because morally impersonal.  It contains no 
revelation of the heart of God, and has no relation to the personal life of conscience and 
obedience: it is technical and subtle like a lawyer’s brief, external to the needs and moral 
activities of the human soul.”94  It seems obvious that Foley views Anselm’s use of 
justice to be similar to (if not identical to) the way that Augustine (and others) used 
justice in formulating the devil-ransom theory of atonement.  In the latter, justice stands 
to the side as a third-party dictating the actions of God, the devil and humanity in the 
aftermath of the first human sin.  In that formulation, there is a “hard mechanical 
legality” that seems to drive the sequence of events.  However, that is not the way that 
Anselm uses justice.  He explicitly repudiates the devil-ransom theory on account of its 
erroneous use of justice and moves in a different direction.  Justice still drives the logical 
sequence of events for Anselm in the CDH, but it does so by appealing to the consistency 
of the divine nature.  In this way, then, Anselm’s justice is perfectly consonant with the 
heart of God and is both ethical and spiritual.   
Foley takes his argument further and compares (unfavorably) Anselm’s use of 
justice to that of others such as Paul and Athanasius.  Since this work focuses on Patristic 
analogues in the CDH, it is appropriate to address Foley’s contrast between Anselm and 
Athanasius.  Foley makes the following case with regard to Anselm’s explanation of 
human salvation: 
There is no necessary relation of the Son of God to man, as Athanasius 
taught, - no solidarity between Him and mankind; He is a mere incidental 
auxiliary, literally a deus ex machina; and the reward which He assigns to 
sinners is something exterior to Himself, and not therefore as in the 
Scriptures something of His very life and self.  All that such a transaction 
can do is to establish for us a legal status with God; it can never initiate a 
 
94 Ibid., 169.   
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moral salvation, for it is almost destitute of moral implications.  But the 
relationship between man and God is exclusively moral, and to make it 
purely legal is to miss the essential point in the need for a work of 
redemption.95   
 
However, Athanasius himself makes frequent use of legal terminology in explaining the 
motivation and rationale for the Incarnation.  Although he does not specifically refer to 
justice as frequently as Anselm does, he makes it clear that the activities of the 
Incarnation happened the way that they did because they were consistent with the nature 
of God.  Athanasius points out that the law of God reflected the order of God and God 
was consistent with His own order:  
For indeed, as I said above, by the law death thenceforth prevailed over us.  
And it was impossible to flee the law, since this had been established by 
God because of the transgression.  And these events were truly at once 
absurd and improper.  For it was absurd that, having spoken, God should 
lie, in that he had established a law that man would die by death if he were 
to transgress the commandment, and man did not die after he had 
transgressed, but God’s word was made void.  For God would not have 
been truthful, if after he had said we would die, man had not died.96 
 
For Athanasius, the Incarnation reflected the consistency of God with God’s own nature, 
similar to the way that Anselm argued from justice that the events of the Incarnation 
happened the way that they did because they were most consistent with the divine nature.  
I contend that both Athanasius and Anselm would argue that the legal or just mechanisms 
of the Incarnation do not obviate the ethical or spiritual aspects of the Incarnation, as 
Foley claims.  The two concerns are not necessarily opposed to one another.  As 
Athanasius pointed out in face of the desire that human beings not be destroyed by 
corruption, God would not save humanity and violate the principles of the divine nature 
 
95 Ibid., 170-171.   
96 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. Henry Chadwick, trans. Robert W. Thomson, 
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)., 147-149 (DI 6).   
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at the same time: “But as this had to be, so again on the other hand lies opposed to it what 
was reasonable for God, that he should appear truthful in passing the law about death.  
For it would have been absurd that for our benefit and permanence God, the Father of 
truth, should appear a liar.”97  The relationship and solidarity between God and humanity 
that Foley saw in Athanasius occurred within a context that valued consistency with the 
divine nature and was explained in legal terms.  There is no reason why Anselm’s work 
cannot be viewed similarly as valuing consistency with the divine nature and explained in 
terms of justice.   
The Influence of Scripture 
The examination of Anselm’s use of justice has shown a dedication of Anselm to 
the sovereignty and consistency of God.  Justice is not an external principle to which the 
actions of God conform, but justice stands for the nature of God, which is consistent 
across all of its attributes (justice, power, mercy, knowledge, etc.).  Anselm appeals to 
justice to make the argument that human sin and salvation are a matter of concern 
between humans and God, leaving the devil off to the side as a third-party and not a 
major player (as Augustine and others portrayed him in variations of the devil-ransom 
theory of atonement).  The justice of God drives the logic of human salvation for Anselm 
and he argues that the necessity and actions of the God-man are ordered by justice.  
Whereas some critics have pointed to Anselm’s use of justice as indicative of the 
influence of feudalism on Anselm, I would argue that Anselm’s use of justice is closer to 
patristic and scriptural analogues.  Having already discussed Athanasius’ work on the 
subject, I now turn to the influence of scripture.   
 
97 Ibid., 149 (DI 7).   
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F.S. Schmitt made note of 85 references to 57 different scripture locations 
throughout the CDH.  Of these, there are only eight references that directly relate to 
Anselm’s discussion of justice.   
Table – Schmitt Scriptural References for Justice Passages 
CDH Schmitt98 Reference Text 
I.3 51:5-7 Romans 5:19  
sicut enim per inoboedientiam unius hominis 
peccatores constituti sunt multi ita et per unius 
oboeditionem iusti constituentur multi 
I.11 68:16 Psalm 35:11 
praetende misericordiam tuam scientibus te et 
iustitiam tuam his qui recto sunt corde 
I.18 78:30 Acts 10:35 
sed in omni gente qui timet eum et operatur 
iustitiam acceptus est illi 
I.18 79:28 2 Peter 3:13 
novos vero caelos et novam terram et promissa 
ipsius expectamus in quibus iustitia habitat 
I.20 88:1-2 Ezekiel 18:27 
et cum averterit se impius ab impietate sua quam 
operatus est et fecerit iudicium et iustitiam ipse 
animam suam vivificabit 
I.20 88:2 Ezekiel 18:22 
omnium iniquitatum eius quas operatus est non 
recordabor in iustitia sua quam operatus est 
vivet 
I.20 88:2 Ezekiel 33:16 
omnia peccata eius quae peccavit non 
inputabuntur ei iudicium et iustitiam fecit vita 
vivet 
I.24 94:11-12 Psalm 35:7-8 
iustitia tua sicut montes Dei iudicia tua abyssus 
multa homines et iumenta salvabis Domine;  
 
Of these references, the one most relevant to Anselm’s use of justice is the reference to 
Psalm 35:11 in book I, chapter 11.  This is the point at which Anselm argues that living a 
just life is the way in which human beings honor God.  The life of justice is defined as 
“iustos facit sive rectos corde, id est voluntate.”99  This is the same “rectos corde” that is 
found in Psalm 35:11.  The fact that he modified “rectos corde” by adding “id est 
                                                 
98 References to Schmitt are to volume 2 of the critical edition in Page:Line(s) format.  Scripture references 
are to the Vulgate, following the LXX number for Psalms references.   
99 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
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voluntate” indicates that he was making a reference to Psalm 35:11 and incorporating it 
into his understanding of justice that he had already defined as “rectitudo voluntati” in De 
Veritate.100   
The pairing of mercy and justice in verse 11 is a theme for the whole Psalm and 
the natural pairing of the two can be found in a similar way in book II, chapter 20 of the 
CDH.  Anselm was committed to the consistency of divine mercy with divine justice.  
Just as David extols God’s mercy and justice in the same breath, Anselm finds both at 
once in the love of God for humanity and the salvation of humanity by God.  The fact 
that he titled this chapter “Quam magna et quam iusta sit misericordia dei”101 strongly 
implies that Anselm was influenced by the understanding of justice (and mercy) that is 
found in the Psalms.  The acclamation of the mercy and justice of God is similar to not 
only Psalm 35, but also to similar passages elsewhere in Psalms: 
Psalm 84:11 – “misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi iustitia et pax 
osculatae sunt” 
Psalm 88:15 – “iustitia et iudicium praeparatio sedis tuae misericordia et 
veritas praecedent faciem tuam” 
Psalm 102:17 – “misericordia autem Domini ab aeterno et usque in 
aeternum super timentes eum et iustitia illius in filios 
filiorum” 
Psalm 111:4 – “exortum est in tenebris lumen rectis misericors et 
miserator et iustus” 
Psalm 114:5 – “misericors Dominus et iustus et Deus noster miseretur” 
 
These verses paint a picture of a divine justice that does not exist without divine mercy.  
Anselm’s concerted effort at the end of book II of the CDH not only answers Boso’s 
concern that the mercy of God might have been dead, but it also indicates that Anselm’s 
 
100 Ibid., De Veritate cap. 12 (I, 194).   
101 The chapter titles are believed to be Anselm’s own, assuming one accepts (as I do) the authenticity of 
the Praefatio that Schmitt included in his Opera Omnia following the Commendation to Pope Urban II.    
 107 Ch. 3 
                                                
understanding of justice was informed (and perhaps strongly so) by the use of justice in 
the Psalms.   
Final Thoughts on Justice 
In the CDH, Anselm uses justice in a way that is much larger and richer than any 
so-called feudal understanding of justice.  What began as a reaction against the way that 
Augustine used justice in the devil-ransom theory of atonement grew into an argument 
impelled by the necessary consequences of sin in the context of the nature of God.  
Anselm had a clearly developed understanding of the nature of God as perfectly simple 
and as justice itself.  So, in the face of suggestions that God conform to an external 
principle of justice or that divine attributes such as mercy or love were somehow opposed 
to divine justice, Anselm was able to consistently argue that these assertions were not 
founded in logic – a strong argument since logic reflects the divine nature.  His own 
position was strongly influenced by neo-Platonic sources (including Augustine) and 
scripture (particularly the Psalms).  This left him with an understanding of the role of 
justice in the Incarnation and Atonement that was more consistent with scriptural and 
patristic sources than feudal and legal usages of justice.102    
 
 
 
102 See also Katherin A. Rogers, The Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canterbury, 
vol. 45, Studies in History of Philosophy (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997).  The enormous influence 
of neo-Platonism on patristic writers is well-established and Anselm does not seem to be far from them.   
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Chapter 4 
Debt 
 
Among the putatively feudal terms under consideration in this work, Anselm used 
debitum and its variants, including debeo, -ere, more frequently than any other 
(approximately 245 times1).  He used it to speak explicitly about the concept of a debt 
and what humanity owes to God.  Additionally, though, he employed the term throughout 
the work to convey ideas of obligation, rightness, necessity and what one ought to do.  He 
used the term so profusely that it will be important to distinguish both uniqueness and 
commonality of usage between the technical and the mundane uses of the term.  That is, 
there are places where his use of debeo is appropriate for the subject under consideration, 
but there are other places where it stands out and it is clear that Anselm is purposely 
employing the term with added theological meaning.  In this chapter, I will examine the 
variations in usage that Anselm employs with the term debt and its variants.  I will then 
examine what he means by debt, who owes the debt and how the debt gets repaid.  In 
order to place Anselm’s usage in context, I will examine the scriptural and patristic 
precedent for using debt in soteriological contexts.  I will then contrast this traditional 
usage with the supposedly feudal implications Anselm’s usage of debt has in the words of 
his critics.  I will conclude by arguing that Anselm was simply using the most appropriate 
term available to him when he expressed the obligation of humanity to God in terms of 
 
1 See Appendix A.   
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debt.  I will argue that Anselm was not unaware of his cultural context in his usage, but 
that he was intentional about the way that he used debt and the way that his readers 
would understand his usage.   
Debt 
Anselm used debitum to refer to a debt, debtor, indebtedness, etc. in less than 20 
percent of the usage under consideration in this chapter.  The context for his usage is 
almost always that of the debt owed by humanity to God.  Anselm first discusses this in 
book I, chapter 11:   
A.  Non est itaque aliud peccare quam non reddere deo debitum.   
B.  Quod est debitum quod deo debemus? 
A.  Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati dei.   
B.  Nihil verius. 
A.  Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo, quod solvendo 
nullus peccat, et quod omnis qui non solvit peccat.2   
 
Here, Anselm places humanity in debt to God from the moment of creation.  As 
mentioned in the earlier discussion of honor, the Creator-creation relationship imposes a 
debt of honor on humanity, since humans owe their entire being to God.  Anselm focuses 
on the human will and argues that the whole will of rational creation (meaning angels and 
humans, though Anselm’s focus here and through most of the CDH is on humans) must 
be subjected to God.  For Anselm, if the human will is subject to God, then this entails 
obedience to God (he does not discuss/consider the possibility of the will being subjected 
to God without corresponding actions of obedience).  By virtue of having been created by 
God, humans must will and act in accordance with God.  Anselm characterizes the force 
of the obligation on the part of humanity in terms of a debt.   
 
2 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1938)., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
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It is clear that Boso takes the image of the debt seriously, given his question in 
book I, chapter 19: “Sed quid est quod dicimus deo: ‘dimitte nobis debita nostra’, et 
omnis gens orat deum quem credit, ut dimittat sibi peccata?  Si enim solvimus quod 
debemus: cur oramus ut dimittat?  Numquid deus iniustus est, ut iterum exigat quod 
solutum est?”3  While Anselm rightly puts off a full response to the line of questioning 
until later in the work, the passage offers insight into the way that Anselm is using 
“debt.”  First, there is the clear reference to Jesus’ own usage of the term in the passage 
from Matthew chapter six commonly known as the Lord’s Prayer.4  Anselm is strongly 
influenced by the characterization of sin as a debt that humans must ask God to forgive.  
This kind of scriptural precedent would have provided a certainty for Anselm’s usage that 
would have defied any questioning of the sort that critics have raised against the 
supposedly “too economic” or “too feudal” term.  I would argue, then, that Anselm did 
not choose to employ the term “debt” for any specific culturally-defined reason or even 
out of arbitrariness.  Rather, his starting point was the scriptural precedent and he 
developed further meaning of the term from that point onward.  Even beyond the quoted 
portion from Matthew 6:12 is the unmentioned second half to the verse: “sicut et nos 
dimisimus debitoribus nostris.”  There is a clear relationship between the debt of sin 
owed by humanity to God and the debts, offences and sins among human beings 
themselves.  The intention of the Lord’s Prayer seems to be that intra-human forgiveness 
of sin should model the forgiveness imparted by God.  If Jesus found the image of a debt 
to be versatile and comprehensive enough to apply to divine-human and human-human 
 
3 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 19 (II, 86).   
4 Schmitt connects Anselm’s use with that of Matthew 6:12 twice – in book I, chapters 12 and 19.  See the 
notes to pages 69 and 86 of his edition.   
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relationships, Anselm seems to think the same way.  So, when Boso questions why one 
should pray for forgiveness of debts even after the salvific work of Christ, he seems to be 
motivated by his human experience with debts and trying to correctly apply it to the 
divine-human relationship.  Anselm defers a full answer to Boso until later in the work, 
but he does note that the continued prayer for forgiveness reflects the difference in 
relationship types: “non expedit homini ut agat cum deo, quemadmodum par cum pari.”5  
There may be a common language of debt, but there is a difference in meaning due to the 
different relationship contexts.   
Anselm raises the topic of the debt of sin again in book I, chapter 24 as he 
assesses the ability of humanity to pay the debt without assistance from God.  Anselm 
earlier explained that no human born under normal circumstances is capable of paying 
the debt and now Boso questions how humans can be held responsible for paying the debt 
if they are inherently incapable of doing so.  In his reply, Anselm employs an analogy 
that draws on a human-human relationship:  
Nam si quis iniungat opus aliquod servo suo, et praecipiat illi ne se deiciat 
in foveam quam illi monstrat, unde nullatenus exire possit, et servus ille 
contemnens mandatum et monitionem domini sui sponte se in monstratam 
mittat foveam, ut nullatenus possit opus iniunctum efficere: putasne illi 
aliquatenus impotentiam istam ad excusationem valere, cur opus 
iniunctum non faciat?6 
 
Anselm uses the example to show that an incapacity to satisfy a debt does not excuse 
someone from the obligation to repay it, therefore humanity is fully responsible for the 
debt of sin even though no human being is able to repay it.  At this point, it appears that 
Anselm is making a correlation between a master-slave human relationship and the 
 
5 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 19 (II, 86).   
6 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 92).   
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divine-human relationship.  However, the relationship between the individuals involved 
is not essential to the point of the analogy.  Whether it is master-slave, teacher-student, 
parent-child, the willed incapacity7 by the one who owes obedience remains the same.  
The level of obligation between the two individuals (whether forced, convenient, familial 
or some other) is not relevant to the point that Anselm is trying to make.  So, although the 
language of Anselm’s example may fit the feudal context in which he was writing, it was 
not a necessary element to the point that he was making with regard to the nature of the 
debt owed by humans to God.   
In the same chapter, Anselm also discusses human sin as a debt to God in the 
context of potential forgiveness out of divine mercy.  Anselm himself raises the issue in 
anticipation of the question about whether God could or should simply forgive 
humanity’s debt of sin in the name of mercy.  However, Anselm argues that this kind of 
mercy would transfer the incapacity from humans to God and it is inappropriate to 
attribute any sort of incapacity to God: “Sed si dimittit quod sponte reddere debet homo, 
ideo quia reddere non potest, quid est aliud quam: dimittit deus quod habere non potest?  
Sed derisio est, ut talis misericordia deo attribuatur.”8  Once again, Anselm highlights 
the difference between God and humanity on the understanding of debt.  When a human 
forgives a debt out of mercy, it is usually considered to be an act of beneficence.  To 
forgo monetary gain to the benefit of someone else is a virtue that is lauded explicitly in 
scripture.9  However, God is not able to simply give up something of His.  Since the debt 
 
7 The use of “willed” here is meant to reflect the fact that the incapacity is not merely a natural deficit that 
is inescapable.  Rather, the one who owes has intentionally acted in some way that resulted in an 
incapacity.  Compare with the “willed obedience” of the God-man (discussed later in this chapter).   
8 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 93).   
9 See, for example, the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant in Matthew 18:23-35.   
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is not anything physical or monetary, but is the honor of His being (as discussed in an 
earlier chapter), God cannot simply forgive a debt.  As Anselm points out, this would 
result in the irrational situation of God relinquishing part of His being.  Again, Anselm 
uses debt in a way that is comparable to strictly human usage of debt, but there is not a 
direct correlation.  In this case, merciful forgiveness of a debt does not carry over through 
the use of analogy.   
In book II, Anselm uses his understanding of debt to describe the purpose and 
activity of the God-man.  Anselm has already established the parameters of the debt owed 
by humanity and it is clear that the God-man must be able to satisfy that debt.  However, 
he pushes further in book II, chapter 11: “Ratio quoque nos docuit quia oportet eum 
maius aliquid habere, quam quidquid sub deo est, quod sponte det et non ex debito 
deo.”10  As large as the debt of sin is and as necessary as its repayment is, Anselm argues 
that there must be something given above and beyond the repayment of the debt.  The 
context seems to suggest that Anselm is motivated here by a desire to show the supreme 
voluntariness of the activity of the God-man.  Not only is the God-man capable and 
willing to pay the debt on behalf of humanity, he gives something over and above what 
was owed.  This is not a simple thing to define, though, since it must be something that is 
both “maior…quidquid sub deo est” and “in ipso.”11  Since the God-man would owe His 
nature and being (everything “in ipso”) to God by virtue of the debt that all humans owe, 
this gift that is offered by the God-man must be something that is not owed.  Anselm then 
suggests handing over the life of the God-man in death, since this would not be 
something owed by Him: “Hoc enim ex debito non exiget deus ab illo; quoniam namque 
 
10 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 110).   
11 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 110).   
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non erit peccatum in illo, non debebit mori, sicut diximus.”12  Not only is death 
something that is not owed by the God-man to God, but it is the only action that the God-
man can undertake perfectly freely.  The debt of honor owed to God makes all of human 
life an obligation to God.  However, death is outside the realm of this debt and it is the 
only activity under the control of a human being that can be willed without obligation.  
Sin brought humanity under obligation even in death, but since the God-man is sinless, he 
is under no obligation with regard to death.  Anselm also points out that handing one’s 
self over to death is the most difficult and highest act of self-giving possible by a human 
being: “Nihil autem asperius aut difficilius potest homo ad honorem dei sponte et non ex 
debito pati quam mortem, et nullatenus se ipsum potest homo dare magis deo, quam cum 
se morti tradit ad honorem illius.”13  Thus, the God-man freely wills to undergo the most 
painful of human processes in order to offer something above and beyond the debt owed 
by human beings to God.14  Anselm is careful to explain what is included in the debt 
owed by humanity and what is not included in that debt so that he makes room for the 
God-man to offer something above and beyond what He would ordinarily owe.   
In chapter 18 of book II, Anselm’s discussion of debt rises to a crescendo.  In this 
chapter, which contains nearly 20 percent of the usage of all variants of debeo, -ere, 
Anselm brings together the concepts of debt, obligation, owing and ought in the crux of 
his argument for the necessity and efficacy of the God-man.  Here, he also explicitly 
considers the meaning of these concepts and how they interact with each other.  With 
 
12 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 111).   
13 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 111).   
14 The fact that Anselm characterizes the death of the God-man as wholly voluntary and above and beyond 
the demands of what was owed by Him as a human being reinforces the Anselmian answer to the critique 
that the death of the God-man constitutes unjust punishment (as discussed in the previous chapter).  Anselm 
takes pains to emphasize the involvement, even supremacy, of the free will of the God-man in this activity.   
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regard to the specific concept of debt, he is again careful to distinguish between what 
should and should not be characterized as a debt for God.  He begins by restating his core 
premise that the debt is so large as to put it beyond the reach of human ability: “debitum 
tantum erat, ut illud solvere, cum non deberet nisi homo, non posset nisi deus, ita ut idem 
esset homo qui deus.”15  The large debt owed by humanity was an obligation that was 
impossible to fulfill and Anselm contrasts this situation with the fulfillment made by the 
God-man that was completely free of obligation: “Nullus umquam homo moriendo 
praeter illum deo dedit quod aliquando necessitate perditurus non erat, aut solvit quod 
non debebat.  Ille vero sponte patri obtulit quod nulla necessitate umquam amissurus 
erat, et solvit pro peccatoribus quod pro se non debebat.”16  Anselm consistently 
emphasizes the fact that, although the God-man paid the debt of sin for humanity, it was 
not something that He owed in any way.  Furthermore, as seen in the previous section on 
his usage in book II, chapter 11, it is just because the payment was not owed but 
voluntary that it was sufficiently efficacious to provide for the salvation of humanity.  
The fact that the God-man freely wills to pay the debt permits one to say that it ought to 
have happened that way, but Anselm differentiates that voluntariness from owing a debt: 
“Dominus itaque IESUS cum mortem, sicut diximus, sustinere voluit, quoniam sum erat 
et pati et non pati, debuit facere quod fecit, quia quod voluit fieri debuit; et non debuit 
facere, quia non ex debito.”17  It is clear, then, that Anselm views a debt as something 
that is owed, but the payment is not restricted to the one(s) “owing” the debt.   
 
 
15 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 126-127).   
16 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 127).   
17 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 129).   
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Owing 
Anselm is both intentional and specific in the way that he uses the term debt.  
However, he uses the same root in different ways to convey similar meanings without 
explicitly referencing the concept of a debt.  The most obvious of these instances is when 
he discusses owing and to owe (debeo, -ere).  In many cases, Anselm combines the two 
terms and “owing” is inseparable from “debt.”  Book I, chapter 11 is a perfect example of 
this, in which Anselm discusses what rational creatures owe to God: “Quod est debitum 
quod deo debemus? … Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo, quod solvendo 
nullus peccat, et quod omnis qui non solvit peccat.”18  This clearly connects the 
relationality of “owing” to the idea of debt.  However, I would argue that one can learn 
more about what Anselm believes human beings owe to God by examining his use of 
“owing” than by his usage of “debt” itself.  I would like to explore some of these 
examples in the following section.   
Anselm discusses the willed obedience19 of the God-man to death in book I, 
chapter 9 through the lens of scriptures from the New Testament.  Anselm re-casts the 
obligations of human beings to God in response to Paul’s discussion of obedience in the 
second chapter of Philippians:   
A.  Cur persecuti sunt eum Iudaei usque ad mortem?   
B.  Non ob aliud, nisi quia veritatem et iustitiam vivendo et loquendo 
indeclinabiliter tenebat.   
A  Hoc puto quia deus ab omni rationali creatura exigit, et hoc illa per 
oboedientiam deo debet.20   
 
18 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).  Other examples include book I, chapter 24 and book II, chapters 18 
and 19.   
19 By this I mean the intentional assent to the divine plan that involved the death of the God-man.  This may 
be contrasted (although Anselm does not explicitly do so) with the aforementioned “willed incapacity” that 
prevents human beings affected by sin from paying the debt of sin.   
20 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 9 (II, 61).   
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Although Anselm elsewhere describes this universal human obligation as a debt, he is 
clearly influenced by the idea of a relationship of obedience.  While the truth and 
righteousness owed to God may be characterized as a debt, the way that they are owed is 
through (“per”) obedience.  This speaks to the nature of the “owing” relationship between 
God and humanity, similar to the way that Anselm expressed that relationship through the 
use of “honor.”21  Anselm makes a connection between “honor” and “owing” in book I, 
chapter 14 when he discusses the way that God’s honor is always maintained, regardless 
of whether or not humans supply it willingly: 
Deum impossibile est honorem suum perdere.  Aut enim peccator sponte 
solvit quod debet, aut deus ab invito accipit.  Nam aut homo debitam 
subiectionem deo sive non peccando sive quod peccat solvendo, voluntate 
spontanea exhibet, aut deus eum invitum sibi torquendo subicit et sic se 
dominum eius esse ostendit, quod ipse homo voluntate fateri recusat.22  
 
The “submission owed to God” (debitam subiectionem deo) reflects the same concept of 
owing through obedience that is found in book I, chapter 9.  It should be noted that both 
of these discussions of “owing” refer to what humans owe to God by virtue of the 
Creator-creation relationship.  The vocabulary here is one of “owing” but the emphasis is 
not on the “debt,” or the “what is owed.”  The owing reflects the relationship (the “how”) 
and, in this case, the relationship is defined by virtue of “being” – Creator and creation.  
Anselm emphasizes obedience and submission to indicate that the debt is not to be 
viewed as something negative, but simply a reflection of the natural order.   
While Anselm primarily speaks of “owing” in the context of the divine-human 
relationship, sin and redemption, Anselm also uses the idea of “owing” to make a point 
 
21 See chapter 2 of this work.   
22 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 14 (II, 72).   
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about the gratitude humanity should feel toward God, if the salvation of humanity was 
accomplished due to necessity.  Boso asks in book II, chapter 5: “quam gratiam illi 
debemus pro eo quod facit propter se?  Quomodo etiam imputabimus nostrum salutem 
eius gratiae, si nos salvat necessitate?” 23  If the God-man was a necessary means for a 
process of human salvation that was necessary in and of itself, why ought humans feel 
any gratitude toward God for what was done?  Anselm expresses this by questioning 
what gratitude or thanks we human beings owe to God for this.  Clearly this is a case in 
which Anselm uses the idea of “owing” without referring to a debt being owed. 24  I 
would argue that this is an indication that “owing” is simply one way of expressing 
obligation for Anselm.  This is illustrated later on in this same chapter when he uses the 
example of someone who makes a vow about holy living.  He comments that such a 
person is under an obligation after having made the vow: “Quamvis namque servare illud 
ex necessitate post votum debeat, ne apostatae damnationem incurrat…”25  In this case, 
he includes “ex necessitate” to add force to the obligation that he conveys here.  Although 
a vow made to God is something one ought to complete once made, it is not the same as 
obediently maintaining righteousness or making recompense for sin.  Yet, the language of 
“owing” and “obligation” is appropriate (though not necessary).  Anselm’s usage is 
indicative that he was paying close attention to what humanity “ought” and “ought not” 
do with regard to God.  There are debts owed and there are also obligations, which is the 
meaning of debeo that will be under consideration in the following section.   
 
 
23 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap 5 (II, 99).   
24 Except perhaps via an English colloquialism “debt of obligation” or, in this case, a “debt of gratitude.”  
Indeed, “debt of gratitude” is used in this section by the translator of the CDH in The Major Works.   
25 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 5 (II, 100).   
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Obligation 
In addition to debt and owing, Anselm uses forms of debeo to express the concept 
of obligation.26  In this sense, there is a middle ground of meaning between “ought” and 
“must.”  He seems to use it in a distinct sense to convey the action(s) incumbent upon 
someone due to a contingent event, usually a result of a free-will choice made by 
someone.  The first example of this arises in book I, chapter 7, in the discussion of the 
devil-ransom theory of atonement.  By Anselm’s reckoning, the devil-ransom theory 
holds that “deum…debuisse prius per iustitiam contra diabolum agere, ut liberaret 
hominem, quam per fortitudinem…”27  Anselm takes issue with the degree of obligation 
attributed to God by the proponents of this theory.  He explicitly rejects the idea that God 
can be constrained by or have any obligation to any other being by virtue of His status as 
the Creator of all else that exists.  Anselm views obligation as a form of owing to which 
one has assented.  This is distinct from a debt or situation of owing that may exist due to 
one’s nature or to natural law.  Anselm makes this clear by way of an example: “Evenit 
enim ut aliquis innocentem iniuste percutiat, unde ipse iuste percuti mereatur.  Si tamen 
percussus vindicare se non debet et percutit percutientem se, iniuste hoc facit.  Haec 
igitur percussio ex parte percutientis est iniusta quia non debuit se vindicare; ex parte 
vero percussi iusta, quia iniuste percutiens iuste percuti meruit.”28  Someone can place 
themselves under an obligation that can change normal circumstances.  This is not 
necessarily something that they “ought” to do or “must” do, but it is incumbent on 
someone to carry through once the choice has been made to commit one’s self in this 
 
26 Generally, Anselm uses debeo in the perfect and imperfect tenses to convey the concept of obligation.  In 
this way, it is indicative of a debt or something owed to which one has committed himself.   
27 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 7 (II, 55).   
28 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 7 (II, 57).   
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way.  This is why Anselm rejects the devil-ransom theory so emphatically, since he does 
not believe that God could have or would have obligated Himself to any being in any 
way.   
 In book II, chapter 10, Anselm expresses the idea of obligation by employing the 
phrase “ex debito.”  With regard to the God-man, he sets out to investigate “utrum autem 
ille homo moriturus sit ex debito, sicut omnes alii homines ex debito moriuntur.”29  All 
human beings are obligated to die, so the question is whether this obligation applies even 
to the God-man.  Anselm makes it clear that the human obligation of death is directly 
related to sin and not part of original created human nature.  The God-man is not 
obligated to die, since it is possible to assume a sinless human nature.  There is also no 
obligation in the sense that the God-man did not choose to sin and so death is not 
incumbent upon Him.  In the following chapter, Anselm emphasizes that the omnipotence 
of the God-man allows Him to freely choose to live or die: “Poterit igitur numquam mori 
si volet, et poterit mori et resurgere.”30  This unrestricted power is inseparable from the 
unrestricted divine will, allowing the God-man to choose death instead of dying by virtue 
of obligation.  The God-man bypassed an obligated death by directly choosing death 
instead of sinning or assuming a sinful nature.  The latter would constitute a limitation of 
the divine nature, which is impossible.  Thus, Anselm concludes (in the words of Boso): 
“illum hominem quem quaerimus, talem esse oportere qui nec ex necessitate moriatur, 
quia omnipotens erit, nec ex debito, quia numquam peccator erit, et mori possit ex libera 
 
29 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 10 (II, 106).  The fact that Anselm transitions into this chapter by writing “nunc 
investigare debemus” (which I omitted from the above quotation for the sake of clarity) is indicative of the 
frequency of his usage of forms of debeo.  Clearly he is using “ex debito” and “debemus” in different ways 
even in the same sentence.   
30 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 110).   
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voluntate, quia necessarium erit.”31  Not only does Anselm make it clear that there is no 
obligation involved in the death of the God-man, he also contrasts obligation with divine 
freedom.  He rules out “ex necessitate” and “ex debito” as causes of the death of the God-
man and asserts that, instead, the God-man hands himself over to death “ex libera.”  For 
Anselm, then, God is never obligated for anything – divine actions (including those of the 
God-man) are executed freely.   
Ought 
The final way that Anselm used debeo and its forms was to express the idea of 
“ought.”  This is the most common usage in the CDH, comprising just over 30 percent of 
the instances of debeo.  Whereas Anselm was unwilling to apply any obligation to God or 
the God-man, he wrote concerning what God or the God-man “ought” to do just as 
frequently as he wrote of what humans “ought” to do.  However, as will be made clear in 
the following section, Anselm carefully couches his language in ways to make it clear 
that divine sovereignty is never comprised.  At the same time, though, Anselm utilizes 
debeo as a common part of his vocabulary to express ideas and concepts without any 
technical or theological meaning.  For example, he opens the CDH by offering the 
following disclaimer: “quamvis a sanctis patribus inde quod sufficere debeat dictum 
sit.”32  He was not attempting to replace the work of those theologians before him, since 
what they had written ought to be sufficient.  This is a general statement made outside of 
the context of the argument and shows that he employed debeo in non-technical as well 
as technical usages.  Aside from this usage of debeo as “ought,” though, I would like to 
explore in the following section the ways that Anselm uses “ought” in what seems to be 
 
31 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 11 (II, 111).   
32 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 1 (II, 48).   
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intentional efforts to explore common orientations between God and humanity with 
regard to the Incarnation.   
With regard to humanity, Anselm uses “ought” in conjunction with the debt owed 
to God as creator: “Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati 
dei.”33  He goes on to describe this as a debt of honor owed to God.  In light of what has 
been discussed earlier, it is clear that Anselm has a strong view of the “ought” in this 
case.  It could be described as necessary, since he argues that it must be corrected when it 
is not carried out.  In this case, “ought” is interchangeable with the ideas of “debt” and 
“owing” since Anselm restates the premise immediately after Boso agrees to it: “Hoc est 
debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo…”34  He seems to use “ought” here to express 
the idea that the submission of the will of rational creatures to the will of God is the ideal 
situation.  As discussed earlier, since God wills and does the best, Anselm believes that 
what is ideal is also necessary, lest the will of God be violated (which is impossible).  
This ties in to the simple, yet telling, assertion that Anselm made to Boso in book I, 
chapter 8: “Sufficere nobis debet ad rationem voluntas dei cum aliquid facit, licet non 
videamus cur velit.  Voluntas namque dei numquam est irrationabilis.”35  “The will of 
God,” then, is a trump card for Anselm in any argument: if something is God’s will, then 
it must be, even if it does not align with human rationality.  God (and God’s will) is the 
standard of rationality, so when there seems to be a conflict between God and rationality, 
God always supersedes rationality.  Thus, when there is an “ought” incumbent upon 
 
33 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
34 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II, 68).   
35 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 8 (II, 59).   
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humanity by reason of the will of God, it carries the force of necessity, due to the perfect 
nature and will of God.   
Anselm also uses debeo in the sense of “ought” to articulate the right order of 
things as they have been ordained by God.  This is clear in book I, chapter 15 when he 
discusses the relationship between the honor rendered to God by rational creatures and 
the order of the universe: “Quas si divina sapientia, ubi perversitas rectum ordinem 
perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa universitate quam deus debet ordinare, 
quaedam ex violata ordinis pulchritudine deformitas, et deus in sua dispositione videreur 
deficere.”36  In this instance, the “ought” (“quam deus debet ordinare”) does not mean 
that God had not been ordering/regulating the universe, but Anselm means that it is right 
that God orders the universe.  It ought to be because it is right.  Anselm goes on to point 
out that rational creatures (above all others) have been given the gift of understanding 
what is right.  He argues that when creatures conform to their place in the order of the 
universe, they do so in obedience to God, which amounts to honoring God.  He goes on 
to explain that humans are unique with respect to this relationship due to their rationality: 
“et hoc maxime rationalis natura, cui datum est intelligere quid debeat.”37  Here, I would 
translate “quid debeat” as “what is right.”  Thus, in the following sentences when Anselm 
discusses honoring God (“cum vult quod debet”) and dishonoring God (“cum vero non 
vult quod debet”), he uses debeo to express what is right for rational creatures to do.  
Although one could literally translate it as “what one ought,” it is clear that what one 
ought to do is such because it is right.  For humanity, “right” and “right order” precedes 
“ought.”   
 
36 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 73).   
37 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 15 (II, 73).   
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At the most fundamental level, then, humans “ought” to conform to the right 
order of creation.  However, the crux of the matter for humanity is when sin enters the 
equation.  Since sin is a violation of the right order as established by God, the question 
arises concerning what one “ought” to do in this case.  For Anselm, the desire seems to 
be to return to the right order of creation as directly as possible.  That process is hindered, 
though, by the limitations incurred by sin.  Anselm addresses this in book I, chapter 24, 
when he discusses whether an incapacity is a valid excuse for not doing what one ought.  
First, he allows that an incapacity is a valid excuse if the incapacity is not the fault of the 
person in question: “Forsitan si nulla est in illo causa impotentiae, aliquatenus excusari 
potest.”38  Yet, there seems to be a small window for this since God created the world in 
right order and any imperfection is the result of creatures.  Inabilities or incapacities in 
human beings can be traced back to previous actions of human beings.  So, Anselm 
argues that all humans find themselves in this position because all have sinned.  The 
preponderance of the condition does not mitigate the obligation not to have it, though.  
Instead, it means that all humans find themselves in the same position: not doing what 
they ought by virtue of the fact that they have an incapacity that they ought not to have: 
“Ipsa namque impotentia culpa est, quia non debet eam habere, immo debet eam non 
habere. … Idem enim est non habere potestatem quam debet habere, et habere 
impotentiam quam debet non habere.”39  The case of a human being who cannot render 
complete obedience to God due to the effect of sin is the same as a human being who has 
the ability to provide complete obedience to God, but chooses not to do so.  Essentially, 
Anselm argues that obedience is just as incumbent upon human beings who are born into 
 
38 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 92).   
39 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 92).   
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sin as it was for Adam and Eve, who chose sin, even though they were perfectly free to 
be in complete obedience to God.  He sums it up very simply when he concludes his 
point for Boso in the following way: “effectum peccati non excusat peccatum quod 
facit.”40  The ultimate “ought” or responsibility for human beings, then, is to conform to 
their place within the right order of creation.  Once they fail in this responsibility, all 
succeeding failures can be traced back to that one.   
Anselm uses “ought” to express the responsibilities incumbent upon human 
beings and he also uses “ought” to convey the way(s) in which the Incarnation of the 
God-man ought to be carried out.  He is aware, though, that he cannot always attribute 
“ought” to God in the same way that he can apply it to human beings.  God as the Creator 
and Originator of all “ought” only to act according to the divine will.  Unlike humans 
who are obligated to conform to the right order of creation, God (and, by extension, the 
God-man) has no such obligation, since there is never an opportunity to choose other than 
the best, as the divine will is always the best.  Some things that may seem to be choices 
or open options to a human perspective are not actual choices made by God (i.e. – God 
does not weigh decisions on a sliding scale of good…God only does the good).  
Therefore, when one articulates something like “God ought to do x” or “the God-man 
ought to be y,” it is merely a case of applying human circumstances of choice and 
obligation to the activity of God.  It is with this background in mind that Anselm delves 
into an intentional discussion of the applicability of “ought” to God (in comparison to the 
applicability of “ought” to human beings) in book II, chapter 18.  Here, Boso presses 
Anselm to explain how the God-man gave something to God over and above what He 
 
40 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 24 (II, 93).   
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owed as a human being when, at the same time, the God-man as God always does what is 
best and it does not seem as though He could do more than what is best: “Quomodo ergo 
asseremus eum non debuisse deo quod fecit, id est quod melius esse et magis placere deo 
cognovit, praesertim cum creatura debeat deo totum quod est et quod scit et potest?”41   
Anselm answers Boso by exploring the common meaning and usage of “ought,” a 
treatment that is unique in the CDH, since he tended to defer detailed answers to other 
works in order to focus on the argument at hand.  However, since Anselm took the time 
to address the meaning and usage of “ought,” it is clear that he considered the discussion 
to be centrally important to his argument.42  After explaining that human beings “ought” 
to do what is better among the choices available to them, Anselm offers an alternative 
understanding of “ought” as it applies to God: 
Quod si te movet verbum quod est ‘debere,’ nec potes illud intelligere sine 
aliquo debito: 43 scito quia sicut contingit ‘posse’ et ‘non posse’ et 
‘necessitatem’ aliquando dici, non quia sunt in rebus ubi dicuntur, sed 
quoniam sunt in alio: ita et ‘debere.’  Quippe cum dicimus debere 
pauperes a divitibus eleemosynam accipere, non est aliud quam divites 
debere pauperibus eleemosynam impendere.  Hoc namque debitum non est 
exigendum a paupere, sed a divite.  Deus quoque dicitur omnibus debere 
praeesse, non quia ille in hoc aliquo modo sit debitor, sed quoniam omnia 
debent illi subesse; et debere facere quod vult, quoniam quod vult debet 
esse.44 
 
Anselm sets out a rubric for “ought” in which x ought to do y for z.  It can equally be said 
that z ought to have y done by x and that y ought to be done by x for z.  When the idea of 
“owing” or “obligation” is assumed by “ought” (this is what Anselm refers to as 
 
41 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 128).   
42 Indeed, as will be explored later in this chapter, many critics have focused on the level of obligation that 
Anselm ascribes to God and the God-man in the CDH, so it is helpful that he clarifies his intentions with 
regard to “ought.”  It may even indicate an area in which he anticipated later critiques.   
43 Although debere and debitum are related, Anselm makes a distinction here between the two terms.  He 
seems to convey the idea of “ought” without “debt,” “owing,” or “obligation.”   
44 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 128-129).   
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“intelligere…debito”), then x can never be God because God never “ought” to do 
anything in this way.  But God can still be z so that God “ought” to have something done 
for Him by someone or something else.  In that sense, one can truly say “God ought,” but 
it is a carefully conditioned statement in which God is understood to be the object of the 
obligation, rather than the subject.  In the example that Anselm gives, God ought to be 
pre-eminent over all things, but that merely means that all things ought to be 
below/beneath God.   
In addition to carefully specifying the subject and object of “ought,” Anselm also 
argues that “ought” is applied to God correctly when it is properly contextualized with 
regard to the divine will.  As was alluded to earlier, what God wills is the same as what 
God “ought,” since God always wills and does the best.  Anselm makes this connection 
clear in the following passage: “Dominus itaque IESUS cum mortem, sicut diximus, 
sustinere voluit, quoniam suum erat et pati et non pati, debuit facere quod fecit, quia 
quod voluit fieri debuit; et non debuit facere, quia non ex debito.”45  The “ought” for God 
in this case is an “ought” that reflects only the divine will with no obligation, owing or 
debt involved.  Ultimately, Anselm points to the sovereignty and aseity of God to explain 
that one can properly say that God “ought” to do something insofar as one understands 
that God only “ought” to do what God wills: “nihil deberet dare nisi quod volebat; 
secundum personam vero sic a se ipso habebat quod habebat, et sic perfecte sibi 
sufficiens erat.”46  This is an “ought” that is profoundly different from “ought” as it 
applies to human beings.  The perfectly free human will has the ability to choose between 
open options without any undue external influence.  However, the perfectly free divine 
 
45 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 129).   
46 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 18 (II, 129).   
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will always chooses and does what is best without even any option to do less than the 
best.  Thus, God “ought” to do everything that God does since God does what He wills.47   
Hopkins’ Critique of Anselm 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that Anselm’s use of debeo and debitum 
reflects a complicated and sophisticated understanding of the terms and their usage to 
express concepts of debt, owing, obligation and ought.  While many critics of Anselm’s 
usage of debt have focused on the putatively feudal and economic contexts for this usage, 
few have recognized the complexity of Anselm’s usage of the term.  Jasper Hopkins, 
though, offers a critique of Anselm’s theory that is based on the complexity of Anselm’s 
usage of debeo, particularly when Anselm uses it to mean “ought.”  Hopkins analyzes 
Anselm’s argument thoroughly in his book A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm.48  
His primary critique of Anselm focuses on the idea that only a God-man could have 
provided for the salvation of humanity.  Hopkins seems to think that Anselm has not 
proven his point and has left the door open (logically) for what he calls a “non-Adamic 
God-man.”49  He argues that Anselm is led astray (to the point of drawing a conclusion 
that is not justified) by his feudal influences (or at least feudal analogies): “It becomes 
increasingly clear that Anselm’s thought is influenced by the following analogy: a servant 
who has dishonored his good master brings disgrace upon himself and his whole 
family.”50  Anselm argues that only one of Adam’s descendents can pay the debt of sin 
and Hopkins likens this to arguing that only the servant or one of his family members can 
 
47 This is similar to the way in which everything that God does is just, since God is justice.  God’s will and 
activity do not conform to nor are judged by any external standards of justice, rightness, etc.   
48 Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis,: University of Minnesota Press, 
1972)., see chapter VI – “Christology and Soteriology.”   
49 Ibid., 197.   
50 Ibid., 197.   
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make amends for dishonoring the master.  Hopkins views this as a uniquely feudal 
perspective that does not stand the test of logic: “Anselm’s attempt to make the doctrines 
of incarnation and atonement plausible does not escape the marks of feudal imagery.  His 
theory may, it is true, be restated independently of this imagery: but this reformulation 
could not then even preserve the semblance of escaping the non sequitor [sic] in the 
fundamental argument of the Cur Deus Homo.”51  For Hopkins, the master-servant 
analogy is inseparable from Anselm’s argument.  In order to make his case, he analyzes 
Anselm’s language concerning who “ought” and “can” pay the debt in order to provide 
for the salvation of human beings.   
The thrust of Hopkins’ critique of Anselm’s use of “ought” and “can” is contained 
in the following passage: 
It becomes clear that when Anselm argues “Only man ought to; only God 
can; therefore, necessarily a God-man,” he is equivocating on the meaning 
of “ought.”  For the sense in which man ought is the unconditional sense 
in which he owes.  (The Latin verb debere, used repeatedly by Anselm, 
contains the notion of owing.)  But the sense in which the God-man ought 
is the conditional sense in which He ought since (if) He wills to.  In Cur 
Deus Homo II, 18 Anselm acknowledges these two different senses.  But 
he fails to realize that their appearance invalidates his argument.52 
 
As seen in the previous discussion of his usage of “ought,” Anselm clearly and 
intentionally uses “ought” in different ways to refer to God and to human beings.  
Hopkins seems to prefer that Anselm use the term univocally and criticizes the different 
applications for God and human beings.  In doing so, he seems to have reversed the 
priority for usages of “ought” that Anselm had.  Hopkins refers to the “ought” that 
reflects the divine will as “the conditional sense.”  However, I would argue that Anselm 
 
51 Ibid., 197-198.   
52 Ibid., 195-196.   
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believed this to be the unconditional sense, since it is the purest form of the idea, without 
the involvement of any external influence.  The will of God is a pure “ought” not only for 
God but also for every creature since whatever God wills “ought” to be done, whether by 
God or by creatures.  What Hopkins calls “the unconditional sense” in which a human 
being owes something, is actually a variation on the basic form of “ought.”  Owing 
something implies external parties and events.  Although it may conform with the divine 
will, this is not necessarily the case.  The concepts of “owing” and “obligation” build on 
the basic idea of “ought” and, as such, the human “ought” to which Hopkins refers should 
be considered to be the conditional sense.  The root of the difference seems to be 
Hopkins’ insertion of the parenthetical “(if)” with regard to the will of God.  While it 
may seem to Hopkins that the “willing” and “ought” of God’s activity are contingent or 
conditional, they are not, as has been discussed in earlier sections of this work.  The 
divine will is still perfectly free even if it does not have the option to do anything other 
than the best.   
In addition to “ought,” Hopkins targets Anselm’s use of “can” and claims that 
there is equivocation on both terms in the CDH.  He adduces Anselm’s understanding of 
“can” from his use of “ought:”  
When Anselm says ‘Only man ought to,’ he is also tacitly saying ‘Only 
man can’; and this sense of ‘can’ is different from the sense of ‘can’ in the 
statement ‘Only God can.’  Only God can – in the sense that only God as 
the power to make satisfaction; only man can – in the sense that only man 
can consistently be thought to make satisfaction.  That is, only God can 
effectively; only man can acceptably.53 
 
In this instance, it seems that Hopkins is making too fine a division of Anselm’s 
language.  Anselm’s “ought” for humanity carries with it the senses of obligation and 
 
53 Ibid., 196.   
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debt.  There is both the original obligation to uphold righteousness for the honor of God 
and the debt incurred by the sinful failure to do so.  The “ought” is specific to human 
beings descended from Adam and no other being “can” fulfill the obligation because it is 
particular to human beings with a certain relationship to God.  The obligation relationship 
is between God and human beings and thus no other being, even another creature created 
by God, can make repayment under the same set of circumstances that a human being 
descended from Adam can.  This is solely due to the “ought” incumbent upon human 
beings descended from Adam and is built into that understanding of “ought.”  However, 
Hopkins has an interest in separating “ought” and “can” for rhetorical purposes, as he 
makes clear in the next paragraph in which he lays out the details of what he views to be 
Anselm’s equivocation.   
Hopkins lays out two meanings each for “ought” and “can:” “Only Adam and his 
natural descendants ought1 in that only they owe; but Jesus ought2 in that He wills to.  
Only God can1 in that He has the power to; but only man can2 in that no other alternative 
is theologically admissible.”54  The “theological admissibility” being referred to here is 
the necessity for someone descended from Adam to pay the debt of sin and this is the 
point that bothers Hopkins so much about Anselm’s argument:  
Anselm’s confusion occurs when he infers, invalidly, that because only 
man ought1 and only God can1, only a God-man ought2 and can1.  And his 
confusion continues when he implies that only Adamic man can2 because 
only Adamic man ought1 – that is, that non-Adamic man can2 not because 
he ought1 not.  But if Jesus both ought1 not and can2, why should the case 
be different for a non-Adamic man?55 
 
 
54 Ibid., 197.   
55 Ibid., 197.   
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Hopkins has thus doubled the “ought” and “can” from the idea that “only humans ought 
and only God is able.”  As mentioned earlier, I would prefer to conflate can2 into the 
meaning of ought2.  Further, though, I would prefer to conflate ought2 into can1.  For 
Anselm, the will and power of God are inseparable.  If God wills x then God has the 
power to do x and vice-versa.  Ultimately, if Anselm were following Hopkins’ rubric, he 
would articulate his argument as “only human beings descended from Adam ought1 and 
only God can1, thus the God-man.”  For Hopkins, though, this does not convincingly rule 
out the possibility of a God-man who is a combination of God and a non-Adamic human 
being.56  The crux of his argument is that “only man can2” is invalid.  He argues that if 
the God-man does not have the same “ought” as Adamic human beings (by virtue of His 
sinlessness), there is no reason that the God-man could not also have a different “can2” 
and could be a combination of God and a non-Adamic human being.   
Anselm would have at least two responses to Hopkins’ challenge.  The first would 
be that Hopkins has not fully grasped the various meanings of “ought” in the CDH.  The 
God-man can and must owe the same debt of upholding righteousness by conforming to 
the will of God as an Adamic human being.  Where the God-man differs from the rest of 
Adamic humanity is that he does not have the same obligations with regard to the debt of 
sin owed to God.  A non-Adamic human being would not have any “ought” that would 
connect him to the relationship between Adamic human beings and God.  Although 
Anselm does not make this argument specifically, Katherin Rogers has articulated it on 
Anselm’s behalf: “Anselm took the biological connectedness of all human beings 
 
56 By “non-Adamic human being” Hopkins means some sort of human being created by God outside of the 
descendents of Adam.  Hopkins seems to envision some parallel, sinless humanity that, while identical in 
nature to human beings descended from Adam, is completely unrelated (biologically) to so-called “Adamic 
human beings.”   
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seriously, and saw the human family as a genuine biological entity with special properties 
of its own.  Mankind is then a real collective object rather like a country or a 
corporation.”57   Anselm clearly shows concern for Adamic humanity as a group, since 
he argues that God could not and would not simply allow the divine purpose for the 
creation of Adamic humanity to go to waste by destroying them.58  By conceiving of 
humanity as a “real collective object,” Rogers contends that there is intrinsic value to th
whole of humanity as a group.  The group can both act and be acted upon collectively in 
the same way as any singular object.  Rogers concludes by arguing that it is possible to 
allow for one member of a group to not owe the same debt as the rest and not in the 
process open the door for any non-member to pay the debt: “it is not implausible to think 
that, just as a country or a corporation may owe a debt, so may the race of Adam.  A
yet each individual member may not personally owe the debt.  In the case of the human
family everyone but Christ does, because He is the only one who is not conceived 
through a willingly chosen procreative act on the part of a human father.”59  Thus, 
Hopkins seems to over-reach in his dismissal of an Adamic God-man in favor of a non
Adamic G
Anselm’s second reply to Hopkins would be the answer he explicitly provides in 
the CDH: payment of the debt by a non-Adamic human being would make Adamic 
human beings the servants of some other being(s) than God and this is not theologically 
 
57 Katherin A. Rogers, "A Defense of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo Argument," in Philosophical Theology: 
Reason and Theological Doctrine, ed. Michael Baur, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association (Bronx, NY: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2000)., 196.   
58 See book I, chapter 4.  Rogers cites a similar passage in De Conceptu Virginali 17.  
59 Rogers, "A Defense of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo Argument.", 197.   
60 Hopkins’ move here also seems to ignore Anselm’s comments (echoed by Bonaventure, as discussed 
earlier in Ch. 1) that the generation of the God-man from a woman in the absence of a man is fitting in 
order to fill out the possible means of human generation (see CDH II.8).   
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appropriate.  Adamic human beings would owe their life to an outsider as their savior and 
would be in debt to someone other than God.  Anselm addresses this in book I, chapter 5 
in the context of any other being providing for the salvation of humanity (whether divine 
in any way or not): 
Quaecumque alia persona hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius 
servus idem homo recte iudicaretur?  Quod si esset, nullatenus 
restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non 
pecasset: cum ipse, qui non nisi dei servus et aequalis angelis bonis per 
omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius, qui deus non esset et cuius angeli 
servi non essent.61   
 
This would effectively yield a parallel situation to the one described in the devil-ransom 
theory of atonement in which humanity is held in bondage by the devil.  Anselm has 
clearly shown that he does not find that to be a logical or plausible state of affairs.  He 
has no room for any third parties in the relationship between God and humanity, 
regardless of origin.    This speaks not only to the relationship between God and 
humanity, but also to the place of humanity within the order of created beings.  Anselm 
concludes his point made above by arguing that humanity was created with the express 
purpose of being in debt to no one except God (“servus esset eius, qui deus non est”).  
Humanity would not exist properly (and would not be restored to the proper status) if 
God combined with some other being to save humanity.   
Hopkins came to his conclusion because he assumed that Anselm was making his 
point from a wholly feudal perspective.  Just prior to making his final point that the CDH 
is irretrievably feudal, Hopkins sketches what he believes to be the way that Anselm 
viewed the relationship between God and humanity: 
 
61 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 5 (II, 52).   
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It becomes increasingly clear that Anselm’s thought is influenced by the 
following analogy: a servant who has dishonored his good master brings 
disgrace upon himself and his whole family.  That disgrace can be 
removed only through the future merits either of the servant himself or of 
some member of his family.  An outsider may, to some extent, redress the 
grievance on behalf of the family; but his actions, by themselves, can 
never remove the family disgrace.62 
 
Hopkins assumes that this apparently self-evidently feudal analogy demonstrates that 
Anselm was so blinded by his feudal context that he was unable to recognize the validity 
of any alternative solution.  However, Hopkins goes to great lengths to develop his own 
feudal analogy in spite of the fact that Anselm included a similar analogy in book II, 
chapter 16 to make the point that the salvation provided by the God-man would be 
efficacious not only for those who were witnesses to the actions of the God-man, but also 
for those who were separated by time and location.  It is useful to compare the point that 
Hopkins made (putatively on behalf of, or in the name of, Anselm) with Anselm’s own 
words: 
Sit enim rex aliquis, cui totus populus suae cuiusdam civitatis sic peccavit, 
excepto uno solo, qui tamen de illorum est genere, ut nullus eorum facere 
posit unde mortis damnationem evadat.  Ille autem qui solus est innocens, 
tantam apud regem habet gratiam ut posit, et tantam dilectionem erga 
reos ut velit omnes qui suo credent consilio reconciliare quodam servitio 
valde ipsi regi placituro, quod facturus est die secundum voluntatem regis 
statuto.  Et quoniam non omnes possunt qui reconciliandi sunt ad diem 
illam convenire, concedit rex propter magnitudinem illius servitii, ut 
quicumque vel ante vel post diem illam confessi fuerint se velle per illud 
opus quod ea die fiet, veniam impetrare et ad pactum ibi constitutm 
accedere, ab omni culpa sint absoluti praeterita;63 
 
Here, Anselm seems to play into the hands of critics like Hopkins by crafting an analogy 
(“similitudinem”) with a seemingly hierarchical and feudal context.  There is a king and a 
people in a particular city who are subservient to him.  The sin of the entire populace is 
 
62 Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm., 197.   
63 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 16 (II, 118).   
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placed in the hands of the one member of the city who remains innocent and is able to 
perform a service for the honor of the king in order to reconcile the people of the city.  
The point of Anselm’s story was that it is logical to allow for the effect of one 
meritorious act to be applied to many people, even those who are not present at the time 
of the act (“tanta fuit vis in eius morte, ut etiam in absentes vel loco vel tempore eius 
protendatur effectus.”64).  The feudal trappings of the story are secondary.  Anselm de-
emphasizes the feudal nature of the analogy by turning the focus from the details of the 
story to the purpose of the creation of human beings.  The reason why the effect of the 
work of the God-man was efficacious for so many people had nothing to do with any 
element of feudalism but had everything to do with what Anselm viewed to be the 
purpose of creation: “Quod autem non solis praesentibus prodesse debeat hinc facile 
cognoscitur, quia non tot praesentes eius morti esse potuerunt, quot ad supernae civitatis 
constructionem necessarii sunt, etiam si omnes qui eiusdem mortis tempore ubicumque 
errant, ad illam redemptionem admitterentur.”65   Anselm returns to the idea that 
humanity was created to replace the complement of beings in heaven after the fall of the 
rebellious angels.  There is an “ought” here that supersedes the supposed machinations of 
feudal society: Anselm’s thought process is governed by the divine purpose for humanity 
and not the details of any analogy that may be used to explain it.  Humanity “ought” to 
fulfill the purpose for which is created and this is the overriding theme for Anselm: 
“Videretur enim inconveniens quod deus vel uno momento permiserit humanum genus et 
ea quae fecit propter usum eorum, de quibus superna civitas perficienda est, quasi 
frustra extitisse.  Nam aliquatenus in vanum esse viderentur, quamdiu non ad hoc propter 
 
64 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 16 (II, 118).   
65 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 16 (II, 118-119).   
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quod maxime facta essent, viderentur subsistere.”66  This passage hints at the broader 
perspective that Anselm takes to the language of his argument throughout the CDH.  
Although the analogy that he employs here may have some appearance of feudalism, the 
points that Anselm uses it to convey are entirely theological; in this case, the concern is 
for preserving the original created purpose for humanity.   
Athanasius’ Usage of Debt 
The relationship between fulfilling the purpose for the creation of humanity and 
the necessity of the Incarnation and Atonement has been explored already in the 
discussion surrounding Anselm’s use of the term “honor” and the comparison to 
Athanasius’ use of “image.”  The connection is visible again in the discussion of debt and 
“ought,” in that both Anselm and Athanasius argue that a God-man was necessary for the 
fulfillment of the purpose for the creation of human beings.  Whereas Anselm utilized a 
broad understanding of debitum and debeo to encompass ideas of debt, owing, obligation 
and ought, Athanasius used the idea of debt (to. ovfeilo,menon) primarily to refer to the 
impact of sin on humanity.  Athanasius viewed corruption and death as the obstacle to the 
fulfillment of the purpose of human creation and, correspondingly, viewed the death of 
the God-man as the way to remove the obstacle: “Therefore as an offering and sacrifice 
free of all spot, he offered to death the body which he had taken to himself, and 
immediately abolished death from all who were like him by the offering of a like.  For 
since the Word is above all, consequently by offering his temple and the instrument of his 
body as a substitute for all men, he fulfilled the debt by his death.”67  The language of 
 
66 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 16 (II, 119).   
67 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. Henry Chadwick, trans. Robert W. Thomson, 
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)., 155 (DI  9).   
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debt found here is repeated later in the work by way of summary, showing Athanasius’ 
commitment to the use of the concept: “But since the debt owed by all men had still to be 
paid, for all, as I said above, had to die…”68 and “For there was need of death, and death 
on behalf of all had to take place in order that what was owed by all men might be 
paid.”69  At the same time, Athanasius reinforces the emphasis placed on the usage of 
debt since he openly admits that he is repeating his ideas in order to draw attention to 
their importance: “Do not be surprised if we frequently repeat the same arguments, for 
since we are talking of the goodness of God, therefore we express the same idea in many 
ways lest we seem to omit anything and incur the charge of saying too little.”70  
Athanasius was committed to using the idea of a debt to characterize what it was that 
humanity owed and what it was that the God-man had to do in order to put humanity in a 
position to fulfill the purpose of its’ creation.  The fact that Athanasius and Anselm share 
this theological position has been recognized, but has met with varying interpretations.   
Foley on Debt as a Connection Between Anselm and Athanasius 
Foley acknowledges the point of convergence between Athanasius and Anselm 
but argues that the commonality begins and ends with the term debt and that the two 
theologians use the word in different ways.  Foley spent a great deal of time examining 
the atonement theories of the patristic period and dedicates a large amount of space to 
discussing Athanasius (second only to Augustine).  He views Athanasius as taking an 
entirely different approach from Anselm and argues that those who draw theological 
parallels between the two do so on the basis of “single words and expressions…taken out 
 
68 Ibid., 183 (DI  20).   
69 Ibid., 185 (DI  20).   
70 Ibid., 183 (DI  20).   
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of their connection.”71  He cites the passages from DI quoted above and points out that 
“the debt spoken of by Athanasius is an obligation resting upon humanity as a whole, on 
account of sin, and hence every man must pay it, and Christ pays it with us, in order that 
corruption may not issue in permanent death.  Nothing more than this can be meant by 
Athanasius…”72  This is an accurate observation based on Athanasius’ usage of the 
concept in DI and reinforced by references in his other works.73  For Foley, Athanasius 
represents the general position of human salvation through the Incarnation accomplished 
via the divinization of humanity in the life and death of Christ.   
While this may be an accurate summary of Athanasius’ work, it is incomplete and 
fails to recognize the nuances of Athanasius’ thought in the DI.  Athanasius uses two 
parables in DI that illustrate this point.  The first, in chapter 9, compares the Incarnation 
to a king taking up residence in a city and honor coming to that city simply by virtue of 
the king’s presence.74  This imagery that is so clearly analogous to the idea of 
divinization is followed up by another parable that goes in a different direction.  This 
second parable, in chapter 10, relates a story of a king whose house or city has been 
attacked through the negligence of the inhabitants and the king himself comes to the 
scene to repossess what has been taken from him.75  Athanasius explains that the king 
does this because he is motivated to restore the royal relationship: 
 [The king] avenges and rescues it having regard not for the negligence of 
its inhabitants but for his own honour.  So all the more, when the race of 
men which had been created by himself had descended to corruption, God 
 
71 George Cadwalader Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1909)., 53.   
72 Ibid., 57.   
73 Foley cites the Orationes Contra Arianos II.66, in which a similar usage of debt is found.   
74 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione., 155 (DI  9).   
75 Ibid., 155-157 (DI  10).   
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the Word of the all-good Father did not neglect them, but effaced the death 
which had fallen upon them by the offering of his own body, and corrected 
their negligence by his teaching, and reformed all men’s estate by his own 
power.76 
 
The emphasis here is less on the salvation of humanity and more on what was fitting and 
proper (to. e``autou
                                                
// pre,pon – translated above as “for his own honour”) for the nature of 
God.  Athanasius goes on to explain that this was “the primary cause” of the Incarnation.  
I take Athanasius’ intent here to be to explain that the relationship between God and 
humanity had to be restored to the state of original creation.  There was a motivation (an 
“ought,” if you will) that used the divinization of humanity as a tool to accomplish the 
over-arching goal, which was the restoration of humanity to its created state so that the 
purpose of human creation would not be frustrated.   
 It seems clear, though, that Foley does not take all of this into consideration when 
making his comparison between Athanasius and Anselm on the usage of debt.  In his 
conclusion on the matter, he attempts to place the two on opposing sides: 
The coincidence [of Athanasius] with Anselm is verbal, not substantial.  
With Anselm, the debt was owed to God’s justice; it was wholly cancelled 
by the obedience of Christ, the equivalence or superabundance of whose 
merit arose from the voluntariness of His death.  With Athanasius, the debt 
was the just claim of God’s law; it was the necessity of death, but not the 
necessity of abiding in death for ever; it was paid so far as to sustain 
God’s law, but not so as to relieve man of its rigorous exaction just as 
before Christ’s death.  But His death, completing His e[nwsij with 
humanity enabled Him to triumph over death as a continuing power, by 
permitting men to share His immortality; and His ability to do this arose 
from His being the Incarnate Word of God.   
 
Foley, while including accurate portrayals of the positions of Athanasius and Anselm, 
fails to evaluate the bigger picture of the usage of debt by the two theologians.  For both, 
paying the debt meant reconstituting the relationship between God and humanity.  It was 
 
76 Ibid., 157 (DI  10).   
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a driving force for the Incarnation and both make it clear that, not only was a God-man 
necessary, but there is a motivation (an “ought”) for both parties.  Athanasius explained 
that it would have been improper for God to allow for the destruction of His creation, 
even though it was a (potential) result of divine law.  Anselm insisted that the 
complement of heavenly beings must be filled and God “ought” to provide for the 
salvation of the human beings whom He created to take the place of the fallen angels.  
Both use the language of debt to describe this in detailed fashion and the similarities are 
found in deep theological contexts and are not superficial, as Foley suggests.   
Hart on Debt and Gift 
In recent years, more scholars have noticed the similar uses of debt by both 
Athanasius and Anselm and have commented on it in more constructive ways than Foley.  
David Bentley Hart has taken an ecumenical approach to the issue, in an attempt to show 
that the doctors of Eastern and Western Christian theology have more common ground on 
the Incarnation and Atonement than has been traditionally granted.  Hart points out that 
both Eastern and Western scholars have criticized the CDH and, in his view, much of this 
has come unfairly: “misreadings of Anselm are legion, but many of the misinterpretations 
to which his work has been subjected over the years are at least instructively false.”77  
Referring to Anselm as a “victim of his own clarity,”78 Hart questions whether “the 
actual text of Cur Deus Homo has not been lost to view, behind the welter of adverse 
judgments brought to bear upon it.”79  However, after examining some of the critiques of
the CDH (both western and eastern), Hart finds a worthy comparator in Athanasius’ DI.  
 
77 David Bentley Hart, "A Gift Exceeding Every Debt: An Eastern Orthodox Appreciation of Anselm's Cur 
Deus Homo," Pro Ecclesia VII, no. 3 (1998)., 335.   
78 Ibid., 335.   
79 Ibid., 340.   
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He finds such similarity of purpose, method and language between the two that he m
the following (almost gushing) analysis:  
Already present in Athanasius’s account is the very story whose inner 
shape Anselm will, in a moment of intense critical reflection, attempt to 
grasp as necessity.  Already, in Athanasius’s theology, one finds the 
language of punishment used, but subordinate to the narrative of complete 
and unmerited forgiveness, and the language of law employed to describe 
the depths of an infinite mercy.  As it is with Athanasius, so it is with 
Anselm.80 
 
Hart then takes on the terminology of debt as an example of misguided criticism that has 
been leveled at Anselm.  Rather than wielding all of the unpleasant connotations 
associated with debt in the ugliness of its worst human applications, Hart views Anselm 
as subverting the human or negative idea of debt in the CDH and showing that the drama 
of the God-man is the offering of a gift of love in a schema of recapitulation.  For him, 
Anselm “has recognized Christ’s act as an infinite motion towards the Father, belonging 
to the mystery of the Trinity, simply surpassing all the arrangements of debt and violence 
by which a sinful humanity seeks to calculate its ‘justice.’”81   
Although Anselm may use the language of debt, justice, etc., Hart sees Anselm as 
using these terms only to highlight the inadequacy of human parallels to divine activity.  
The integration of God into humanity via the God-man allows these flawed concepts of 
debt, honor, justice and satisfaction to be renewed, just as the God-man renews humanity.  
For Hart, “in the end, Anselm merely restates the oldest patristic model of atonement of 
all: that of recapitulation.”82  The God-man not only brings humanity back into a right 
relationship with God, but He goes above and beyond what is necessary, to the point that 
 
80 Ibid., 347.   
81 Ibid., 347-348.   
82 Ibid., 348.   
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His offering is viewed as a gift, not merely the fulfillment of a debt.  Hart argues that 
Anselm’s God-man “recapitulates humanity by passing through all the violence of sin 
and death, rendering to God the obedience that is his due, and so transforms the event of 
his death into an occasion of infinite blessings for those to whom death is condign.”83  
Just as death is transformed (even appropriated) by the God-man, Hart argues that 
Anselm’s vision is one in which the sinful institutions and social structures that so many 
critics have accused Anselm of reinforcing are instead co-opted in the CDH: “as Christ’s 
sacrifice belongs not to an economy of credit and exchange, but to the Trinitarian motion 
of love, it is given entirely as gift, and must be seen as such: a gift given when it should 
not have needed to be given again, by God and at the price that we, in our sin, imposed 
upon him.”84  So, for Hart, the ideas of debt, owing, obligation and ought are present in 
the CDH not as part of an underlying feudal structure to the argument, but to exemplify 
the idea that the work of the God-man exceeds these human concepts and demonstrates a 
divine love for humanity that resists limitation in any way.  Hart argues that Anselm 
accomplishes this through the introduction of the infinite (which is beyond human 
comprehension) into a supposedly economic system: “simply by continuing to be the God 
he is, and through the sheer ‘redundancy’ of the good that flows from the infinite gesture 
of his love – which is a generosity in excess of all calculable economy – God undoes the 
sacrificial logic of our bondage; his gift remains a gift to the end, despite all our efforts to 
convert it into debt.”85  Rather than constraining the saving grace of God in a feudal 
complex, Hart views Anselm as having elevated human efforts to describe the 
 
83 Ibid., 348.   
84 Ibid., 348.   
85 Ibid., 348-349.   
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Incarnation and Atonement with human (even feudal) language by incorporating divine 
elements (in this case, the infinity of God).  He acknowledges, though, that this is a 
matter of perspective: “Whether one chooses, of course, to follow Nietzsche in the 
Genealogy of Morals and see the redundancy of Christ’s merit, inasmuch as it avails for 
salvation, as an infinite multiplication of debt depends upon one’s prejudices.”86  Hart 
chooses, instead, to interpret Anselm’s language as the triumph of God over sin, gift over 
debt: “The gift, which is the very language of love, precedes, exceeds, and annuls every 
debt.  Inasmuch as this is the story that Anselm repeats, elaborates, probes, and 
proclaims, he certainly has his place among the fathers.”87   
McIntyre on Debt 
The central message that Hart conveys is that Anselm is misunderstood when 
critics focus on his use of debt as an indication of bringing a feudal perspective to the 
Incarnation and Atonement.  This is the same point that John McIntyre makes in his book 
St. Anselm and His Critics,88 though he does not make the same comparison with the 
work of Athanasius.  Instead, McIntyre argues that all of Anselm’s use of debt and its 
variants (as discussed above) can be conflated into one understanding of “oughtness:”  
It must also be pointed out that for St. Anselm the notions of ‘ought’ and 
‘owing a debt’ are the same, so that the propositions: ‘the rational nature 
ought to subject its will to the Will of God’, and ‘the rational nature owes 
God the debt of subjecting its will to the Will of God’, are logically 
equivalent.  This equivalence is of supreme importance in the 
understanding of St. Anselm’s soteriology, but it is most frequently 
ignored.  For, while etymologically the two notions of ‘ought’ and ‘owing 
a debt’ are identical, in modern thought they have become quite separate; 
 
86 Ibid., 349.   
87 Ibid., 349.   
88 John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh,: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1954). 
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very few modern analyses of the concept ‘oughtness’ ever take account of 
the debt implication contained in it.89 
 
McIntyre argues that not only is Anselm conveying the same point when he uses the 
forms of debeo that are translated as debt, owing, obligation and ought, the variations and 
shades of meaning conveyed by the different English words do not exist for Anselm.  He 
views all of the variants as logically interchangeable, though he seems to prefer “ought” 
and “oughtness” for the fewer possible connotations that come with these terms.  
McIntyre develops this argument in support of his ultimate conclusion concerning 
Anselm’s use of debt: “Therefore, when St. Anselm develops the notion of debt in the 
chapters succeeding I.11, in his investigation of human sin and of salvation, he must not 
be interpreted in economic rather than in more or less religious terms.  In St. Anselm 
moral or religious oughtness is ever reducible to economic indebtedness…”90   
Whereas Hart argues that Anselm intentionally transforms human notions of debt 
by disrupting them with the presence of the infinite divinity and transforming them into a 
system of divine gifting, McIntyre chooses a more direct route by simply preferring the 
moral and religious to the economic and arguing that the variations of terminology reflect 
different, equivalent uses of one concept.  Although McIntyre’s approaching is tempting 
for its simplicity and ease of application, the richness and variety of Anselm’s use of 
debeo is too wide-ranging and important to conflate into a single meaning.  Even though 
the English language reflects this variety by different words, there is no reason that the 
intentions of Anselm cannot be located in a common source in spite of the varying usage.  
It is clear that Anselm does not operate with an exclusively economic understanding of 
 
89 Ibid., 67.   
90 Ibid., 67.   
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debt across his varying usage of debeo, but it is not likely that every instance can be 
translated with a version of “ought” or that his use of debt always carries the force of the 
overarching divine gift.  Rather, the right approach seems to be one that allows for 
variety of usage but also incorporates a shift of mindset that removes the feudal/economic 
context from the possible range of meaning.   
Properly Understanding Anselm’s Use of Debt 
I argue that a proper understanding of Anselm’s use of debt and its variants must 
take into consideration the similar usage by Athanasius, the scriptural references and 
sources that Anselm himself mentions, and the varieties of meaning that Anselm clearly 
employs.  The idea of expressing the obligation of humanity in terms of a debt obviously 
resonated with Athanasius in his systematic examination of the Incarnation and 
Atonement.  As seen earlier, though, Athanasius’ particular usage was in the context of 
the restoration of creation to its original state.  Sin had placed humanity in violation of 
divine law and the conflict between the death sentence that was impending for humanity 
and the goal of maintaining creation in its perfect state left humanity in a position of debt.  
Athanasius used this term to express the idea that the sin of humanity ought to be 
corrected.  In this sense, the point that Athanasius makes with his use of debt can be 
expressed in the different ways that McIntyre points out in his work with respect to 
Anselm’s usage.  Athanasius’ usage, while significant, was not as frequent or varied as 
Anselm’s.  Taken together, the points made by Athanasius and McIntyre can be 
summarized in this: the use of debt reflects the idea that there is an “ought,” an obligation 
for the sinful state of humanity to be corrected in order that the purpose of human 
creation can be fulfilled.   
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The argument that humanity “ought” to be free from sin and the consequences 
thereof is reflected not only in the work of Patristic sources such as Athanasius, but also 
in scriptural sources.91  The most important scriptural source for Anselm and his use of 
debt is the passage from the Lord’s Prayer in Matthew that is cited explicitly in book I, 
chapter 19.92  In the Lord’s Prayer, the comparison is made between the way that God 
forgives human debts (presumably sins) and the way that humans forgive debts of each 
other (presumably more than simply financial debts and perhaps even more than sinful 
actions committed against one another).  As mentioned above, this passage provides 
scriptural warrant for using the term debt to describe the relationship between God and 
humanity.  Anselm acknowledges this and argues that even though the term debt is used 
to describe the relationship between humans and other humans and also between God and 
humans, the term cannot be used bi-directionally in the case of the latter.  That is, God 
can never be considered to be in debt to a human being (or humanity) in the same way 
that any human being can be in debt to another human being.  Now that Anselm has 
established that there are clear differences of usage, it raises the question whether there 
are also other important differences of meaning accompanying the differences of usage.       
 
91 I have tried to show that there is a strong similarity between the understandings of debt by Athanasius 
and Anselm, but by no means can I or do I argue that Anselm was influenced on this matter by Athanasius.  
Anselmian scholars such as Giles Gasper have searched the record of the library at Bec and other historical 
records for evidence that Anselm may have read Athanasius, but there is none to be found.  From a textual 
perspective, Schmitt did not cite Athanasius at all in the notes of critical edition of the CDH.  In fact, 
Schmitt is nearly silent in his notes to the sections of the CDH in which the idea of debt occurs and makes 
no connection to any patristic writer.  I can only point to the strong similarities of intent and usage in 
arguing for a connection between Athanasius and Anselm.  I feel comfortable in doing this since it is clear 
from the works of other Anselm scholars (Gasper, McMahon, etc.) that I am not alone in my line of 
thought.   
92 et dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos dimisimus debitoribus nostris – Matthew 6:12.  As mentioned 
earlier, Schmitt noted the influence of this passage twice in his notes to the CDH.  Also, he does not 
connect any other “debt”-related sections of the CDH to scriptural passages.    
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As discussed earlier, Anselm uses debeo in the sense of “obligation” uniquely 
with regard to human beings and does not use it to speak of any “ought” or debt on the 
part of God.  This seems to be due to the fact that Anselm uses it to describe situations in 
which the circumstances are contingent – usually a result of a choice of human free will 
and often in opposition to the will or law of God.  Anselm appears to protect the 
sovereignty of God at all times – although humans may find themselves in debt or in 
situations of obligation, the same cannot be said of God.  The only “ought” for God is 
that God’s will ought to be carried out.93  For Anselm, this is almost redundant, since 
whatever God wills simply “is.”  When human sin disrupts the purpose of creation and 
the creature fails to render honor to the Creator, there may be an apparent temporal 
failure of God’s will to be implemented, but God’s will always reigns and the apparent 
lapse is corrected.  Regardless of whether one accepts Anselm’s understanding of eternity 
(which allows him to consistently view the sovereignty of God as prevalent), it is clear 
that Anselm’s intention is to use debt and its variants to express the degree to which 
creation is in compliance with God’s will at any given time.  The absolute sovereignty of 
the divine will along with the certainty that any lapse in conformity is only apparent 
combine to defy any attempt to quantify any amount(s) of human debt or obligation to 
God.  Thus, the assertion by critics of the CDH that Anselm characterizes the sin of 
humanity in the same terms as a financial debt owed by a serf to a master fails to conform 
to Anselm’s self-understanding of his of debt and its variants.  Instead of recklessly 
applying the elements of feudal obligations to the infinite and ultimately loving actions of 
 
93 This is the only way in which God may be said to be “in debt” – to Himself.  However, it seems to be 
more clear to simply say that God’s will must be carried out.  Perhaps the theology of the Trinity may have 
a more complex rubric of intra-divine obligation, but that is not germane to this discussion.   
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God in the Incarnation and Atonement, Anselm has wielded the infinite and perfect 
activity of God to show that the relationships in question defy quantification.  Anselm’s 
point is just that the relationship between humans and God cannot be expressed in human 
terms and debt is the example, not the exception.  Anselm applies this principle 
consistently and rigorously throughout the CDH in the course of a thoroughgoing 
treatment of the Incarnation and Atonement that makes use of a sophisticated 
understanding of debt, owing, obligation and ought.  In the end, it is clear that Anselm 
makes exactly the opposite move that so many of critics have accused him of making – 
Anselm’s use of debt demonstrates how inconsistent the CDH is with the human 
relationships present in feudal society rather than playing out the Incarnation and 
Atonement as an economic transaction in a feudal drama.   
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Chapter 5 
Satisfaction 
 
If asked to provide a one-word summary of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, any 
reader, from the casual student to the lifelong expert, would most likely reply: 
“satisfaction.”  Textbooks, articles and entire works devoted to the CDH (whether taking 
a neutral, negative or positive approach to the work itself) most often portray the idea of 
satisfaction as Anselm’s clear emphasis and most significant contribution to theological 
discourse via this work.  The primary reason for this is that the CDH is the first work in 
the history of Christian theology to portray the salvific work of the Incarnation and 
Atonement as satisfaction made by humanity in order to correct and heal the 
consequences of human sin.  However, in the intervening centuries since the CDH 
entered the realm of theological discourse, the term satisfaction has taken on a life of its 
own, expanding in meaning and application far beyond Anselm’s use in the CDH.1  As a 
result, the important role that satisfaction plays in the CDH has served as a lightning-rod 
of criticism.  Critics have inappropriately applied later understandings of satisfaction to 
the CDH and point out supposed shortcomings due to the fact that Anselm did not 
somehow anticipate the negative connotations of “satisfaction.”  This has led even 
friendly interpreters of Anselm and the CDH to downplay satisfaction in favor of other 
points (such as justice) in the CDH.  For example, Alister E. McGrath, who would likely 
 
1 See Aulén’s Christus Victor for an overview of the Reformation appropriation of satisfaction and his 
interpretation of Luther’s use thereof.   
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call himself a friendly interpreter of Anselm, commented that “[t]he weak point in 
Anselm’s Soteriology is generally considered to be his discussion of satisfaction.”2  This 
seems to reflect not so much an inadequate treatment of the subject by Anselm, but rather 
the expectations of modern readers that any appropriation of a term with such negative 
connotations in theological discourse should be accompanied by a justification for doing 
so.  However, I argue that it is unreasonable to expect Anselm to anticipate later 
developments in usage and understanding of satisfaction and he should be judged on his 
own terms and by his own meanings and usage.  The goal of this chapter is to explore 
carefully the way that Anselm employed the term satisfaction in the CDH and to clarify 
the meaning he conveyed with its usage.  This will be distinguished from the various 
inaccurate meanings that have been attributed to him, most of which stem from later 
developments in the meaning of the term.   
Anselm and Historical Usage of Satisfaction 
Explorations of Anselm’s use of satisfaction typically begin with an analysis of 
the origins of the term itself.  From a historical perspective, attention usually turns first to 
Tertullian, who appears to have been the first Christian writer to apply the terms 
“satisfactio” and “satisfacere” to the realm of soteriology.  Foley, in his book Anselm’s 
Theory of the Atonement, points out that the term “is purely a Latin conception, having no 
equivalent in Greek; and was borrowed from the legal language of Rome.”3  The legal 
aspect of the linguistic origin and Tertullian’s own background as a lawyer have caused 
some interpreters to focus perhaps too narrowly on the legal connotations of satisfaction.  
 
2 Alister E. McGrath, "Rectitude: The Moral Foundation of Anselm of Canterbury's Soteriology," 
Downside Review 99 (1981)., 211.   
3 George Cadwalader Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1909)., 78.   
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Foley seems to fall into this category as he argues that Tertullian’s usage led directly into 
medieval (specifically Anselm’s) usage of satisfaction: “[Tertullian] was led to 
contemplate all moral relations from the legal standpoint, and it would have been natural 
for him to describe the relation of Christ to our salvation in juridical terms.  He 
introduced the forensic conceptions which afterwards governed Western theology, and 
thus prepared the way for the mediæval theory of Atonement.”4  Although Foley 
acknowledges that Tertullian and Anselm (along with other Western theologians) used 
satisfaction in different ways, he blames Tertullian for what he considers the negative 
impact of the term: “his use of satisfaction is a mischievous superstition, which had most 
disastrous results.  The unethical and legal categories which he introduced afterwards 
dominated Western thought.”5  Foley’s focus on the historical origins of the use of 
satisfaction seems to have influenced his characterization of Anselm’s use.  He argued 
that the incorporation of the term (in supposedly the first such application of it since 
Tertullian) fit the Roman, legal approach that Anselm took in the CDH: “God is not 
thought of as a Father, but as a Judge or a Teutonic Over-lord.”6  This harsh verdict is 
clearly tied to the historical approach that Foley takes to the origins of the use of 
satisfaction.   
On the other hand, at least one scholar has argued that the historical approach is 
wrong-headed and is not the best way to understand Anselm’s use of satisfaction in the 
CDH.  McIntyre takes the position that Tertullian “was writing some eight hundred years 
before St. Anselm, and he cannot be regarded as exerting any great influence upon the 
 
4 Ibid., 80-81.   
5 Ibid., 81-82.   
6 Ibid., 167-168.   
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latter.”7   Those who emphasize Tertullian’s usage also frequently point out similarities 
between Roman law and the church system of penitence that had been developed by 
Anselm’s day.  However, the systems of penance, confession, etc. were so entrenched in 
the life of the Church that it is not possible to prove that Anselm based his idea of 
satisfaction on the putatively Roman origins of penance any more so than the many other 
aspects of church and monastic life.  I would argue that so much attention has been paid 
to the supposed historical origins of satisfaction that those who criticize Anselm on this 
basis run the risk of falling victim to the fallacy of origins.  There is simply no textual 
evidence from Anselm that his usage was in any way affected by the previous usage of 
the term.  Rather, Anselm makes a versatile enough usage of satisfaction in the CDH that 
its’ proper meaning can be satisfactorily derived from Anselm’s work itself.  McIntyre 
makes the following argument on the subject: 
The meaning of the word as it appears in Anselmic soteriology is to be 
discovered, therefore, not by a historical analysis of previous uses of it, 
but by an examination of the place which it occupies within his scheme.  
For in a very real sense he builds up his own interpretation of it as the 
work proceeds, so that in the end we have an entirely new conception.8 
 
This approach denies that Anselm used satisfaction simply in keeping with a tradition 
that had been inaugurated with Tertullian.  Instead, McIntyre (and others) would argue 
that Anselm chose the word deliberately to fit his theological approach in the CDH.  In 
the process, he appropriated a secular word9 and developed his own theological meaning 
in his use of it.  McIntyre points out that this is not an uncommon occurrence in the 
 
7 John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh,: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1954)., 85.   
8 Ibid., 87.   
9 Although the word is secular in origin, it had already been incorporated into Christian theology and life 
before Anselm.  See the Rule of Benedict (discussed later in this chapter) as an example with which Anselm 
would have had intimate knowledge.     
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history of theological language, particularly language involved in the description of the 
Incarnation and Atonement: 
This kind of occurrence is frequently taking place in the history of 
theological language and usage.  It happened when the words “ransom” 
and “propitiation” were applied to the Death of Christ by the earliest 
writers; in the new reference these words were “baptized” into a new 
meaning, which had certainly associations with the old in that the same 
words were still used, but in which these associations were radically 
transformed.10 
 
Anselm clearly develops a unique meaning of satisfaction in the way that he appropriates 
the term for the CDH.  The exploration of Anselm’s use of satisfaction in this chapter 
will attempt to show it is best understood through the Anselmian context itself.  The 
history of the use of satisfaction by Tertullian and others was not relevant for Anselm and 
is not relevant to interpretations of Anselm’s work.11  In an echo of the words of Foley 
(in his dismissal of the significance of the use of “debt” by both Athanasius and Anselm
“The coincidence…is verbal, not substantial.”12  Anselm may have used the same term as 
Tertullian but his meaning was set by his own usage and not that of Tertullian.  It is 
merely coincidence and not influence that connects the two theologians.   
Anselm’s Usage of Satisfaction 
Anselm provides a first glimpse into his understanding of satisfaction in his 
opening chapter when he quotes from I Peter 3:15 in his description of those who have 
been asking him to write the CDH: “Dicunt enim eas sibi placere et arbitrantur 
satisfacere.  Quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad fidem accedant, sed ut eorum quae 
 
10 McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo., 88.   
11 McIntyre articulates this point well: “For that reason I should say that most of the historical and critical 
analysis of the notion of satisfaction, as it appears in writers prior to St. Anselm, has been downright 
misleading, for it has created the impression that St. Anselm is bound in his employment of the notion by 
the interpretations placed upon it by his predecessors.”  (Ibid., 88).   
12 Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement., 58.   
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credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur, et ut sint, quantum possunt, »parati 
semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti« se »rationem de ea quae in« nobis »est 
spe«.”13  Satisfaction is, firstly, an answer or response.  As such, it is not something that 
arises in a vacuum, but it responds to a need, a challenge, even a void.  For Anselm, 
satisfaction is both the answer and the nature of the answer given to the question “cur 
deus homo?”  Anselm portrays his own (putatively satisfactory) response to his eager 
(even pestering) audience as a parallel effort to the satisfaction provided by the God-man 
in the salvation of humanity.  He filled an unmet need in a way similar to how God filled 
an unmet need in the Incarnation.  So, the nature of the answer is one of completely 
responding to and fulfilling a need.  To some (such as Anselm’s audience), the need 
might have been glaring.  To others, though, the need might not have been so obvious.  
Anselm’s goal was to provide a satisfactory answer so that both those who recognized the 
need and those who did not were able to understand that the full and proper response had 
been given.   
This brings the conversation around again to the idea of proportionality and 
appropriateness that has earlier arisen in the discussion of the honor of God.  Satisfaction, 
as the fulfillment and response to a need, is inherently related to the type and size of the 
need in question.  In the case of honor, Anselm argued that the offense to the honor of 
God was infinite, so the response (the satisfaction) must be of an infinite nature, as well.  
This relationship is not something that all interpreters of Anselm understand (or at least 
acknowledge) when approaching the CDH.  One might argue that Hopkins failed to 
properly estimate the importance of proportionality for Anselm in his criticism of the use 
 
13 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1938)., CDH lib. I, cap. 1 (II, 47).  Cf. I Peter 3:15.   
 156 Ch. 5 
                                                
of “ought” in the CDH.  Anselm seems to value maximal proportionality (even 
parallelism) in describing the fittingness of the various aspects of the Incarnation and 
Atonement.  The importance of the type and quality of the satisfaction would imply that 
since the need arose through the activity of humanity, the satisfaction should come 
through the activity of humanity.  Anything else is less than a full or maximal response to 
the issue at hand and when the activity of God is involved, only the best or maximally 
appropriate is possible.  Other critics have recognized this tactic that Anselm used and 
attempted to turn it against him on the issue of sin.  To some, Anselm may be viewed as 
making too strong a connection between satisfaction and sin, to the extent that a 
weakness in the understanding of the latter necessarily translates to a weakness in the 
former.  Foley provides a compelling example of this when he argues:  
He has no understanding of a real salvation because he has no real 
understanding of sin. It is represented as something momentous in its 
effects upon both God and man, but its true ethical character is never 
discerned. It is not to him an “offence against inherent right and truth,” 
against the reasonable principles of righteousness or the loving heart of a 
Father; it is not disunity of spirit or perversion of will or depravation of 
nature. It is an affront to a great dignitary, a laesa majestas, an outward act 
of refusal to pay what is due.14 
 
For Foley, the weakness of Anselm’s idea of satisfaction is inherently tied to the 
perceived weakness of Anselm’s concept of sin.  In making this criticism, he appears to 
tacitly support the idea that human salvation should be related to human sin, in some 
way.  Against Foley, Anselm would argue that his own understanding of sin is both real 
and comprehensible and so also is his portrayal of satisfaction.  Foley seems unconvinced 
and Anselm’s position on the issue has been addressed in earlier chapters, so the point 
here is not to defend Anselm’s concept of sin, but to argue that it would be an artificial 
 
14 Foley, Anselm's Theory of the Atonement., 155-156.   
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move for anyone to address Anselm’s idea of satisfaction without incorporating his 
understanding of sin.  Anselm clearly identifies the relationship between the two and the 
answer (satisfaction) is only truly comprehensible in the context of the question (sin).   
Satisfaction and Fittingness 
It is this relationship of need and response, question and answer, sin and 
satisfaction that provides the context for Anselm’s use of the idea of “fittingness” in the 
CDH.  While some interpreters of Anselm have linked his use of “fittingness” with that 
of “necessity” in order to contend that Anselm does not intend any sort of strict necessity 
for his argument, I would counter that Anselm uses the two in distinct contexts.  
Necessity has been discussed earlier in this work in the context of Anselm’s use of 
justice, since Anselm used both “justice” and “necessity” to explain the consistency of 
God’s actions with God’s nature.  The use of “fittingness” in the CDH does not affect 
that usage, but rather stands beside it in the discussion of the degree to which the 
satisfaction of the God-man so appropriately responds to the urgent need raised by the 
presence of human sin.  Anselm addresses this briefly and in broad terms at the beginning 
of the CDH: 
Si enim diligenter considerarent quam convenienter hoc modo procurata 
sit humana restauratio, non deriderent nostram simplicitatem, sed dei 
nobiscum laudarent sapientem benignitatem.  Oportebat namque ut, sicut 
per hominis inoboedientiam mors in humanum genus intraverat, ita per 
hominis oboedientiam vita restitueretur.  Et quemadmodum peccatum 
quod fuit causa nostrae damnationis, initium habuit a femina, sic nostrae 
iustitiae et salutis auctor nasceretur de femina.15   
 
There is a great deal of flexibility and contingency in using words like convenienter and 
oportebat when trying to prove a point, though, and Boso points this out in the next 
 
15 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia. CDH lib. I, cap. 3 (II, 51).   
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paragraph: “Omnia haec pulchra et quasi quaedam picturae suscipienda sunt.  Sed si non 
est aliquid solidum super quod sedeant, non videntur infidelibus sufficere, cur deum ea 
quae dicimus pati voluisse credere debeamus.”16  If the primary argument for the 
Incarnation and Atonement is one from “fittingness,” then it does not stand the test of 
logic, especially to non-Christians.  Anselm acknowledges this from the beginning, but 
he does not abandon the language of “fittingness,” “appropriateness,” etc. entirely.  He 
returns to this language in a small way at the conclusion of the work when discussing 
how it is that humanity benefits from the salvific work of the God-man: “Quibus 
convenientius fructum et retributionem suae mortis attribuet quam illis, propter quos 
salvandos, sicut ratio veritatis nos docuit, hominem se fecit, et quibus, ut diximus, 
moriendo exemplum moriendi propter iustitiam dedit?”17  It was “appropriate” for the 
reward given to the God-man to be redirected to humanity to allow for human salvation.  
This is the final step in Anselm’s argument, after which he makes a summary comment in 
which he references satisfaction: “Puto me iam aliquantulum tuae satisfecisse quaestioni, 
quamvis hoc melior me facere plenius possit, et maiores atque plures quam meum aut 
mortale ingenium comprehendere valeat huius rei sint rationes.”18  He contends that his 
argument is based on a firm foundation of logic, but he clearly includes what is “fitting” 
and “appropriate” in order to provide a more fully satisfactory answer.  By extension, 
Anselm seems to imply that these elements are also fundamental parts of the satisfaction 
accomplished by the God-man for the salvation of humanity.  Therefore, in addition to 
 
16 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 4 (II.51).   
17 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 130).   
18 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II, 131).   
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the element of breadth and fullness in satisfaction, one must include “fittingness.”  True 
satisfaction, for Anselm, is both complete and fitting.   
Satisfaction and Recompense 
In Book I, chapter 11, Anselm introduces the primary use of satisfaction in the 
CDH: the necessary and sufficient solution to the problem of sin.  In this context, 
“satisfactio” is most often translated as “satisfaction” and “recompense.”  When used as a 
verb, the terms are accompanied by “give,” “make” or “pay” (as in “make recompense”).  
This understanding of satisfaction presumes much of the discussion of the terms “honor” 
and “debt” found in earlier chapters of this work, since it is the lack of honor that creates 
a need (or debt) that is filled by satisfaction.  This is made clear in Anselm’s summary 
statement at the end of the chapter: “Sic ergo debet omnis qui peccat, honorem deo quem 
rapuit solvere; et haec est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator deo debet facere.”19  
Satisfaction is something that is carried out in response to sin and on behalf of sinners.  
Anselm very quickly and clearly establishes the scope of this satisfaction: “Nec sufficit 
solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata plus debet reddere quam 
abstulit.”20  The need for satisfaction in this case is not equivalent to the offense at the 
source of the need.  Sin as an offense against God created a metaphysical “hole” that was 
much larger than the implement that created it.  The lack of honor given to God was only 
the sin and not the need created by sin, even though it was a “lack” or “need” in and of 
itself.  The need created by sin was constituted by both the lack of rendered honor and the 
dishonor associated with that lack of honor.  This combination of a lack of honor and a 
state of dishonor must be met with satisfaction of the same magnitude.  As discussed in 
 
19 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II.68-69).   
20 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 11 (II.68).   
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chapter two, sin constituted an offense of infinite magnitude, since any dishonoring of 
God is an immeasurable offense.   
Given a need resulting from an offense to the divine honor of infinite magnitude, 
the question arises as to how to deal with this need.  In Book I, chapter 12, Anselm raises 
the possibility of a resolution to the problem without satisfaction.  To the question of 
whether the problem of sin can be solved by a pardon coming from divine mercy, Anselm 
makes the following reply: “Sic dimittere peccatum non est aliud quam non punire.  Et 
quoniam recte ordinare peccatum sine satisfactione non est nisi punire: si non punitur, 
inordinatum dimittitur.”21  There are three options in the range of possibilities: 
satisfaction, punishment, or neither (which constitutes a disordered [“inordinatum”] state 
of affairs).  Simple forgiveness falls into the “neither” category and is ruled out as 
unfitting by Anselm since it is tantamount to a disordered state, which is incompatible 
with divine will and ordinance.  This option is clearly excluded by Anselm, since there is 
no possibility of inconsistency within God.  The only remaining alternative to 
satisfaction, then, is punishment.22  Anselm explains the nature and efficacy of 
punishment of a human being as the following:  
“…deus eum invitum sibi torquendo subicit et sic se dominum eius esse 
ostendit, quod ipse homo voluntate fateri recusat.  In quo considerandum 
quia, sicut homo peccando rapit quod dei est, ita deus puniendo aufert 
quod hominis est.  Quippe non solum id suum alicuius esse dicitur quod 
iam possidet, sed quod in eius potestate est ut habeat.  Quoniam ergo 
homo ita factus est, ut beatitudinem habere posset, si non peccaret: cum 
 
21 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 12 (II.69).   
22 He makes this situation clear at the end of Book I, chapter 13: “Necesse est ergo, ut aut ablatus honor 
solvatur aut poena sequatur.  Alioquin aut sibi deus ipsi iustus non erit aut ad utrumque impotens erit; 
quod nefas est vel cogitare.”  - Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 13 (II, 71).  This narrows the focus of his inquiry and 
sets up the discussion in Book I, chapter 14.   
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propter peccatum beatitudine et omni bono privatur, de suo quamvis 
invitus solvit quod rapuit…”23   
 
Punishment would remove the possibility for human beings to participate in the beatific 
vision and would be a condemnation to eternal death for all humanity.  However, as 
Anselm explains in (perhaps inordinate) detail in the following chapters (Book I, chapters 
16-18), humanity was created in part to fill out the complement of heavenly beings.  
Punishment of human beings for sin would leave that purpose unfulfilled and God would 
be in the position of thwarting His own efforts, another inconsistency that is impossible 
for God.24 
So, Anselm rules out the possibilities of dismissing sin outright and punishing 
humanity in order to make recompense for sin.  The only option left, then, is satisfaction 
for sin.  By detailing the faults of the rejected possibilities, Anselm also provides some 
insight into the nature of this satisfaction.  First, satisfaction must be consistent with the 
order of God’s nature and creation.  Not only must it not violate the principles established 
by God, but it must also be aligned with them.  In that way, satisfaction must fit into the 
order of creation, specifically the relationship between God and humanity.  God must 
retain His role as Creator and humanity must retain its’ role as part of creation.  The 
earlier discussion of Anselm’s use of “honor” highlighted the importance of this 
relationship.  Anselm is convinced that satisfaction works to maintain the relationship 
between God and humanity.  This conviction is informed by Anselm’s rejection of the 
 
23 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 14 (II, 72).   
24 Anselm does not spell out this rationale explicitly, though it seems to follow from his reasoning.  
Punishment would seem to exclude humanity since it would be an eternal death sentence, ruling out eternal 
happiness.  Instead of making this point, he focuses on the fact that punishment only restores the honor of 
God and does not remove the sin of humanity (see, for example, the illustration of the rich man and the 
pearl in Book I, chapter 19 and his concluding remarks in Book I, chapter 23).   
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idea that sin could be forgiven without any response to sin.  This latter situation carries 
with it an alteration of the relationship between God and humanity, since the relationship 
that was formerly based on honor and worship now has to somehow incorporate dishonor 
and sin into its basis.  This impossibility highlights the fact that, for Anselm, the correct 
solution must reinforce the principle that excluded the incorrect solution: the divine-
human relationship of honor and worship must be preserved by satisfaction.  
Additionally, satisfaction must also allow for human beings to fill out the complement of 
heavenly beings by completely removing sin and its effects from the ranks of humanity.  
Since punishment would result in the complete destruction of humanity, satisfaction must 
provide a means of salvation for humanity.  Since punishment also fails to remove sin, 
satisfaction must provide a means for the removal of sin from humanity.  This must be 
done wholly; it is not enough to simply counteract the effect of the first sin, but there 
must be a solution to all sin that affects human beings.  Satisfaction must heal humanity 
from the compounded effects of sin and provide a means of restoration to the pre-sin 
state, which in turn allows for human beings to become heavenly beings and participate 
in the beatific vision.   
One can gain insight into Anselm’s use of satisfaction as recompense not only 
from the rejected alternatives, but also from the contextual descriptions he adds when he 
makes use of the term.  The first instance in which Anselm expands on his meaning of the 
term is in Book I, chapter 15 when he lists satisfaction as recompense among the 
alternatives for solving the problem of sin: “Ipsa namque perversitatis spontanea 
satisfactio vel a non satisfaciente poenae exactio – excepto hoc quia deus de malis multis 
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modis bona facit – in eadem universitate suum tenent locum et ordinis pulchritudinem.”25  
Anselm here contrasts punishment with a voluntary or free-will recompense for sin 
(“perversitatis spontanea satisfactio”).26  For Anselm, satisfaction is a completely free 
and independent act undertaken by the God-man.  It was not necessitated or forced on 
Him by any external influence.  It was also not an act undertaken out of ignorance: the 
God-man had complete understanding and control of what occurred.27  This usage also 
indicates that recompense was an active process for Anselm – the God-man was the 
initiator and executor of all that took place.  This is in contrast to the passive nature of 
punishment, which is beyond the control of those who are punished.  Satisfaction is an 
active response to the problem of sin that is compatible with the Anselmian (and 
Augustinian) view that God is pure act and His activity (universally, not just with regard 
to humanity) is one unified act in which He moves everything else.  All other beings 
receive the divine action and this case of recompense is no different.  The God-man 
provided for the salvation of humanity and it is up to human beings to respond to that act 
of benevolence.   
Another qualification for satisfaction as recompense is proportionality, according 
to Anselm.  As referred to earlier in this chapter, Anselm valued proportionality within 
the context of fittingness.  After deciding that satisfaction is the only option for human 
salvation, Anselm discusses the need for recompense to be proportional to the motivating 
offense.  Once again, he appeals to divine sovereignty and the order of creation to make 
 
25 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. I, cap. 14 (II, 73).   
26 See also Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 19 (II, 85) in which elaborates on his meaning of satisfaction: “…sine 
satisfactione, id est sine debiti solutione spontanea…”   
27 This point is important in order to clarify that the divine nature of the God-man did not simply wield the 
human nature for its own purpose.  It was a perfectly free and unified action on the part of the God-man as 
man.   
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his case (via Boso): “Aliter aliquatenus inordinatum maneret peccatum, quod esse non 
potest, si deus nihil relinquit inordinatum in regno suo.  Sed hoc est praestitutum quia 
quamlibet parvum inconveniens impossibile in deo.”28  However, Anselm quickly points 
out that humanity can offer only what they already owe to God.  Humans have no innate 
way to make any supererogatory offering to God.  Still, the scope of satisfaction must 
meet or exceed the scope of sin, which is immeasurably great (or weighty – “ponderis”).  
He makes this clear in Book I, chapter 21: 
A.  Patet quia secundum quantitatem peccati exigit deus satisfactionem.   
B.  Non possum negare.   
A.  Non ergo satisfacis, si non reddis aliquid maius, quam sit id pro quo 
peccatum facere non debueras.29   
 
This places an impossible burden on humanity, since it would require a perfect record of 
human submission to God to approach the requirement of offering something 
“proportional to the amount/size of sin” (“secundum quantitatem peccati”) and something 
that is clearly beyond human capacity to offer recompense “greater” than sin (“maius”).  
Anselm presses this point to not only advance his point that God must be introduced to 
the ranks of humanity in order for true satisfaction to be had, but he also sets the ground 
rules that he will later follow for elucidating what exactly constitutes satisfaction.30   
The last noteworthy context for Anselm’s use of satisfaction is his pairing with 
the words for “ought” – “debere,” “debitum,” etc.31  Satisfaction brings with it certain 
obligations and Anselm particularly focuses on the obligations related to the magnitude 
of the payment and the nature of the payer.  The issue of magnitude has been discussed 
 
28 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia. CDH lib. I, cap. 20 (II, 86).   
29 Ibid., CDH lib. I, cap. 21 (II, 89).   
30 See the discussion later in this chapter and CDH Book II, Chapters 18-19.   
31 For a full discussion of Anselm’s use of these terms, please see Chapter Four of this work.   
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earlier, so the issue of who ought to make satisfaction is worth exploring here.  At the 
end of Book II, Chapter 6, Anselm comes to the following conclusion: “Si ergo, sicut 
constat, necesse est ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, 
nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi deus nec debet nisi homo: 
necesse est ut eam faciat deus-homo.”32  Not only is satisfaction a need that ought to be 
met, but the obligation (or the “ought”) extends to who ought to carry it out.  This is 
characterized both positively, as seen in the previous quotation, and negatively, as seen in 
the following question concerning whether God could assume non-Adamic humanity33 in 
order to save Adamic humanity: “Sed si novum hominem facit non ex ADAE genere, non 
pertinebit ad genus humanum quod natum est de ADAM.  Quare non debebit satisfacere 
pro eo, quia non erit de illo.”34  While the one who pays/makes satisfaction must be a 
human, that one must be an Adamic human, since there is an inherent connection 
between the human beings who prompted the need for satisfaction and the human being 
who ought to make the satisfaction.  In this case, there is an impetus stronger than mere 
“fittingness” that drives Anselm’s line of reasoning.  It is clear, then, from the shades of 
meaning he employs in the context of obligation that Anselm is using the term and the 
idea of satisfaction in a complex and intentional way.   
Satisfaction as Fulfillment 
In the end, the defining chapter for Anselm’s understanding of satisfaction is 
book II, chapter 19.  Here he defines what it was that the God-man accomplished in order 
 
32 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 6 (II, 101).   
33 Please refer to the previous chapter’s discussion of Hopkins’ critique regarding the possibility of 
salvation via a human being drawn from outside the lineage of Adam; this is the meaning of “non-Adamic 
humanity” being used here – some imagined “human” being created with no biological connection to 
Adam.   
34 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 8 (II, 102).   
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to make satisfaction via the Incarnation and Atonement.  The death of the God-man was 
carried out to provide a benefit that would balance out the sin of humanity.35  For 
Anselm, this necessitates a response in the form of a gift from God in order to recognize 
the greatness of the action of the God-man: “Immo necesse esse video, ut pater filio 
retribuat.  Alioquin aut iniustus videretur esse si nollet, aut impotens si non posset; quae 
a deo aliena sunt.”36  The gift follows necessarily on the salvific activity of the God-man 
and the last remaining topic for Anselm concerns what should be done with it.  Since the 
God-man is God and needs nothing, he envisions a transfer of the gift to humanity that 
would be a natural next step: 
Quibus convenientius fructum et retributionem suae mortis attribuet 
quam illis, propter quos salvandos, sicut ratio veritatis nos docuit, 
hominem se fecit, et quibus, ut diximus, moriendo exemplum moriendi 
propter iustitiam dedit?  Frustra quippe imitatores eius erunt, si meriti eius 
participes non erunt. Aut quos iustius faciet haeredes debiti quo ipse non 
eget, et exundantiae suae plenitudinis, quam parentes et fratres suos, quos 
aspicit tot et tantis debitis obligatos egestate tabescere in profundo 
miseriarum, ut eis dimittatur quod pro peccatis debent, et detur quo 
propter peccata carent?37 
 
The sharing of the gift with humanity emphasizes the necessity of the God-man to be 
both divine and human.  The process also ties together the previous issues of honor (by 
restoring the relationship between God and humanity to its proper status), justice (by 
showing the supreme justice of saving the human beings to whom the God-man is so 
closely related) and debt (by explicitly stating that the gift allows for the debt to be 
excused).  Satisfaction in this way is the culmination of all of the previous issues 
discussed both in this work and the CDH.  Anselm clearly takes this approach since he 
 
35 Anselm starts by assuming this: “Quantum autem sit quod filius sponte dedit, non est opus exponere.” - 
Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II.130).   
36 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II.130).   
37 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II.130-131).   
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plays up the meaning of satisfaction as a full answer: “Puto me iam aliquantulum tuae 
satisfecisse quaestioni…”38  Finally, in his summary remarks at the end of this chapter, 
he notes that “…ab homine deus exigebat ut dabolum vinceret, et qui per peccatum deum 
offenderat, per iustitiam satisfaceret.”39  The ultimate satisfaction came through 
righteousness – the righteousness of the God-man whose death counteracted the sin of 
humanity and the righteousness that was counted for the benefit of humanity as a result of 
the gift following upon the death of the God-man.  Satisfaction ties up all of the loose 
ends and provides a full divinely empowered response to any challenges to the order of 
creation.   
Analogue for Satisfaction – Rule of Benedict 
Having earlier discussed and rejected the legal understanding of satisfaction as an 
influence on Anselm’s own usage, it is worthwhile to explore other possible influences 
(whether positive or negative).  One influence that would undoubtedly be at the forefront 
of Anselm’s mind (in this matter and in almost any other area of his life) is the Rule of St. 
Benedict (RB).  As a monk and abbot, the RB would have been read, understood and 
internalized to the point that it would likely have been difficult for Anselm to distinguish 
between his own theological and liturgical intuition and that of the RB.  Not only would 
the RB have guided his formation as a human being and as a member of a monastic 
community, but it would have also reinforced many of the foundational theological 
concepts that play a role in the CDH, including honor, righteousness and order.  While 
the Bible (likely the only work with which Anselm would have been more familiar than 
the RB) did not include a highly-developed understanding of the term satisfaction in the 
 
38 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II.131).   
39 Ibid., CDH lib. II, cap. 19 (II.131).   
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few occurrences of the term, the RB clearly and intentionally did so.  In the RB, 
satisfaction is used repeatedly to describe the public restoration of monks after having 
committed public offenses.  This is primarily a penitential context, since satisfaction is 
always used as a corrective and restorative measure.    
Table – Satisfaction Occurrences in the RB 
Word RB40 Page (Fry)
satisfactionem 24.4 220 
satisfactione 24.7 220 
satisfactionem 27.3 222-224 
satisfactione 43.6 242 
satisfactionem 43.11 244 
satisfaciat 43.12 244 
satisfactionem 43.16 244 
satisfaciant 44.Titulus 244 
satisfactum 44.3 244 
satisfaciat 44.8 246 
satisfactione 44.8 246 
satisfaciant 44.9 246 
satisfactione 45.1 246 
satisfaciens 71.8 292 
 
Variants of “satisfactio” occur 14 times in the RB, although the concept is 
referenced many times over in the various contexts.  The majority of the references occur 
fittingly in chapters 43, 44 and 45, which deal with excommunication and restoration.  
Chapters 24, 27 and 71 also address the issue of excommunication, though they are not as 
focused on the issue as the aforementioned chapters.  Separation from the other monks 
and from the daily work is the punishment for offenses until satisfaction is made: 
Privati autem a mensae consortio ista erit ratio ut in oratorio psalmum 
aut antiphonam non imponat, neque lectionem recitet, usque ad 
satisfactionem.  Refectionem autem cibi post fratrum refectionem solus 
                                                 
40 References are to Chapter:Section according to the numbering in the Fry Latin-English edition.  The page 
numbers reference the same work.   
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accipiat, ut, si verbi gratia fratres reficiunt sexta hora, ille frater nona, si 
fratres nona, ille vespera, usque dum satisfactione congrua veniam 
consequatur.41 
 
Whereas the offense necessarily brings separation (as both punishment for the offender 
and an example and preventative measure for the other monks), satisfaction brings 
pardon, reconciliation and restoration.  In this case, satisfaction is used broadly, without 
any detailed information concerning what constitutes satisfaction.  Presumably, that is 
left up to the abbot or someone else designated for the purpose of disciplining the 
monk(s).  The only qualification or specification in this case is the word “congrua,” 
which indicates that the satisfaction must be consistent or proportional with the offense in 
question.42  Otherwise, pardon (“veniam”) does not follow without satisfaction.   
In the RB, chapters 43-45 contain the bulk of the instances of satisfaction.  Here, 
the context is the correction of offenses committed with regard to the work of God (“opus 
Dei”).  In this context, there is a clear order of punishment/separation, satisfaction, then 
restoration:  
Quod si quis in nocturnis vigiliis post gloriam psalmi nonagesimi quarti, 
quem propter hoc omnino subtrahendo et morose volumus dici, occurrerit, 
non stet in ordine suo in choro, sed ultimus omnium stet aut in loco quem 
talibus neglegentibus seorsum constituerit abbas, ut videantur ab ipso vel 
ab omnibus, usque dum completo opere Dei publica satisfactione 
paeniteat.  Ideo autem eos in ultimo aut seorsum iudicavimus debere stare 
ut, visi ab omnibus, vel pro ipsa verecundia sua emendent…43 
 
 
41 Saint Benedict, Rb 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict in Latin and English with Notes, trans. Timothy Fry 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1981)., 24.4-7 (220).   
42 This appears to coincide with Anselm’s use of “conveniens” to describe the fittingness of satisfaction.  
While “congrua” refers more to proportionality, Anselm expands on the same idea with his use of 
fittingness to express less quantitative and more qualitative consistency.    
43 Benedict, Rule of St. Benedict., 43.4-7 (242-244).   
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The dual purpose of the punishment is clear here: a public example for other monks (“ut 
videantur ab ipso vel ab omnibus”)44 and to bring shame and correction to the offender 
(“visi ab omnibus, vel pro ipsa verecundia sua emendent”).  However, the primary 
purpose is the correction of the offender, since being made a public example in the sight 
of all other members of the community is intended to increase the shame that should 
drive the offender to correct his ways.  Even if, for whatever reason, punishment or 
correction is not prescribed, pardon must be given as a replacement and satisfaction must 
still follow: “…nisi forte abbas licentiam dederit remissione sua, ita tamen ut satisfaciat 
reus ex hoc.”45  Correction (whether in the form of punishment or pardon) is clearly a 
necessary precursor to satisfaction.   
The RB specifically highlights prostration as one form of correction leading to 
satisfaction in chapter 44: “Qui pro gravibus culpis ab oratorio et a mensa 
excommunicantur, hora qua opus Dei in oratorio percelebratur, ante fores oratorii 
prostratus iaceat nihil dicens, nisi tantum posito in terra capite, stratus pronus omnium 
de oratorio exeuntium pedibus; et hoc tamdiu faciat usque dum abbas iudicaverit 
satisfactum esse.”46  In addition to prostration at the oratory entrance, prostration at the 
feet of the abbot and prostration at the place of work are mentioned as possible elements 
of satisfaction.  In this section, the key to the nature of the satisfaction is the judgment of 
the abbot.  Prostration in the oratory is to be done “…usque dum abbas iudicaverit 
satisfactum esse” and prostration at the place of work occurs “usque dum ei iubeat iterum 
 
44 It is important to note that the process of satisfaction is effective not only for the one who committed the 
offense, but also for the surrounding community.  While some critics of Anselm draw a correlation to the 
punishment of an individual, it is clear even in the small role that punishment plays for Anselm that his 
influence is a process of correction in the context of community and not one offender being 
punished/corrected in a vacuum.   
45 Benedict, Rule of St. Benedict., 43.11-12 (244).   
46 Ibid., 44.1-3 (244).   
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abbas ut quiescat iam ab hac satisfactione.”47  The extent of the actions that lead to and 
accomplish satisfaction is subject to the judgment of the abbot.  The abbot has the 
freedom to vary the corrective actions to more or less extents depending on the 
magnitude of the offense involved: “Qui vero pro levibus culpis excommunicantur 
tantum a mensa, in oratorio satisfaciant usque ad iussionem abbatis; hoc perficiant 
usque dum benedicat et dicat: Sufficit.”48  In this case, the extent of the corrective action 
is temporally based: the same action is performed longer for greater offenses.  The RB 
gives a great deal of freedom to the authority figure involved (the abbot, in this case) to 
judge what form and to what degree the actions taken for satisfaction should be, even 
allowing for complete pardon.   
Potential Influence of the RB on Anselm and the CDH 
If nothing else, the RB would have provided a relevant comparator for Anselm’s 
use of satisfaction in the CDH.  However, considering the influence that it held over the 
daily lives of Anselm and his audience (either current monks or people who had spent 
time in a monastic setting), Anselm’s usage would have certainly brought to mind 
monastic satisfaction and perhaps even personal experiences in which they made 
satisfaction for offenses or imposed correction on others in order for satisfaction to be 
made.  When Anselm discussed how heavy the weight of sin is in Book I, Chapter 21, the 
minds of Anselm and his readers would have easily made the connection to the weight of 
an offense in a monastic context.  It would have been clear to the audience that the sin of 
humanity went far beyond any sin that was anticipated in the RB.  When the discussion 
turned to how the life of Christ was recompense paid to God for the sins of mankind, a 
 
47 See above citation and Ibid., 44.8 (246).   
48 Ibid., 44.9-10 (246).   
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connection would have been easily made with the corrective actions necessary to make 
satisfaction in the RB.  What Christ did went far beyond any number of prostrations or 
other corrective actions at the disposal of an abbot in the monastic life envisioned by the 
RB.  Anselm’s lengthy characterization of the weight of the offense and the payment 
made for sin served to highlight (albeit implicitly) that the initial sin of humanity had far-
reaching implications, beyond the scope of human categories of righteousness and 
justice.  The RB provided a tool for the abbot to make judgments based on divine 
example, even though the scopes were clearly far apart.   
Here is where the primary difference is found, though: the degree to which the 
corrective actions provided satisfaction relative to the magnitude of the offense was to be 
judged by the abbot, according to the RB.  This was necessary for the monastic context, 
since there was obviously a wide variety of offenses, so a wide variety of punishments 
was needed to fit the crimes.  However, the CDH deals with one “crime” only.  In the 
monastic context, the first task would have been to separate the offender and assess the 
magnitude of the offense.  So, in the CDH, humanity was separated from eternal life by 
sin and Anselm weighed the magnitude of sin against the One offended.  So, the 
magnitude of the offense was considered to be immeasurably large, in accordance with 
the fact that it was God who was offended by sin.  Much like the discussion in chapters 
43 and 44 of the RB, Anselm weighs the potential means of satisfaction, including 
pardon.49  Still, the circumstances of the initial sin of humanity dictated that the only one 
to judge the nature and magnitude of the sin is God.  Further, God, as the offended party, 
determined that the corrective action must be equivalent to His own nature and His honor 
 
49 See CDH Book I, Chapters 12-15.   
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that were offended by sin.  An offender in the monastic context sinned primarily against 
the rule (and, by extension, God) and the abbot (using the rule as a reference or starting 
point) determined the corrective action.  The rule served as both a mediator and third-
party in the monastic context.  It provided an objective standard of right and wrong and 
provided guidelines, if not specifications, for punishments relative to offenses committed.  
This was fitting for the context, but this is not the context of the sin of humanity and, 
likewise, this is not the context of the satisfaction for that sin.  There was no third-party 
rule or abbot to stand in for the judgment of God.  This returns the discussion to the idea 
of the direct relationship between God and humanity.  Satisfaction has a defined role in 
the context of that relationship and any other use of the term must carry with it the 
qualification that it is out of context.  While some of the earlier-identified key elements of 
satisfaction are present in both contexts (proportionality, fittingness, etc.), the purpose 
and mechanism of satisfaction are clearly different.   
In the RB, the goal of satisfaction is to reintegrate the offender into the 
community in such a way that both the offender and the community will recognize that 
appropriate corrective measures have been taken.  At the end of the process, though, the 
status quo is the same as it was before the offense.  While the state of human beings in 
the beatific vision is comparable to the original created state (without sin), the two are by 
no means identical.  The end of the Incarnation and Atonement is eternal rest in the 
goodness of God and the perfection of the original creation.  The end of the corrective 
process in the RB is the restoration of the offender to his prior standing in the 
community.  The offender could easily (and would likely) offend again in some way.  
Satisfaction in the RB is limited to the earthly, human sphere of the monastic life with no 
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direct impact on the spiritual realm (other than the merit of obedience and righteousness).  
The lofty goal of the satisfaction involved in the CDH presses the idea of satisfaction to 
the highest and ultimate extent.  The satisfaction involved is satisfaction once and for all, 
without any exception or qualification.  There is no possibility for reversal or repetition 
since the end state is eternal.  Anselmian satisfaction is satisfaction in its fullest and 
perfect form.  The satisfaction described in the RB is an imperfect instantiation of the 
ideal satisfaction that Anselm endeavored to describe in the CDH.  Since the RB was 
temporally prior to the CDH, Anselm may be best viewed as perhaps attempting to 
reverse-engineer the system of satisfaction he knew through the RB to capture the pure 
satisfaction that is appropriate for the salvation of humanity.  However, Anselm himself 
would have likely considered his own work to draw upon scripture and first principles 
and not directly from the RB, since he would have viewed the RB as drawing upon those 
same sources.50   
The Rule of Benedict provides a clearly influential analogue for Anselm’s use of 
satisfaction in the CDH.  It should be understood, though, that Anselm lays out a broader 
and significantly different context for his own usage.  While the RB would have held a 
significant influence over Anselm’s understanding of satisfaction, Anselm attempted to 
use the term in a way that transcended the usage in the RB.  Anselm had a higher and 
broader purpose in mind in the CDH: the salvation of humanity is a far cry from the order 
of a monastic community.  Apart from the differences of scope (and perhaps a result 
thereof), the monastic context of the RB involves different persons in the satisfaction 
process.  The abbot plays a role in judging the amount of corrective action needed.  In 
 
50 The scriptural foundation for satisfaction will be examined in a later portion of this chapter.   
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this case, the abbot does not quite stand in for God, since the abbot himself is not also the 
offended party (rather, the offense is committed against the rule and, by extension, God).  
This is the most delicate area of comparison, since critics of Anselm tend to compare the 
corrective actions involved in satisfaction to imperfect instances in human communities.  
The monastic community is a natural comparator, but Anselm evidently wanted to reach 
beyond the comparators to establish an ideal image of satisfaction.  He did so by 
considering and rejecting as imperfect some elements of the satisfaction process in the 
RB (pardon, quantitative punishment, etc.).  In the end, Anselm was attempting to convey 
an idea of satisfaction that would have resonated with people familiar with the RB, but 
would have been noticeably different.  I would contend that Anselm used those 
differences to emphasize the incomprehensibly greater gravity and scope of the salvific 
work carried out by the God-man in the CDH.   
Scripture and Satisfaction 
Even though the word “satisfaction” does not occur in any passage in the Bible 
that deals with the Incarnation or Atonement,51 I argue that Anselm used Biblical 
concepts in developing his usage of the term.  Ultimately, Anselm would not agree that 
the ideas conveyed by satisfaction in the CDH were extra-Biblical or, as some critics 
have contended, contrary to Biblical models for human salvation.52  John McIntyre offers 
a helpful way of thinking about Anselm’s use of satisfaction in contrast to the approach 
of many critics: 
 
51 The instances of variants of “satisfactio” in the Vulgate edition of the Bible deal are found in mundane 
contexts in which the term is used mostly to refer to an answer of some sort.  See the discussion earlier in 
this chapter of I Peter 3:15.   
52 There are numerous examples of this in the 19th and 20th centuries, but for a particularly recent and 
pointed example, see Daniel Saunders, "A Theological Assessment of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo," 
Churchman 123, no. 2 (2009). 
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St. Anselm’s procedure in the Cur Deus Homo is not: Given an a priori 
idea of satisfaction, God must do so-and-so and do such-and-such in order 
to save fallen mankind; but rather: Given that God’s attributes are mercy, 
justice, righteousness, omnipotence, love and (if we may for the present 
call it an attribute) aseitas, then He will save mankind in a manner which 
is not only conformable to these attributes but, in fact, is more completely 
expressive of them than any other event in the whole history of the 
relations of God and man, namely, by means of a satisfaction offered by 
Himself.53   
 
I would like to adapt that procedure in this section by examining Anselm’s use of 
scripture with regard to the ideas of honor, justice and debt that inform his usage of 
satisfaction.  David Neelands has pointed to Anselm’s use of Matthew 6:12 as a 
scriptural basis for his discussion of “debt.”54  As discussed earlier in this work on the 
topic of “debt,” I argue that Jesus’ approach to “debt” in this passage indicates both the 
nature of debt and owing and the nature of the relationship between God and humans.  
Human forgiveness ought to follow as an imitation of divine forgiveness of the debt of 
sin.  This reference, coupled with the universality of human sin as expressed in Romans 
3:23, indicates that a debt must be paid on behalf of all humanity.  Romans 3:23 also 
characterizes the effect of sin on the relationship between humanity and God: all humans 
lack the “gloria” of God.  I take this to be indicative of a disruption of the honor 
relationship, as I have articulated it in the earlier chapter on “honor.”  The failure of 
humanity to render honor to God brings with it a separation from the honor or glory of 
 
53 McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo., 89.   
54 David Neelands, "Substitution and the Biblical Background to Cur Deus Homo," The Saint Anselm 
Journal 2, no. 2 (2005)., 83.   
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God.  This separation runs contrary to the will of God in creation, though, since God 
created human beings to fill out the complement of heavenly beings.55   
Given this scriptural background, it would have been natural for Anselm to 
believe that he had a scriptural warrant for his understanding of satisfaction.  All human 
beings had been separated from God by sin and were in need of reconciliation with God 
through salvation.  To Anselm, the universality of sin required a form of satisfaction that 
provided for universal human salvation (though certainly without any guarantee of such).  
Thus, I argue that the salvation of humanity via a system of satisfaction would have 
matched up with the scriptural story of Jesus Christ saving humanity from sin through 
His death, burial and resurrection. This can be seen in part by examining a number of 
passages in the book of Hebrews that align closely to Anselm’s views in the CDH even 
though he did not reference them directly and Schmitt did not reference them in his 
critical edition.  There are some points that are nearly identical: human participation in 
salvation through obedience (Hebrews 5:9), the necessity of the death of the God-man for 
redemption (Hebrews 9:15-16), the one act of the God-man is sufficient for all (Hebrews 
9:12, 25-26). 56  This would have been the “doing enough” and meeting the need of 
humanity that satisfaction aims to accomplish, in Anselm’s view.  Although the exact 
language and details of his argument are not all directly identifiable in scripture, Anselm 
seems to be on solid scriptural ground for the building blocks that make up his argument 
that culminates in his concept of satisfaction.   
 
55 See CDH Book I, Chapters 16-18.  As I have mentioned earlier, Anselm does not seem to have direct 
scriptural evidence for this, but he proceeds as if he does (and it could probably be developed by pulling a 
number of scriptural passages together).   
56 I am grateful to personal conversation with David Neelands and the discussion following Neelands’ 
paper at the Second Saint Anselm Conference at Saint Anselm College in April 2002 for the identification 
of some of these references.     
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The Place of Satisfaction in Anselm’s Scheme 
Interpreters of Anselm are correct to highlight satisfaction as the overriding theme 
of the Cur Deus Homo.  However, it has been the purpose of this chapter to emphasize 
that this must be done in concert with a proper understanding of what Anselm meant by 
satisfaction.  It is not enough to merely look to Anselm’s own social context or a reader’s 
own 21st century context to establish a working meaning of satisfaction.  Instead, I argue 
that Anselm’s influences and the broader purpose of his work in the CDH play key roles 
in the way that Anselm used the term.  It is clear from Anselm’s usage in the CDH that he 
was not merely appropriating a legal term in the manner of Tertullian.  Nor was he 
borrowing a term from the feudal social context of the world outside of his monastic life.  
Rather, just as his goal in the CDH was to present a refined argument for the necessity of 
the Incarnation of the God-man, he employed a refined usage of satisfaction that stripped 
away the imperfections of even the familiar monastic usage and conformed to the 
structure of scripture and first principles upon which he based his entire argument.  The 
CDH, then, does not represent a poisoning of Atonement theology with feudal verbiage.  
Instead, it represents a refinement and appropriation of the most suitable language to 
describe the Incarnation of the God-man, without concern for imperfect or improper uses 
of the language.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
In the Cur Deus Homo, Anselm attempted to cast a wide net in his discussion of a 
narrow topic.  The criticism leveled at this work has charged that not only did Anselm 
fail to accomplish his stated goals, but also that the goals themselves were improperly set.  
In the preceding chapters I have endeavored to show that Anselm was consistent with his 
own philosophical system and came to a reasonable conclusion that stands the test of both 
logic and time.  While some critics have claimed that he improperly applied the concepts 
and terminology of feudal society to the central doctrine of Christian theology, I have 
argued that his use of “honor,” “justice,” “debt” and “satisfaction” was an approach that 
guided him through his argument in a way that was consistent with scripture and 
tradition.  Further, Anselm was not alone in the steps of his process or in the conclusion 
he reached.  In this final chapter, I hope to bring together the points made in the 
individual preceding topical chapters in order to evaluate Anselm’s work as a whole in 
the CDH.   
There are three principles (of a theological/methodological nature) that were 
employed by Anselm and stand against the assertions of critics who contend that Anselm 
improperly applied concepts based in feudal society at key points in his argument:  
1) The relationship between God and humanity was established at creation and all 
activity between the two must be compatible with that relationship 
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2) God acts in accordance with His divine nature 
3) God’s perfect activity cannot be compromised, marred or somehow left 
unfinished.   
These principles have been outlined at various points in previous chapters of this work 
and now I wish to draw them together to show how they fit into the comprehensive 
picture of Anselm’s methodology.  In each case, I will show how Anselm drew upon 
scriptural and Patristic sources in the ways that he incorporated these principles into his 
theological standpoint.  I will then point out the specific criticisms that are answered by 
each theological principle in order to draw out a unique perspective on what Anselm was 
trying to accomplish in the CDH.  Finally, I will evaluate the successes and shortcomings 
in Anselm’s approach and point the way toward further steps in fully understanding the 
CDH and the positive ways that Anselm did include imagery from feudal society in his 
work.   
Divine-Human Relationship 
The reason that I examined honor as the first example of Anselm’s language is 
that his entire argument is based on the relationship between God and humanity that was 
established at the creation of all things.  For Anselm, this represented a strong and easily 
accessible foundation for discussion with non-Christian unbelievers.  Anselm unpacked 
the concepts that he viewed as implicit in the nature of creation (given the nature of God 
and the nature of created beings) and used “honor” to express the structure of relationship 
that was established necessarily when God created things that existed apart from God 
Himself.  Anselm considered this to be an elementary idea, even though it played an 
important role in the development of his argument.  However, this is likely the idea that is 
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most often confused with a concept derived from feudal society.  The difference is that 
the relationship between Creator and creation reflects the perfect order of the universe 
and the balanced nature of the relationship must be maintained out of necessity.  The 
feudal relationship between lord and servant may reflect a societal order, but it is an 
imperfect order that does not need to be maintained out of necessity.  Anselm was very 
clear on the distinction between God and all that was not God and he would not have 
confused or conflated the two types of relationship.   
Divine Consistency 
The simple idea that God acts in accordance with His divine nature may seem 
elementary, but it is crucial to properly understanding Anselm’s logic in the CDH.  While 
some critics may find fault with Anselm for his frequent use of the principle of justice, it 
would have been incomprehensible to Anselm for God to compromise justice in any way 
since, as was explained in chapter three, God is Justice in the same way that God is Love, 
Mercy, Goodness, etc.  Anselm made this point in the Monologion and McIntyre spent 
most of his book on Anselm articulating the consistency of divine activity with regard to 
the specific principle of divine aseity.1  This has been explained in detail earlier, but it is 
worth a repeated emphasis: the idea that God would somehow compromise one divine 
principle for the sake of another in some modern or even post-modern narrative in which 
mercy defeats justice would have been incomprehensible to Anselm and one should not 
expect that he would have considered this.  He clearly addressed this in book I, chapter 
12 and perhaps it is this direct rejection that bothers critics so much.  In Anselm’s works 
in general and the CDH in particular, there is a certainty that the perfect nature of God 
 
1 John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh,: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1954). 
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can and should be carried forward to all logical conclusions, even in the face of the most 
difficult challenges.  This is clear in his explanation (and later defense) of his ontological 
argument and especially in the CDH.  “Justice” and “necessity,” then, should not be taken 
as indications that Anselm portrayed God as an unflinching enforcer of the rule of law, 
but rather they should be understood as Anselmian expressions of divine consistency.  
This divine consistency does not mean that punishment, violence, etc. are part of God’s 
plan…just the opposite, in fact.  In spite of sin and the seeming condemnation of 
humanity that would accompany it (by human law and logic), Anselm argues that God’s 
benevolent plan for creation wins out in the end.  The goodness of God reigns supreme, 
even if events that occur in the interim may seem difficult to reconcile with divine 
goodness.   
Perfect Divine Activity 
This emphasis on the consistency of the perfect divine nature leads to the next 
point in a straightforward way: the activity of God is perfect and cannot be compromised 
in any way, even if it may appear that way from a limited (particularly human) 
perspective.  Again, Anselm addressed this issue directly in book I, chapters 13 through 
15 using the example of divine honor.  He was forced to address it since his argument 
depended on both the ideas that sin marked a violation of the honor of God and that the 
honor of God cannot be violated.  Sin was a problem for God that must have had a 
resolution of necessity.  Anselm argues that the God-man was that necessary answer and 
that it was, accordingly, part of the same divine action as was the creation of all things.  
At times, this involves agreement by the audience with Anselm on his view of the 
eternity of God, but this was an assumption that he apparently felt that theistic 
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unbelievers would be willing to make.2  This would have been a safe assumption, 
considering he was responding to supposed charges that the doctrine of the God-man is 
unfitting for a perfect God.  A perfect God would not change and would not engage in 
any activity that is incomplete or inconsistent.  Anselm took his opponents’ concern for 
consistency and turned it into a situation in which the burden of proof is placed on those 
valuing consistency to show that God could consistently ordain and carry out human 
existence in light of the condition of sin without entering the world à la the God-man.   
These three principles that I would argue are hallmarks of Anselm’s theology both 
as a whole and in the CDH are not simply medieval but are shared with, if not 
inaugurated and established by, patristic theology.  Anselm’s language in the CDH was 
consistent with these principles and part of the unique way that he expressed those 
principles so that they would be accessible to his audience.  It is not difficult to find 
evidence that these principles were fundamental to patristic theology and Athanasius is, 
perhaps, the best case for this.  Anatolios characterized Athanasius as desiring “to show 
that the fact of the incarnation is consistent with who God is, and with God’s general way 
of relating to creation from the beginning.”3  In the introduction to a translation of 
Athanasius’ DI, Edward R. Hardy noted Athanasius’ desire to counter Arian views on the 
divinity of Christ and so he emphasized the full divinity in the Incarnation: “In On the 
Incarnation and the early Nicene controversy Athanasius stood for the true deity of the 
                                                 
2 These unbelievers would presumably be Jews and/or Muslims.  There was a strong tradition of Platonism 
(which would be the mostly likely source – via Augustine – for Anselm’s view of eternity) among both 
Jews and Muslims.   
3 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought (London: Routledge, 1998)., 39.   
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divinity of Christ.”4  There was clearly a focus not only on the divine power of the God-
man, but also on the effectiveness of the work of God in the world.  Athanasius made this 
explicit in chapter 6 with his comparison of God to a worker or artist whose work must 
be completed and maintained without corruption: “…it would have been especially 
improper that the handiwork of God in mankind should come to nought, either through 
their neglect, or through the deceit of demons.”5   Athanasius clearly followed these same 
principles found in the CDH throughout his Christological work.6  It has been well-noted 
already that Anselm owes much of his theological foundation to Augustine (and his 
Christian neo-Platonic approach to theology).  Augustine incorporated these three 
principles in his own work on innumerable occasions, but one place in which they all 
come together is in the Confessions at the end of book ten and the beginning of book 
eleven.  Augustine here works “backward” from the redemption of humanity by Christ 
and then turns to Creation and the perfection of God.   
In this light, I argue that it is difficult, if not simply wrong, to pursue the claim 
that Anselm’s approach in the CDH was different from that of the church fathers in the 
patristic era.7  Therefore, I contend that Anselm’s language in the CDH should be 
understood as an aspect of the ingenuity of his work and not as a failing thereof.  
Although this may not be obvious from a prima facie reading of his work, a serious and 
                                                 
4 Edward Rochie Hardy, Christology of the Later Fathers, The Library of Christian Classics ; V. 3 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954)., 49.   
5 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. Henry Chadwick, trans. Robert W. Thomson, 
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)., 149 (DI 6).   
6 In addition to De Incarnatione…, see his Orationes Contra Arianos.   
7 For those who place importance on the distinction, I would argue that Anselm is consistent with both 
Eastern and Western church fathers.  He was clearly influenced by the Western church as the context in 
which he was trained.  Although Gasper’s work has pushed (or perhaps established) the limits on scholarly 
speculation concerning possible Eastern influences on Anselm, I would argue that his work and the 
comparative work done previously here is enough to show that Anselm’s work in the CDH is also 
consistent with that of the Eastern church fathers.    
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thorough investigation of Anselm and his approach to theology should make this clear.  
While previous interpreters of Anselm have engaged Anselm’s work in the CDH in 
detailed interpretive works, too many have failed to consider the aforementioned 
principles that guided Anselm’s theological method.  It is my hope that this work will 
prompt further consideration and discussion of Anselm’s teaching in the CDH and lead to 
a renewed appreciation for a theologian who was able to integrate traditional Christian 
theological principles into a discussion of contemporary issues.   
Anselm and Feudal Language 
While I maintain that the language that Anselm used in the CDH can be 
interpreted as representative of a Biblical and Patristic approach to the subject at hand, 
there is no question that Anselm attempted to invoke some feudal imagery.  The only 
question is to what extent he did this and how important it was for his argument.  The 
clearest example of such imagery is the parable of the king and the sinful city in book II, 
chapter 16.8  Anselm’s explanation of how a larger group of people can participate in 
reconciliation that has been brought about through the righteousness of one individual 
appears to be a story plucked out of feudal society and filled with contingent claims (like 
the king choosing to allow future pardons on the basis of the one reconciliation).  
However, it clearly appears after Anselm’s argument has been made logically complete 
and, in the words of Southern, this parable (“similitudinem”) and other similar passages 
in the CDH illustrate principles “from the facts of everyday life.  They are 
 
8 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson, 1938)., CDH lib. II, cap. 16 (II, 118-119).   
 186 Ch. 6 
                                                
complementary expressions of Anselm’s argument.”9  They are complementary to the 
argument, but they are not fundamental parts thereof.  If anything, Anselm used similar 
passages and language intentionally to make his work more accessible to a wider 
audience.  He would have been conscious of the potentially greater reach of his work as 
archbishop compared to his influence as a monk or even abbot of Bec.  Further, if we 
take Anselm seriously that he aspired to reach out to the “unbelievers,” it is reasonable to 
think that he may have sought more common ground than the shared theological 
principles of Jews and Christians (and perhaps even Muslims).  He may have considered 
Feudalism and feudal language to be a commonly understood source for similes and 
parables in order to communicate his argument effectively.  I hope that I have shown that 
the instances of supposedly feudal language that appear in the heart of Anselm’s 
argument constitute a clearly different usage.  At those points, he was not seeking to 
illustrate but to build a sound argument.  Anselm’s theological training and impulses 
would have dictated that he choose language that was consistent with biblical and 
patristic tradition in those cases and leave the social and cultural illustrations for a 
different section.  I contend that is precisely the explanation for the way that Anselm used 
language that was evocative of feudal society in the CDH.   
Biblical Atonement 
In the interest of a balanced perspective on Anselm’s work in the CDH, it is 
important to point out the ways in which Anselm’s language did not convey all aspects of 
the Incarnation that are present in scripture and tradition.  While, as Rogers has pointed 
 
9 R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought, 1059-1130, 
The Birkbeck Lectures, 1959 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963)., 114.   
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out,10 Anselm’s language has clear scriptural precedent, there are some scriptural themes 
that do not clearly fit into Anselm’s scheme in the CDH.  For example, the idea of 
humanity being reconciled to God via the blood of Christ is not found in Anselm’s work.  
This is clearly an important motif not only within sacramental theology but also within 
the theology of the New Testament, particularly as expressed by Paul (in Romans 5, for 
instance).  As mentioned earlier, Anselm intentionally focused on high-level issues 
involved in the Incarnation and Atonement and in this case, the closest he came was to 
discuss the necessity of the death of Christ.  While it may be said that the motif of the 
blood of Christ in the New Testament may be easily replaced by discussing the death of 
Christ, it would be a neglectful hermeneutical approach to conflate the two.  There are 
too many passages of scripture and too many layers of meaning involved with the idea of 
the blood to equate it with the death of Christ, so this seems to be a clear area in which 
Anselm’s work in the CDH is not comprehensive.  The degree to which this constitutes a 
failing on Anselm’s part depends on one’s own theological perspective, though.  A 
similar detail to which Anselm pays little attention is the role of the resurrection.  It is 
mentioned only in passing in the discussion of the way in which human salvation results 
from the death of the God-man (in book II, chapter 19).  The resurrection seems to be 
relegated to an unspoken assumption that life could not be brought back to humanity 
without the resurrection of the God-man.  It is possible that Anselm avoided discussion of 
the resurrection since this topic lies at the heart of devil-ransom theology.  According to 
the latter, the resurrection represents the triumph of Christ over the devil and marks the 
 
10 Katherin A. Rogers, "A Defense of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo Argument," in Philosophical Theology: 
Reason and Theological Doctrine, ed. Michael Baur, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association (Bronx, NY: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2001)., 197.   
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release of humanity from the control of the devil.  Since Anselm directly rejected this 
interpretation of the Incarnation and Atonement, it is likely that he would not have been 
interested in drawing unnecessary attention to the core tenet of the opposing redemption 
theory.    
Final Assessment 
The real genius and importance of Anselm’s work was that he managed to explain 
the central tenet of Christian theology in a way that simultaneously embraced scripture 
and tradition along with the most progressive philosophical and social perspectives of his 
time.  All of these issues come together in the language that he used to express his ideas 
in the CDH.  Anselm’s use of terms such as “honor,” “justice,” “debt” and “satisfaction” 
allowed him to convey a traditional doctrine in an approach that was innovative and in 
language that was accessible to the widest possible audience of his day.  In the case of 
each term, where some critics have found faulty theological language, I have tried to 
point out that Anselm successfully uses his language to point his audience to high-level 
theological issues that would justify the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, even to 
some non-Christians.  Instead of a system of hierarchical obligations, I have argued that 
Anselm used “honor” to express the mutual relationship of love between God and 
humanity.  Instead of proceeding according to strict legal rules, I have argued that 
Anselm’s use of “justice” was indicative of an emphasis on the goodness and consistency 
of God.  Instead of reducing the core of Christian dogma to a financial transaction, I have 
argued that Anselm used “debt” in a complex and comprehensive way to illustrate the 
order of creation and the sovereignty of God.  Instead of representing a heartless God 
with offended sensibilities, I have argued that Anselm used “satisfaction” to express the 
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wholeness of divine action and need for a resolution to all things that reflects the 
goodness of God. While some members of his audience over the years have taken him up 
on his offer to receive “correctionem,” I would contend that many of those who have 
done so have not thoroughly considered “si rationabiliter fit.”11  Anselm was too brilliant 
a thinker, too careful a writer to have unwittingly or indiscriminately incorporated 
language drawn from feudal society that would have compromised the biblical and 
patristic traditions that he held in such high regard.  Instead, I argue that he used the 
language that has drawn so much scrutiny in an intentional way to draw the issue at hand 
into the contemporary arena in order to demonstrate the fittingness and greatness of 
Christian theology.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Anselm of Canterbury, Opera Omnia., CDH lib. II, cap. 22 (II, 133).   
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Appendix A 
 
Terminology Usage in the CDH 
 
This appendix lists the occurrences of the terms examined in this dissertation in 
the Latin text of the Cur Deus Homo found in F.S. Schmitt’s critical edition.  Attempts 
have been made to catalogue every reasonable variant of honor, iustitia, debitum and 
satisfactio.  This includes privative and oppositional prefixes along with verbal and 
nominal forms.   
 
 
Term =  Word from the text of the Cur Deus Homo 
 
CDH =  Location in the Cur Deus Homo (Book.Chapter) 
 
Schmitt =  Location in F.S. Schmitt’s Opera Omnia, Volume 2 (Page:Line) 
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Appendix B 
Scripture References in the CDH 
 
F.S. Schmitt tracked a number of references to scripture in the CDH and this 
appendix contains a listing of those references.   
 
 
Reference =  Scripture Location (Book Chapter:Verse – References to Psalms are 
according to the LXX numbering) 
 
CDH =  Location in the Cur Deus Homo (Book.Chapter; P = Prologue) 
 
Schmitt =  Location in F.S. Schmitt’s Opera Omnia, Volume 2 (Page:Line) 
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Old Testament 
   
Deuteronomy 32:8 I.18 81:31-32 
Deuteronomy 32:8 I.18 82:17-19 
Job 14:5  P 40:3 
Psalm 35:11  I.11 68:16 
Psalm 35:7-8  I.24 94:11-12 
Psalm 44:3  I.1 49:18 
Psalm 50:7  I.22 90:24 
Psalm 50:7  II.16 116:22 
Psalm 65:20  II.6 101:20 
Psalm 77:39  I.7 58:11 
Psalm 109:7  I.9 62:19 
Ecclesiastes 3:22 I.1 48:25-26 
Isaiah 53:7  I.10 66:9 
Isaiah 53:7  II.17 124:27 
Ezekiel 18:22  I.20 88:2 
Ezekiel 18:27  I.20 88:1-2 
Ezekiel 33:16  I.20 88:2 
 
Apocrypha 
 
Baruk 3:38  II.11 111:31-32 
  
New Testament 
  
Matthew 3:17  I.8 60:3-4 
Matthew 6:12  I.12 69:31-32 
Matthew 6:12  I.19 86:1 
Matthew 7:12  I.20 87:15-17 
Matthew 10:8  I.1 49:5 
Matthew 26:39 I.8 60:23-24 
Matthew 26:39 I.9 63:25-26 
Matthew 26:42 I.8 60:25 
Matthew 26:42 I.9 63:27 
Luke 2:52  I.9 63:14 
Luke 6:48  II.19 131:10-12 
Luke 10:22  I.9 62:22-23 
Luke 20:36  I.5 52:22 
John 6:38  I.8 60:20-21 
John 6:38  I.9 63:17-18 
John 6:44  I.10 65:1 
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New Testament (Cont.) 
 
John 6:71  I.18 83:10 
John 7:16  I.9 63:18 
John 8:34  I.7 58:11 
John 8:44  II.21 132:23 
John 8:55  II.10 106:24-25 
John 10:17  I.10 66:9-12 
John 10:17  II.11 110:1 
John 14:31  I.8 60:22 
John 14:31  I.9 62:10 
John 14:31  I.9 64:10 
John 14:31  I.10 64:15-16 
John 14:31  I.10 65:9-10 
John 16:15  I.9 62:23 
John 18:11  I.8 60:22-23 
John 18:11  I.9 62:11 
John 18:11  I.9 64:10-11 
John 18:11  I.10 64:16 
John 18:11  I.10 65:9-10 
John 18:11  I.10 66:1 
Acts 10:35  I.18 78:30 
Romans 5:12  II.16 116:23-24 
Romans 5:19   I.3 51:5-7 
Romans 8:32  I.8 60:19-20 
Romans 8:32  I.9 63:23-24 
Romans 8:32  I.10 64:16-17 
Romans 8:32  I.10 65:11-12 
Romans 8:32  I.10 65:13 
Romans 12:19  I.12 70:3 
1 Corinthians 2:8 II.15 115:12-13 
1 Corinthians 15:42 II.11 109:11 
2 Corinthians 4:4 II.9 105:25 
2 Corinthians 9:7 I.16 74:17 
Galatians 5:6  I.20 87:30 
Ephesians 2:4  I.25 94:27-28 
Philippians 2:8 I.8 60:17-18 
Philippians 2:8 I.9 62:11-12 
Philippians 2:8 I.9 64:11 
Philippians 2:8 I.10 64:17-18 
Philippians 2:8 I.10 65:15 
Philippians 2:9 I.9 62:17-18 
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New Testament (Cont.) 
 
Colossians 1:15 II.9 105:25 
Colossians 2:14 I.7 58:1 
Hebrews 4:15  II.11 111:26-27 
Hebrews 5:8  I.8 60:18-19 
Hebrews 5:8  I.10 64:18 
Hebrews 5:8  I.10 65:16 
James 1:17  I.10 64:21-22 
1 Peter 3:15   I.1 47:10-11 
2 Peter 3:13  I.18 79:28 
Apocalypse 21:1 I.18 79:28  
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